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PREFACE
Historical investigation is a self-justifying effort. 
The discovery of the forgotten event or a different view of 
a circumstance or condition contributes to the total body of 
knowledge and needs no further defense. However, in this 
instance, there is a benefit in briefly tracing the rumina­
tions that lead to this particular study. In short, the 
historical significance of the post-World War II American- 
Malayan relationship is hardly self-evident. The obvious 
questions: why this subject and wherein lies the value?
The long, tortuous involvement of the United States 
of America in what can be called, in an extended sense, the 
Indochina Wars, has precipitated a fascination in the story 
of America's post-World War II involvement in Southeast 
Asia. In the main, the objective has been to fathom the 
root causes for the American travail of the Sixties and 
Seventies in Vietnam, Laos', and Cambodia. Understandably, 
the retrospective efforts proceed with a singleness of
-'-The term, Southeast Asia, is used throughout in the 
contemporary context. It apparently first came into use 
during World War II; e.g., the creation of a South-East 
Asian Command (SEAC) in 1943. Prior to the war, the British 
commonly referred to the area as part of South Asia; Ameri­
cans usually spoke in terms of the Far East.
reference and emphasis; the subcontinent, Southeast Asia, 
is viewed through the optics of Indochina. As a result, 
terms are often casually interchanged, adding to the concep­
tual muddle; Vietnam is Indochina i£ Southeast Asia. Rarely 
are Southeast Asia or a specific nation outside of Indochina 
subjects in themselves. Often obscured or ignored is the 
fact that in addition to Indochina, Southeast Asia is Burma,
- i
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, an area 
of mainland and island inhabited by diverse people. However, 
the extra-Indochina American experience is often relegated 
to footnote status. The total region and its parts are 
treated only insofar as they are relevant to the American 
involvement in Indochina. This general observation suggested 
a question; does the American-Southeast Asia story change in 
its essentials when viewed from a vantage point other than 
Indochina? Assuming that the Indochina involvement was 
motivated, more or less, by a desire to halt the spread of 
Asian communism, the question can be asked another way.
Does that motive explain American interest, influence, and 
actions elsewhere in Southeast Asia?
Post-World War II British Malaya suggested itself 
as a subject for investigation for several reasons. First, 
the Malayan experience contains elements which presumably 
might have drawn American attention in view of the general 
thrusts of American foreign policy as it took shape during
World War II, and as it evolved in the post-war period. For 
example, Malaya reverted to British colonial status in Sep­
tember 1945 at a time when an accepted tenet of American 
foreign policy favored progress toward independence for 
colonial peoples. Though Great Britain had made a commit­
ment in 1943 to the post-war preparation of Malaya for self- 
government, progress toward that goal was frustrated. The 
first step proved false; the plan for reorganizing Malaya 
into a union of states, initiated in October 1945, drew 
resistance from the very people the British had tradition­
ally sought to protect, the Malays. The second attempt at 
a "first step," the formation of the Federation of Malaya in 
1948, was threatened within months by a savage, insurgent 
communist activism that threatened both the British attempt 
to set Malaya on the path of self-government, and the then 
fragile sense of Malayan nationalism so necessary to an 
achievement of home rule. By that time, the emphasis of 
American foreign policy had shifted from anticolonialism to 
anticommunism.
This study suggests that, although American foreign 
policy addressed itself to both colonialism and communism, 
neither concern adequately explains the American interest 
or influence in regard to Malaya. Malaya's status as a 
British colonial possession was never seriously questioned 
by the United States; therefore, the preparation of Malaya
iv
for self-governing status and the task of meeting the com­
munist threat remained British responsibilities. However, 
America did have an interest; prewar Malaya had been the 
world's largest producer of natural rubber, a material 
needed by both consumer and defense industries. In 1942, 
with the closure of Southeast Asia by the Japanese, ninety 
per cent of the world's rubber-producing capacity had been 
cut off; more than half of that capacity lay within Malaya. 
Under the pressures of war, the United States Government 
built a giant synthetic rubber industry where none had pre­
viously existed, an industrial miracle often described as 
second only to the atom bomb. By 1945, America was produc­
ing rubber at a rate equal to the total prewar world capac­
ity. The implications for the future were obvious. The 
American rubber products manufacturing industry would have 
a national source of supply independent of all foreign areas 
and the American military would never again be threatened 
by the precipitous loss of a strategic material. On the 
other hand, British Malaya ,was economically dependent upon 
the world's rubber markets and America had historically 
constituted half of that market; therefore, the post-war 
recovery of Malaya, the progress toward self-government and, 
after 1948, the survival of Malaya in the rising tide of 
Asian communism would all depend to a large degree upon her 
ability to produce and market rubber.
VThe purpose of this study is twofold: (.1) to
examine the American view of British Malaya at the end of
World War II; and (2) to recount the post-war Malayan expe­
rience and search for the tracks of America's interest and 
influence. Evidence emerges that there were two American 
perceptions of Malaya. The first recognized Malaya as the 
largest producer of natural rubber* In this context, Malaya 
was at once the source of a critical commodity and a poten­
tial threat to an infant, strategic industry. The second
perception hazily distinguished Malaya in the regional con­
text of Southeast Asia, an area beset with confused efforts 
to maintain the colonial systems, and communist efforts to 
subvert both the colonial systems and progress toward non­
communist systems of self-government.
A question persists among students of America's 
Post-World War II foreign affairs: did the United States
have a Far Eastern policy? Writing at the close of the 
Korean War, Edwin 0. Reischauer put the question in the
form of challenge in his work, Wanted: An Asian Policy.^
■ 1
Writing some twelve years later in the midst of deepening
2Edwin 0. Reischauer, Wanted: An Asian Policy (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), pp. 181, 257. For example:
Dr. Reischauer takes issue with both the absence of clear 
policy, and the bankruptcy of policy in evidence; e.g., the 
reluctance of the United States to take the lead in solving 
colonial problems as a matter of policy and the reluctance 
to provide economic aid versus military aid to Asian nations.
vi
American entanglement in Vietnam, Richard S. Kirkendall 
observed that although American post-World War II policy in 
Europe was clear, " . . .  a similar clarity was not to be 
found regarding American interests in the Far East."J As a 
contribution toward an understanding of the condition, this 
study claims value.
The selection of the end-date of the period under 
study requires some explanation. The year 1953 was chosen 
for reasons to be found in events, both in Malaya and the 
United States. By 1953, the British and Malayan forces 
under British leadership had turned the corner in the mili­
tary struggle to contain communist insurgency. Though the 
threat remained for years to come, the heat had gone out of 
what was termed with typical British reserve, "the Emer­
gency." In America, 1953 saw the end of the administration 
of President Harry S. Truman and the stewardship of his 
second term Secretary of State, Dean A. Acheson. Admittedly 
a somewhat arbitrary point in the continuum of American 
foreign affairs, the end of the Truman-Acheson period is
i i
a convenient place to take stock. Though the change in 
American leadership from the Democratic to the Republican 
Party did not result in a major shift in foreign policy, it
3Richard S. Kirkendall, The Truman Period As A 
Research Field (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri
Press, 1967), p. 63.
vii
did reflect the political differences concerning government 
involvement in the business affairs of the Nation. In 195 3, 
the United States Government withdrew from the synthetic 
rubber business.
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CHAPTER I
POST-WAR AMERICAN POLICY DEVELOPMENT:
THE MAINSTREAM
At the time of the Japanese surrender in August 1945, 
the United States Department of State had already settled 
upon a policy of nonintervention in British Malaya.^ How­
ever, that policy cannot be explained in the context of 
Malaya; neither can it be described as an American disposi­
tion toward the peoples of Malaya nor a conscious recogni­
tion of a specifically Malayan condition or circumstance.
It was, rather, a reiteration in the specific of a larger 
decision to follow a noninterventionist course in the 
European colonial areas of Southeast Asia.
The noninterventionist policy of 1945 might suggest 
that there had been a retreat from the earlier American 
policy which had championed the cause of self-government as
lu.S. Department of State, "An Estimate of Condi­
tions in Asia and The Pacific At The End of The War in The 
Far East and The Objectives and Policies of The United 
States" (hereafter cited as "Conditions in Asia and The 
Pacific and Objectives and Policies of The U.S."), Foreign 
Relations of The United States (hereafter cited as FRUSj: 
Diplomatic Paper 1945, Vol. VI , The British Commonwealth 
And The Far East (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1969), pp. 570-573.
2set forth in the United Nations Declaration of January 1942 
which embodied the principle of " . . . the right of all 
people to choose the form of government under which they
ofwill live."2 Although the contrast between the return 
colonialism in 1945 and the democratic ideals of 1942 might 
seem a lightning rod to charges of abandonment, such judg­
ments are neither accurate nor sustainable. The world of 
1945 was a complex place with events moving at breathtaking 
speed. The problems of war were quickly to be replaced by 
the problems of peace, and the purposes of rather heady 
principles set down amidst the urgency of 1942 simply had to 
give way to the realities of the moment. The first priority 
was the conclusion of the war, a priority soon to be re­
placed by the restoration of order to large portions of the 
world which existed in the chaotic vacuums left by the 
defeated axis powers. To a large degree, policy was sub­
jected to the pressures of changing priorities and the rush 
of events. It is more accurate to say that the principles
of 1942 were not consciously, abandoned; rather, they were,
/
of necessity, deferred. Inasmuch as the American policy 
statement concerning British Malaya was no more than a
^u.S., Congress, Senate, Atlantic Charter, A Decade 
of American Foreign Policy; Basic Documents, 1941-1949 , 
81st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1950), p. 1.
3reflection of the larger decision governing the colonial 
areas of Southeast Asia, it is necessary to outline the 
evolutionary process from the United Nations Declaration of 
1942 to the British return to Singapore in September 1945*
Deyond the westernmost island of the Philippine
Commonwealth, the United States had limited pre-World War II
interests or direct involvement in Southeast Asia. The focus
and motive of contact in the European colonial areas had
been trade, primarily the American importation of rubber and,
3 ■ •to a lesser extent, tin. The relative importance and the 
degree of mutual dependency between the colonial areas and 
America were about equal. The United States consumed about 
half of the world's rubber and approximately forty per cent 
of the tin; Southeast Asia produced ninety per cent of the 
world's rubber and sixty per cent of the tin. America took 
these materials, not available elsewhere in the quantities 
required, and, in return, provided approximately thirty per 
cent of the area's total export earnings.^ However, the
^In four of the fiVe' years preceding 1941, natural 
rubber was the highest value commodity imported by the 
United States. See New York Times, November 5, 1946, p. 38.
^See Henry Brodie, "The Post-War Patterns of Trade," 
in South Asia In The World Today, Phillips Talbot, ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), pp. 125-126.
The approximate value of exports from Indonesia, Malaya and 
Indochina in 1936 was $816.7 million; the value of exports 
to the United States was $239.3 million. The year 1936 was 
selected by Brodie as representative of normal prewar trade 
because of the minimum effect of distortion caused by the 
Depression prior to 19 36 and the changes in trade and
American contact and involvement did not extend to the more 
dramatic historical contexts of territorial acquisition or 
intervention as had been the case in the Philippines and 
China. Though American interest Sharpened in the strategic 
context during the preliminaries to the Japanese conquest 
of 1941 and 1942, that interest was refocused with the loss 
of the Philippines and remained peripheral throughout the 
Pacific War.
The development of the American view of what Euro­
pean colonial Southeast Asia should be when World War II 
ended was, to a large degree, a reflection of the thinking 
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Beginning with the 
Atlantic Charter drafted by Roosevelt and Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill, Roosevelt pushed forward the concept that 
colonialism must pass from the modern scene. Throughout the 
war until his death in April 19 45, Roosevelt continued to 
express his thoughts concerning the future of colonial areas 
however, there is indication that his enthusiasm was not 
matched by consistency, or a facility in the subject of
i i
Southeast Asia— including the Philippines. Roosevelt's 
Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, once observed that the
currency values between 1936 and 1942. Figures are attri­
buted to the U.S. Department of State, Division of Research, 
Far East. Brodie, Special Assistant to the Chief, Division 
of Research, Far East, presented these figures at the. Uni­
versity of Chicago's Harris Foundation Lecture Seminar in 
1949.
5President was "all mixed up" in his understanding of the
5location of the various Philippine Islands.
Though Roosevelt was a devotee of Wilsonian princi­
ples concerning self-determination, he was not without human 
failings in his selection of those who violated the princi­
ples. In Southeast Asia, he succumbed to judgments of good 
and bad colonialists. The French were "bad," and he was 
insistent that the United States make no offer of substan­
tive assistance to the Free French in any effort to reclaim 
Indochina. In the 19 30s, Roosevelt had been appalled at 
the viciousness with which the French colonial fonctionnaires 
had suppressed all native opposition to their rule.^ The 
rapid collapse of France before the German armies in 1940 
and the acquiescence of the Vichy Government to Japanese 
requests for air and naval facilities in Indochina in 1941 
added to Roosevelt's conviction that France was no longer a 
great nation worthy of a share in the responsibilities of
^Quoted in Russel H. Fifield, Americans In Southeast 
Asia: The Roots of Commitment (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell
Company, 1973), p. 37.
6 "Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary 
of State, October 16, 1944," FRUS 19 45, Vol. Ill, The Bri­
tish Commonwealth and Europe (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1965), p. 777.
^Elliot Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duell
Sloan, and Pearce, 1946); and Victor Purcell, "Lessons From 
Malaya," The Nation, Vol. 178 (June 12, 1954), p. 500.
68world leadership. He believed that Indochina should be 
given complete independence as soon as possible following the 
war and that, until prepared, a trusteeship should be estab­
lished. At the Conferences at Teheran and Cairo in 1943, 
Roosevelt had personally raised the issue and received at
least passive agreement for the concept from Joseph Stalin
9 .and Chang Kai-shek. Churchill did not support the idea; 
trusteeship had far too obvious an application to the Bri­
tish colonial area. The Free French and the British, there­
fore, supported each other in resistance to the plan and 
quietly worked to influence the American Department of State 
to support recognition of the French claim to Indochina . 
However, Roosevelt remained committed and again raised the 
proposal to Stalin at the Yalta Conference of February 
1945.^ In March, General Charles De Gaulle attempted to
^Gary R. Hess, "Franklin Roosevelt and Indochina," 
Journal of American History, Vol. LIX (September 1972), 
p. 35 3; also Walter La Feber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and 
Indochina: 194 2-45," The American Historical Review,
Vol. 80 (December 19 75), p. 1285.
^Hess, "Roosevelt and Indochina," p. 357.
10Ibid., pp. 355, 358; "An Estimate of Conditions in 
Asia and The Pacific and The Objectives and Policies of the 
U.S.," p. 568; arid La Feber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and 
Indochina," p . 12 72.
llFRUS: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta (Wash­
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955); p. 770;
and Fifield, Americans In Southeast Asia, p. 41.
1dissuade Roosevelt, warning that the loss of Indochina and
the economic effect of that loss could weaken France's abi-
12lity to resist communism. At the time of his death,
Roosevelt remained insistent that Indochina not be handed
back to France and that the French should reenter Indochina
13only m  the status of trustee. Although an Indochina 
trusteeship was discussed at the highest level, there is 
evidence that it was either not clearly understood or not 
accepted as policy within the Department of State.^
With less concrete justification than he had for 
his opinion of the French, Roosevelt judged the Dutch to be 
"good" colonialists, the record of heavy-handed rule in 
the Netherlands East Indies notwithstanding. The only 
explanation for the judgment appears to have been a rather 
shallow knowledge of the Dutch rule in the East Indies, and 
his personal admiration and friendship for the Dutch royal 
family. Though he made no specific proposal for post-war
l^Hess, "Roosevelt and Indochina," p. 364; Fifield, 
Americans In Southeast Asia, p. 38; and La Feber, "Roosevelt, 
Churchill, and Indochina," p. 1293.
^Hess, "Roosevelt and Indochina," p. 365. La Feber 
marks the change in Roosevelt's insistence that the French 
not reenter Indochina, to an allowance that they might re­
enter but only as trustee, as a significant change to his 
original position in "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina," 
p. 1293.
l^pifieid, Americans In Southeast Asia, pp. 45-46; 
and La Feber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina," 
p. 1292.
8trusteeship for the Dutch possessions, Roosevelt apparently
believed that the American example set in the Philippines
was a suitable model to be emulated and that the Dutch
15shared his view.
The British did not escape Roosevelt's advice on the 
future of colonial people; however, the issue seems to have 
been raised in muted terms, perhaps a reflection of the 
closeness of the Anglo-American alliance, the friendship of 
the two leaders, and the sheer weight of the priorities of 
war which occupied their attention. At the Quebec Confer­
ence of 194 3, Roosevelt did suggest that the British offer 
Burma immediate independence within the Commonwealth as an 
incentive for the people of Burma to stiffen their resolve 
against the Japanese. The proposal was received cooly; the 
British were satisfied that the ruthless activities of the 
occupying Japanese secret police would provide sufficient 
stimuli.^ However, Roosevelt did not pursue the proposal 
for Burma's independence as he did the Indochina trusteeship. 
In fairness, the British had' made efforts between the wars 
of 1914 and 19 39 in establishing an intent to prepare the
- ^ E l l i o t  Roosevelt, As He Saw It, pp. 223-224.
■^John F. Cady, "The Historical Background of U.S. 
Policy in SEA," in Southeast Asia: Problems of United
States Policy, ed. by William Henderson (Cambridge, Massa­
chusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1963),
p . 16.
9Eastern Empire for self-governing status. The British 
promise, laid out in the Montagu Declaration and set in 
motion by the Montagu-Chelmesford Reforms enacted by Parlia­
ment in 1917, applied specifically to India, and implicitly
17to Burma, but did not encompass Malaya. (As will be seen,
Malaya posed quite special problems.)
In December 1943, the British Secretary for the
Colonies announced in the House of Commons that:
The main aim of the Government as regards the 
political future of Malaya after its libera­
tion will be the development of its capacity 
for self-government within the Empire.
The announcement is curious both in its timing and urgency.
First, apparently no articulated planning preceded the
announcement; in fact, a detailed proposal was not made
l^Burma was considered administratively a part of 
India until 1937. The Montagu Declaration announced " . . .
gradual development of self-governing institutions . . .
responsible government in India as an integral part of the 
British Empire." Planning for Indian self-government con­
tinued into World War II. In May 1945, a British White 
Paper outlined measures leading to self-government for 
Burma and set a target date of 1949. See Saul Rose, Britain 
and South-East Asia (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1969), pp. 77-79; and John C. Campbell, and others, The 
United States In World Affairs 1947-1948 (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1948) , pp. 215-218 (hereafter works in the 
Council on Foreign Relations series are cited as USWA).
1 ^ 3 9 5  h.C. Ded. 5s., 384, December 1, 1943, quoted 
in Lennox A. Mills, Malaya: A Political and Economic
Appraisal (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1958), p. 24.
10
19public until October 1945. Second, there had been no 
prewar, popularly-based nationalist demand from the peoples 
of Malaya for an end to British rule. Several explanations 
for the 1943 policy statement are Suggested. It was most 
probably a sop to the Malayan resistance force, the Malayan 
Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). The force consisted 
primarily of Chinese Malayans, but leadership was dominated 
by Chinese members of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP).
Prior to Russia's entry into the war, the MCP had been as 
anti-British as it had been anti-Japanese; however, after 
the Russian entry, the MCP moderated its view toward the 
"British Imperialist." In the same month as the announcement 
by the Colonial Secretary, an agreement was reached with the 
MPAJA wherein they would be supplied with the British arms? 
in return, the MPAJA was to harass the Japanese and to pre­
pare to assist allied forces when the time came for libera­
tion.^ That the announcement was meant to secure the 
loyalty of the MPAJA and MCP is supported further by the
fact that in May 19 44 Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten,
\ . \
Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command (SEAC), 
recommended that the British Government transmit the specific 
post—war plan for Malaya to the MPAJA.^ His stated aitn was
19See below, p. 67.
2 0 Rose, Britain and South-East Asia, pp. 126-128.
2 1 Ibid., p. 127.
11
to blunt any precipitous MCP plan to seize control at the
end of the war. However, the plan was not released because
it was still in the formulative stages of p r e p a r a t i o n . ^
The date of the announcement by the Colonial Secretary,
following on the heels of the 1943 Quebec Conference, could
also be taken as an attempt to soothe America's passion
for dismantling the colonial system. In 194 3, there was
growing concern in England that Roosevelt might expand his
insistence on trusteeship for Indochina to include the
2 3British colonial area. The declaration concerning Malaya 
may therefore have been designed to serve a double purpose. 
It anticipated the possible problem of the MPAJA and MCP 
and it served to demonstrate an agreement in principle 
with Roosevelt's determined insistence that colonialism 
must end. By making the declaration, the British preempted 
Roosevelt; an alternative to trusteeship for Malaya was 
established before trusteeship could be proposed. In either 
event, placation of the MPAJA or Roosevelt, the announcement 
concerning Malaya set the last stone in place. Great 
Britain had established the intent to pursue preparations
22ibid.
2 3La Feber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina,"
p. 1279.
for self-government in the entire Eastern Empire.
Though President Roosevelt had quite definite ideas, 
if less definite plans for colonial Southeast Asia, it is 
an overstatement to describe them as firm, doctrinaire 
policy. Roosevelt's proposals are best described as preli­
minary soundings in search of commitment. They most nearly 
approached policy status in September 19 44 when his Secre­
tary of State, Cordell Hull, submitted a memorandum on the 
subject to Roosevelt. The paper proposed that the prewar 
colonial governments of Southeast Asia commit themselves to 
grants of independence or self-governing dominion status to 
the colonial areas as soon as practicable. Toward this 
end, the colonial powers should be urged to join in a
regional commission and pledge trusteeship status for the 
25colonies. Hull did caution that such proposals would not 
be received with enthusiasm by the colonial powers, but he 
expressed the hope that the universal good to be realized 
would overbalance any short-term benefits to be gained by 
retention of colonies. Roosevelt was pleased with the
■i
memorandum; apparently, it was an accurate synthesis of his
2^That the Malayan declaration was prompted by im­
mediate concern over the MPAJA is reasonably clear in the 
coincidence of the declaration and Anglo-MPAJA agreement 
occurring in December 1943. That it was prompted by British 
concern over the trusteeship plan is not directly evidenced; 
however, it is unlikely that the value of the declaration 
in that context was missed by. the Foreign Office.
2^Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol.
II (New York: MacMillan and Company, 1948), pp. 1600-1601.
13
and Hull's thinking.^
Hull's memorandum, suggesting a general proposal 
applicable to the three colonial powers, may have been 
prompted by a distrust of British post-war intentions. It 
had been decided at Quebec in 1943 that the liberation of 
Southeast Asia was to fall primarily to the British. With 
the exception of the northern portion of Indochina above 
the fifteenth parallel, the responsibility for liberation 
was assigned to SEAC under Mountbatten. Hull had since 
received "persistent" reports that the British were contem­
plating a "federation" arrangement in Southeast Asia under 
their "aegis if not control" to include Burma, Malaya, 
Thailand, and Indochina. Hull transmitted the sujpstance
of these reports and his evaluation to Roosevelt in Septem- 
27ber 1944. The source of the report, several Burmese 
officers, was highly questionable and the evidence was incon­
clusive. Although London had denied the report, Hull saw a 
potential for danger in any American association should the 
British, in fact, be considering such a plan. The memorandum 
suggests several things that might have been on Hull's mind. 
First, given that the British would enter and retake South­
east Asia, their ability to influence events would be
27 "Memorandum from the Secretary, of State to the 
President: Southeast Asia; British Attitudes, September 8,
1944," FRUS: The Conference at Quebec 1944 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 263-264.
14
unchallenged; i.e., there was little to be done short of 
intervention. Second, the British would arrive as the repre­
sentative of the colonial powers. Hull believed that an 
American presence would be perceived by the people of South­
east Asia as supportive of colonialism; he therefore recom­
mended that no American civil affairs officer be permitted
p o
to serve in the SEAC area. The proposal for a regional, 
multi-nation trusteeship was apparently put aside. It was 
not discussed at the Conferences at Quebec in 1944 or Yalta 
in 194 5; though as previously mentioned, the Indochina 
trusteeship was discussed at Yalta.
Within two weeks of Roosevelt's death, it became
evident that opposition to his plans for Southeast Asia was
not limited to the European colonialists but included some
among the highest levels within the State Department. In
mid-April, a memorandum was prepared within the Office of
Far Eastern Affairs to be transmitted to the new President,
Harry S. Truman. It was offered as a summary of Roosevelt's
views on Southeast Asia: i i
President Roosevelt recognized the future impor­
tance to the United States of Southeast Asia.
He saw the necessity of aiding the 150,000,000 
people there to achieve improved social, eco­
nomic and political standards. He realized 
that dynamic forces leading towards self^ 
government were growing in Asia; that the 
United States - as a great democracy - cannot 
and must not try to retard this development
2 8 Ibid.
15
but rather act in harmony with it; and that 
social, economic, or political instability in 
the area may threaten the peace and stability 
of the Far East and indeed the world.29
The memorandum was accurate as far as it went, but it did
not alert the new President to the regional trusteeship
scheme as agreed upon by Hull and Roosevelt in the preceding
September, or of the soundings concerning Indochina taken
as recently as the conference at Yalta in February.
At approximately the same time the Office of Far 
Eastern Affairs was drafting the memorandum on Southeast 
Asia, the Office of European Affairs was preparing a paper 
on specific plans for Indochina, also to be transmitted to 
President Truman. In the coordination process with Far 
Eastern Affairs, the basic point of disagreement between 
the Roosevelt view and that of the Department; plus an 
internal disagreement between the Offices of European Af­
fairs and Far Eastern Affairs, crystalized. Both offices 
agreed not to raise the plan for trusteeship; however, Far 
Eastern Affairs modified the memorandum to include a policy 
insistence that the French pledge self-government for Indo­
china within the foreseeable future. This disagreement 
could not be resolved at the divisional level and was esca­
lated for resolution to the Assistant Secretary of State 
for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs,
^Quoted in Fifield, Americans In Southeast Asia,
.p p . 36-37.
lb
James C. Dunn. Dunn took the matter to the Under Secretary 
of State, Joseph C. Grew, with a recommendation that the 
memorandum be scrapped and that the Indochina question be 
allowed to drift rather than accept Far Eastern Affairs' 
proposal to seek guarantees from France.^
Despite the differences within the Department, cir­
cumstances did not allow the issue to remain unresolved.
The Philippine liberation had been completed in February 
1945 and in March, the Japanese had surrendered in Burma. 
Further military operations in Southeast Asia were imminent 
and the U.S. Department of War had requested policy guidance. 
In a June 1945 memorandum from the Secretary of State to the 
Secretary of War, policy and objectives representing the 
views of "the Department of State as a whole" were laid down 
with individual attention given to a general policy for 
colonial Southeast Asia and each of the colonial areas.. The 
introduction stated that:
The United States Government may properly con­
tinue to state the political principle which 
it has frequently announced, that dependent 
people should be given the opportunity, if 
necessary after an adequate period of prepara­
tion, to achieve an increased measure of self- 
government, but it should avoid any course of
^Recounted in ibid. , pp. 45-46, based on U.S. 
Department of Defense, United States - Vietnam Relations, 
1945-1967, Book 8 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1961), pp. 1-25.
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action which would seriously impair the unity 
of the major United Nations.
In regard to Indochina, the statement left little
doubt that the trusteeship proposal was dead:
The United States recognizes French sover­
eignty over Indochina. It is, however, the 
general policy of the U.S. to favor a policy 
which would allow the colonial people an 
opportunity to prepare themselves for increased 
participation in their own government with 
eventual self-government as the goal.
It was estimated that the French would make some concession
to self-government and autonomy primarily to soften native
opposition to their return, but also to "avoid unfriendly
United States opinion." The estimate noted that the French
would rely upon the British to support their interests
inasmuch as the British were equally committed to insuring
that no prewar colonial powers would "suffer diminution of
32power or prestige."
The Department of State analysis and estimates for 
the Netherlands East Indies took note of the fact that the 
Dutch Government would have two political problems with 
which to deal. First, there were old arguments, deferred by 
the war, concerning autonomy between the East Indies Dutch 
and the Netherlands Government. Second, there was the
31 "An Estimate of Conditions in Asia and The Pacific 
and The Objectives and Policies of the U.S.," p. 556. 
(italics added).
^ Ibid. , p. 568 (italics added) .
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question of how to deal with Indonesian nationalism.3 3  
Though sketchy, the Dutch plan was to convene a constitutional 
committee to work out solutions. The objective was to grant 
home rule to Indonesia and to: keep the new nation within the 
Dutch Commonwealth. The Department of State estimated a 
"quiescent period" between liberation and the proposed con­
stitutional conference. Policy was stated to be noninterven­
tionist and favored progress toward self-government using 
the same language as that in the statement concerning Indo­
china. The statement concluded on an economic note thatx 
escapes precise interpretation:
Traditional Dutch policy is in agreement 
with the view of the United States which 
favors equal opportunity for all nations 
and their nationals.34
This could have been an endorsement, in the context 
of Indonesia, of the Dutch system of rubber production 
which consisted largely of native, small holders who grew 
rubber as a second money-crop in contrast to the large, 
foreign-owned plantation system in British Malaya and Ceylon.
The State Department's analysis of British Malaya's 
prospects for recovery noted that the key would be the 
recovery of the rubber-producing industry. 3 5 The
3 3'ifrid. , pp. 573-574 .. ^ Xbjd. f 5 7 4 .
35Ibid., pp. 571-572..
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estimate concerning possible political difficulties missed
the mark in that it predicted the source of dissatisfaction
to be the Malayan Chinese who had traditionally been kept in
a second class status by the British in deference to the
Malays. This assumption, based on prewar conditions, was
reasonable inasmuch as the estimate also noted that thus
far the British Government had not revealed its plans for
Malaya. It did take note of pressures being brought to bear
upon the British Government by English business interests to
recognize the claims of the Chinese and Indian Malayans, and
to abandon the protectionist policy which favored the Malays.
(As will be seen later, it was the attempt to do just that
which brought the British into conflict with the Malays in
1946, rather than the Chinese as predicted by the American
Department of State.) As far as policy was concerned, the
statement was clear if by now somewhat repetitive:
The United States is following a policy of non­
interference in any British possession but we 
favor a policy which would allow colonial people 
an opportunity to prepare themselves for in­
creased participation in their own government 
with eventual self-government as the goal. The 
United States favors a policy of equal economic 
and commercial opportunity for all nations. 3 6
The last statement concerning commercial opportunity suggests
several explanations. Xt could have been a reference to
36Ibid., p. 572.
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the prewar British dominance of the Malayan rubber- and tin- 
producing industries to the near exclusion of all but British 
investors. It might also have been a reference to the 
British-inspired, prewar International Rubber Regulation 
Committee which had acted as a production and pricing cartel; 
or, a general reference to the imperial preference system 
of trade— or all of these.
The policy guidance given by the American Department 
of State calls forth several observations. Most importantly, 
the warning to avoid any action that could threaten the 
unity of the United Nations (stated in the introductory por­
tion) sets the condition as the first priority. Having said 
that, all other statements of "policy to favor a policy" for
preparing dependent people for eventual self-government
37 .pale. Granted, the concept to pursue actively the cause
of colonial independence was conceived by no less a level of 
authority than the Presidency and by September 1944, had 
reached the point of being a working paper consensus between 
Roosevelt and his Secretary of State. Still, the level of 
authorship does not necessarily guarantee that concepts con­
tinue to develop of their own momentum in the absence of the 
author. Changes in leadership create an atmosphere conducive 
to the abandonment of schemes unpopular within an agency, and
^ Above, pp. 16-18.
21
the resurrection of schemes kept chained in the dark by the 
o l d  l e a d e r s h i p . 38 jn the last year of World War II, the 
changes in leadership were nearly continuous.^ Secretary of 
State Hull left the Cabinet in November 1944 and was replaced 
by Edward R. Stettinius. In December, the Office Of Under 
Secretary of State was created and manned by Joseph C. Grew. 
Stettinius could barely have settled in among such preoccupa­
tions as the coming climax of the War in Europe and the Yalta 
Conference when Roosevelt died and Truman was sworn in as 
President. In July, following the San Francisco Conference 
of the United Nations, Stettinius stepped down to be replaced 
by Truman's choice, James F. Byrnes. In August, Under Secre­
tary Grew was replaced by Dean Acheson. Though necessitated 
by failing health, death, and politics, these rapid and con­
tinuous changes in personalities were hardly conducive to 
policy continuity or the growth of fragile concepts. This 
seems particularly valid when the personal style of conduct­
ing foreign affairs, which was Roosevelt's habit, is taken 
into account. When he departed and the guard changed, the 
continuity was broken and there was nothing for the newcomers 
to do but look to the institution for guidance; i.e., the 
Department of State.
38a  personal, though hardly novel, observation.
38Dean Acheson, Present At The Creation: My Years 
in the State Department (New York: W. W. Horton and Com­
pany, 1969),p . 559.
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As previously mentioned, it was upon the advice of 
James C. Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State,, that the issue 
of Indochina's future, the focus of Roosevelt's plans, was 
cut adrift. In addition to Dunn, who was considered to be a 
"Europe-firster," the leadership above him following the last 
round of changes, did not share Roosevelt's personal interest 
in Southeast Asia. Grew, Byrnes, Acheson, and Truman were 
Europe-oriented. This is not to infer that they were pro­
colonialism or consciously against independence for Southeast 
Asian colonies; rather, these subjects did not draw their 
attention. Given the speed and magnitude of events between 
Roosevelt's death and August 1945, it is not surprising that 
the future of Cambodia or Sumatra was absent from the list of 
urgent matters. The question of policy concerning Southeast 
Asia was left to the offices within the Department of State. 
In retrospect, given that the United States and her colonial­
ist allies were still engaged in pursuing the defeat of 
Japan, the abandoning of Roosevelt's plans to secure firm
pledges for an end to colonialism seems reasonable, if not
\ 1
unavoidable.40 American pressure upon her allies to give up
40An opposite view is. defensible. For example, the 
United States could have recognized the changed situation 
and . . . "identified with nationalist groups." Instead,
the United States chose to recognize "legalities" and "shoe­
horned" the colonialists back into Southeast Asia. See 
Harold Issacs, "A Policy For. the U.S." in South Asia in the 
World Today, Talbot (ed.), pp. 226-227. This view, while 
defensible inasmuch as it noted a failure to actively support 
nationalism, went too far in its implication that the United
their eastern empires could have resulted in an untimely 
divisiveness.
In the summer of 1945, the political future of South­
east Asia was secondary by comparison with the immediate 
requirements to see to the defeat of Japan and the civil ad­
ministration of liberated areas. (Though somewhat akin to 
the pre-World War II colonial order, the wartime lines of 
division in Southeast Asia had been drawn according to the 
more pragmatic military necessity and reflected the various 
theaters of operations.) At the Potsdam Conference of July 
1945, the final adjustments to the military theater areas 
were made. SEAC was expanded to include that portion of 
Indochina below the sixteenth parallel (the northern portion 
remained within the China Theater), and the remainder of the 
Dutch East Indies and British Borneo were added. Although 
there were zealous offers of increased Dutch military parti­
cipation and movement of French troops from the Continent to 
assist in the liberation of their respective colonies, time 
ran out on August 14 with the Japanese surrender announcement. 
It was left to the. British to liberate the area and take the 
surrender of the Japanese occupation forces. On the day 
Japan announced acceptance of the Potsdam surrender terms,
States took action to reestablish the prewar status quo. A 
more balanced description would state that the United States 
Was passive, thus allowing the expected; i.e., the return of 
the colonial powers to their possessions.
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SEAC forces landed in the Cochin area of Indochina. On 
August 30, a British Naval task force arrived in Hong Kong. 
Mountbatten accepted the surrender of Japanese southern 
forces at Singapore on September 12 and, on September 20, 
British and Dutch forces landed on Java. The British field 
commanders made it clear in the French and Dutch areas that 
they were acting on behalf of the legitimate colonial author­
ities. In Indochina, the Vietminh were ignored. 4-*- In the 
Dutch East Indies, the nationalists under Dr. Achmed Sukarno 
would not be ignored and, after a Dutch refusal to discuss 
the future with the leaders of the newly-proclaimed republic, 
the British found themselves fighting Indonesians as proxy 
for the Dutch. Thus began a period of recurring violence 
which would last until 1949 . ^
In the period between the end of World War II and 
Korea, the United States policy of nonintervention in colo­
nial Southeast Asia was effective inasmuch as America largely
41Major General Douglas M. Gracey accepted the 
surrender in South Indochina and recalled; "I was welcomed 
. . . by the Vietminh . . 1 'welcome'; and all that sort of
thing . . . very unpleasant situation . . . and I promptly
kicked them out." Quoted in Purcell, "Lessons From Malaya," 
p. 501.
On August 17, 1945, Indonesian nationalists under 
the leadership of Dr. Achmed Sukarno proclaimed a republic.
On October 1, 1945, the Dutch Government refused to discuss 
the future of Indonesia with the group and within the month 
armed clashes occurred between the nationalists and British.
avoided direct involvement as an active supporter of one or 
the other side in disputes that seemed never ending. As a 
world leader, however, America was active in the roles of 
mediator, advisor, and intermediary. For example, the 
United States persuaded the British to abandon their earlier 
insistence that Thailand be treated as a defeated nation. 
America had chosen to virtually overlook the Thai-Japanese 
alliance of December 1941, and the Thai declaration of war 
issued in January 1942 against Great Britain and America. 
Britain, on the other hand, wished to exact reparations 
primarily in the form of needed rice and a concession to 
build a canal across the Kra Isthmus. In December 1945, the 
United States began repeated pleas to the Dutch Government 
and Indonesian nationalists to seek a peaceful solution to 
their dispute. In 1947, America offered to provide good 
offices to the belligerents and, in 194 8 , made the U.S.S. 
Renville available for the negotiations which did produce the 
first effective truce in the Indonesian dispute. In 1946, 
the French asked the United States and Great Britain to
i i
mediate her dispute with Thailand over Indochina territory 
seized by Thailand during the war.
To the colonial peoples of Southeast Asia, the 
American policy seemed, at best, ambivalent. Although 
America officially refrained from taking sides in the dis­
putes between the colonialist and the colonialized, non­
involvement invariably favored the stronger side, in most
cases the colonialist. After 19 47, the United States was
seen to have "leaned" toward the colonialists in recognition
that the dependency relationship between the retention of the
colonial areas might contribute to European economic recovery
and the success of the Marshall Plan. The communist or
nationalist activitist seized upon the American passiveness
as a demonstration that America1s real interest was in the
continuation of colonialism. And, of course, the colonial
peoples were well aware of the concentration of American aid
in Europe and that the little aid which did flow into South-
43east Asia was filtered through the colonial governments.
Post-war British Malaya was initially tranquil by 
comparison with her colonial neighbors; however, she was of 
considerably more specific and immediate interest to the 
United States than her neighbors. But it was not the issues 
of borders or nationalism that drew America into importance 
and sometimes conflict in British Malaya. The point of 
tangency between a colonial area the size of Florida and the 
most powerful nation of the post-war world was the produc­
tion and price of natural rubber. The short period between 
1941 and 1945 had completely changed the relationship
^Campbell, USWA; 1947-1948, p. 184. For a Southeast 
Asian's critique and evaluation of American policy in 
general agreement with Campbell, see "Address by Carlos P. 
Romulo" delivered at the Harris Foundation Lecture Seminar, 
1949, in South Asia Today, Talbot, ed., p. 156ff.
between the prewar world's largest producer and its largest 
customer. Whereas Malaya had produced half the world's rub­
ber and America had consumed that amount, the two were now 
potential competitors. In 1945, the United States produced 
synthetic rubber in amounts twice that of Malaya's prewar 
capacity and could deliver it to the American manufacturer 
at less than the price of the prewar Malayan product. The 
potential for self-destructive competition was, however, 
foreseen. Almost unnoticed in 1943, the Governments and 
businessmen of Great Britain and the United States had 
quietly begun to anticipate the problem.
CHAPTER II
MALAYA AND THE U.S.: A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
Given the condition of the European colonial nations 
at the close of World War II, a question arises. France and 
the Netherlands had been defeated, occupied, and exploited 
by Nazi Germany; England had narrowly escaped the same fate 
and had been nearly exhausted in the effort. All three had 
been isolated from their Southeast Asian empires which had 
been left to their own devices under Japanese rule. Conti­
nental Europe, in particular, had borne all the calamities of 
war. The interruption in industry and trade had all but 
ruined the economy. The destruction and deterioration of the 
industrial plant and the isolation of occupation left the 
prospects for recovery clouded for the immediate future.
Added to this were the simpler, humanitarian problems of
^-John C. Campbell and other, USWA: 1945-1947 (New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 358-359. Spared the
occupation and devastation visited upon Europe, Great Bri­
tain was nonetheless in dire economic straits. Between 
1941 and 1945, the value of United Kingdom exports fell by 
half while import values rose by fifty per cent. The aver­
age annual trade deficit for 1942-44 was 918 million pounds 
sterling. At the same time, British foreign investments 
worth $4.5 billion were sold or lost while foreign members 
of the sterling area accumulated sterling balances worth 
$14 billion in London.
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feeding and housing the war-weary. Given that the eastern 
empires were little better-off in terms of condition and 
prospects, the question is; why were the colonial nations so 
intent on shouldering the responsibilities for dependent 
areas and the immediate liability that those responsibilities 
represented? In short, what had been lost that had to be 
regained?
Prewar colonial Southeast Asia occupied a minority,
but important position in the economic systems of the mother
countries. The eastern empires are best portrayed as one
corner of a triangle that described trade among Europe,
colonial Southeast Asia, and the United States. Southeast
Asia was primarily a supplier of raw materials to industrial :
Europe and America. The most significant items were the
2twentieth century strategic materials, rubber and tin.
Along the first side of the triangle, Southeast Asia exported 
raw materials to Europe and imported European-finished goods. 
Southeast Asia enjoyed an export balance in this trade on a
2Size and order of importance can be estimated in 
terms of the net trade surplus of South and Southeast Asia 
for 19 36 (includes India and Ceylon). "Ores and metals" 
(primarily tin) and rubber accounted for 2 1 per cent and 
34 per cent respectively of the total. Taken in the con­
text of "raw materials" Cwhich accounted for 64 per cent 
of the total net surplus) rubber nnd "metal and ores" ac­
counted for 52 per cent and 33 per cent respectively. See 
Brodie, "Post-War Patterns of Trade," p. 12 8 .
near two-to-one basis. However, it must be recognized that 
the exporters were, in the main, the same foreigners who drew 
off the export surplus earnings as returns on their invest­
ments? i.e., minus operating and colonial government expenses, 
surpluses were returned to Europe and the United Kingdom.
Along the second side of the triangle, Southeast Asia ex­
ported the largest part of her raw materials to the United
States. In this trade, the Southeast Asian export balance
3
was large, approximating a twelve-to-one advantage. Al­
though the possible American market in Southeast Asia was 
relatively small, it was kept to a minimum through import 
tariff systems preferential to the colonial mother countries. 
As to the third side of the triangle, Europe was the largest 
market for American exports, primarily raw materials and 
agricultural products. Because of relative self-sufficiency, 
America enjoyed a favorable balance of trade with Europe and 
the United Kingdom. It was in this deficit trade with the 
United States that Europe was able to apply to advantage the 
surpluses earned in the Southeast Asia-American trade. The 
surpluses flowed to Europe and the United Kingdom in the form 
of profits to the mine and plantation owners:
3Ibid., pp. 125-126. The value of 1936 exports from 
Indonesia, Malaya and Indochina to the United Kingdom and 
other non-Asian countries was $373.2 million; imports to** 
taled $197.7 million. In trade with the United States, the 
value of 1936 exports was $239.3 million while imports to­
taled $2 0 . 8  million.
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There has been a continuous and substantial 
export balance of trade from Southeast Asia.
In 1939, this excess amounted to about 
$250,000,000 or approximately' $2.00 per 
capita for the entire population of the area.
The primary cause of the excess was the neces­
sity of paying the earnings upon landownership 
and other capital investments of foreigners, 
largely in England and the Netherlands although 
to a lesser extent in China, the United States, 
and Japan. Thus the export balance resulted 
in European credit in the United States, since 
much of the surplus export came here. With 
these credits, Europeans, including the British, 
were able to buy a considerable volume of goods 
from us [the United States] in excess of the . 
value of goods which they sent directly to us.
The surpluses served to double advantage in that the American 
dollars earned also represented a monetary advantage of pro­
viding dollar exchange to be applied to the deficit without 
forcing a continual and uncontrollable drain on the dollar 
currency holdings of the mother countries. Seen in the per­
spective of post-war 1945, the recovery of the colonial areas 
and their potential for producing raw materials, profits, and 
dollar exchange was of considerable importance to the three 
colonial nations.
The benefits of the. triangular trade were greatest 
to Great Britain and Malaya in comparison to the French and 
Dutch areas and their mother countries. First, measured 
against the total value of exports from Malaya, Indochina,
4Roland S. Viles, "Southeast Asia in World Econo­
mics" in The New World of Southeast Asia, Lennox A. Mills,
ed. ( M i n n e a p o l i s i  The University of Minnesota Press, 1949) ,
p . 3 5 7 .
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and Indonesia, Malaya exported forty per cent of the total. 
Second, measured against the value of exports to the United 
States, Malaya exported seventy-two per cent of the total 
value. Simply put, Malaya exported more than either the 
French or Dutch areas and a higher percentage of Malayan 
exports earned dollar exchange. Third, though Southeast Asia 
had a large balance in trade with the United States, Malaya's
i i
balance was greater than her colonial rivals; whereas the
total value of American imports was equal to eight per cent
of exports, the value of American imports into Malaya equaled
5only three per cent.
In the period immediately preceding World War II, 
approximately thirty per cent of the total value of Malayan 
exports was earned in American markets. In return, in 19 38, 
the United States took approximately fifty-five per cent of 
Malayan tin and forty-one per cent of the rubber.^ Though
^Brodie, "Post-War Patterns of Trade," pp. 125-126. 
The total value of 19 36 exports from Indonesia, Malaya, and 
Indochina was $816.7 million; the value of Malaya's exports 
was $364.1 million. The value of exports from the three to 
the United States was $239.3 million; the value of Malaya's 
exports was $171.4 million. The value of imports among the 
three from the USA was $20.8 million (8 per cent of exports 
to the USA); the value of imports from the USA to Malaya was 
$5.4 million (3 per cent of exports).
^Lennox A. Mills, "Prewar Malaya" in Malaya, pp. 19-
20. The year 19 38 is a questionable index as it is the ex­
ception in the period 1935-1941 and shows America's share of 
Malaya exports down by sixteen per cent from those calcu­
lated for 1936 in ibid. However, 19 38 is a dramatic demon­
stration of the directness of the linkage between Malayan 
export values and the American auto industry. The value of
33
rubber was the more valuable of the two, tin was also a main 
element of the export economy; however, tin was declining in 
importance as early as. the ,1930s. and after 1945 was unable to 
regain its former importance. The post-war inability to 
recover was a result of combined and complex forces: heavy
war damage and a shortage of needed recovery capital; pro­
hibitive increases in production costs; the increase in com^
t s
petition developed during the war, such as the expansion of 
mining in Bolivia and the creation of a government-owned 
smelting industry in the United States; and the inescapable 
fact that Malayan ore was a diminishing resource.
1937 rubber exported from the British area to America was 
$125 million; in 1938, it fell to $50 million. The American 
auto industry's annual absorption rate in early 19 37 was
650,000 tons; a year later, it was down to 300,000 tons. The 
average of monthly indexes of American auto production for
19 38 was fifty-four per cent of the 1937 average. See 
P. T. Bauer, The Rubber Industry: A Study In Competition and
Monopoly (Cambridge: Harvard University Press for The London
School of Economics and Political Science, 1948), pp. xi-xii, 
133.
^In 1945, not a single tin dredge was operable. The 
unit replacement cost in 194 7 was three times the prewar cost 
of about $450,000. See Mills, Malaya, p . 2QQ. Representa­
tive production figures are: 1940, 81,000 tons; 1946, 8,000
tons; 1955, 61,000 tons. By 1955, other factors had come 
into play to put a ceiling on the possible output; e.g., cur­
tailed defense stockpiling. See "Table G, Rubber and Tin - 
Malayan Production and World Prices, 11 in J. M. Gullick,
Malaya, Revised (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964),
p. 248; Norton Ginsburg and Chester F. Roberts, Jr., Malaya 
(Seattle, Washington: The University of Washington Press,
1958), pp. 400-403, 405; James W. Gould, The United States 
and Malaysia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1969), p. 151; and U.S., Department of Commerce, 
"Malaya - Summary of Basic Economic Information," Business 
Information Service; World Trade Series, No. 597, June 1954,
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The most significant prewar issue and irritant 
between British Malaya and the United States had been the 
price of natural rubber. Until 1910, eighty per cent of the 
world's rubber had come from Central and South America and 
the native hevea tree. The British had successfully trans­
planted the hevea tree first to Ceylon in the mid-nineteenth 
century and only later to Malaya. The demand for rubber 
after 1900 grew first with the bicycle, then with the auto­
mobile industry and the supporting tire industry. Two 
factors combined after 1910 to make Malaya the world's 
largest producer: the South American hevea was ruined by
leaf blight, and the demand for automotive vehicles boomed. 
Both the expansion of the rubber plantation or estate system : 
of Malaya and the demand for automotive tires were given 
impetus by World War I. By 1919, world consumption had 
risen to 300,000 tons per year, three times the consumption 
in 1914. However, because of the lead time required to in­
crease capacity (the hevea requires five to six years growth 
before it can be tapped) and the inability to hedge market 
operations, prices do not mirror either supply or demand at
0
p. 7. For information on the American Government's smelting 
industry and the increase in Bolivian output see U.S., Con­
gress/ Senate, Committee On Currency And Banking, Mainte­
nance Of The Domestic Tin Smelting Industry, S. Rpt. 263;
80th Cong., 1st. sess., 1947, Senate Miscellaneous Reports 
on Public Bills, Vol. II.
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any given time. In periods off sharply increasing demand,
the price will soar out of all proportion, but the lag in
capacity can— -as it did following 1919— produce a situation
wherein production catches demand just as demand begins to
fall. Following 1919 prices, which had ranged from U.S.'
$.60 to over $1.00 per pound in 1914-1919, fell to $.17 in
1921-22. At that time, natural rubber production was almost
8
a British monopoly.
.In an effort to break the boom or bust syndrome, the
British implemented the Stevenson Rubber Restriction Plan in 
91922. The plan was aimed at controlling supply, thereby 
controlling price through export tax rates which limited the 
amount a producer could profitably put on the world market.
The plan was temporarily successful— prices rose to over $1.00 
in 1926-1927— but had to be abandoned in November 1928; it 
backfired badly. The artificial shortage raised prices? how­
ever, it also stimulated production outside of the
p
See Paul Lamartine Yates, Forty Years of Foreign 
Trade (New York: MacMillan and Company), pp. 113-116; and
Gould, The United States and Malaysia, pp. 66-67/ 72. For 
world price, production and consumption statistics, 1910-1945, 
see U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Banking And 
Currency, Rubber Production And Importation Policy Hearings, 
Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking 
And Currency, Senate, on S.J. Res. 79, H. J. Res. 77, and 
S.J* Res. 83, 81st Cong., 1st. sess.r 1947, pp. 54^48 (here­
after cited as Senate Hearings: Rubber Act of 1947) .
.S ., Congress, Senate Hearings: Rubber Act of
1947, pp. 13-14, 57; Ginsburg and Roberts, Malaya, p. 391; 
and Rose, Britain And South-East Asia, p. 6 6 .
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British-controlled area, most notably in Indonesia, but also 
in Indochina, Liberia, and South America. New plantings 
matured after, 192 8 and the resulting glut on the market : 
started prices on a downward slide that accelerated after the 
Great Depression curtailed consumption in 1930. By 1933, 
prices had crashed to $.02-3/8. The Stevenson Plan also
changed the relationship of producers. in 1922, the British
1 '■
areas produced seventy per cent of the world*s rubber; in 
1928, the figure had slipped to fifty-two per cent. Between 
1922 and 1928, Indonesia doubled capacity (by 1940, the 
Dutch were producing nearly as much as Malaya) while the 
British areas had increased by only forty per cent. However, 
though diminished, the British retained their majority status 
and the accompanying potential to affect prices. Because of 
that influence and the dependency of the Dutch and French on 
the processing and shipping facilities of Malaya's entrepot, 
the British assumed a position of leadership among the South­
east Asian producers and initiated action to conclude an 
International Rubber Regulation Agreement (IRRA) in December 
1934.10 Under the agreement signed by France, the Nether­
lands, Siam and Great Britain, an International Rubber
•^For complete information on the IRRA see Bauer, 
"Part II, The Establishment of International Regulation,"
The Rubber Industry, pp. 75-110. This is claimed as the 
only documented work on the subject, see also, Ginsburg 
and Roberts, Malaya, pp. 413-414.
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Regulation Committee (IRRC) was formed; the task was to 
estimate world demand and to restrict equally the amount each 
rubber producer would place on the market. Thus, the IRRC 
artificially created price competition among consumers. 
Long-range IRRC efforts included restrictions on new planting 
and replanting with high yield trees to reduce production 
costs. Whether or not the IRRC could solve the long-term 
problem became academic after the closure of Southeast Asia 
in 1942; however, the IRRC was able to raise and stabilize . 
prices to just above $ . 2 2  a pound in the three years prior to 
World War II .1 1
The Stevenson Plan and the IRRA were thorns to the 
American rubber manufacturers who, with some justification, 
resented the unilateral British price manipulation under the, 
former and subjugation to an international production-pricing 
cartel under the latter. As the major consumer, the industry 
felt denied of the influence that would have been theirs had 
it been a free market operation. The industry's resentment 
was not to be forgotten and was to color post-war American 
negotiations on rubber price and supplies.
Though the production capacity, supply, and price of 
rubber remained matters to be hammered out between the
llHThe Unpredictable Commodity - Rubber," United 
Nations World, Vol. 2 (July, 1948), p. 61; and U.S., Congress, 
Senate Hearings: Rubber Act of 1947, pp. 13-14, 57.
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American industry and the IRRC until 1941, World War II intro­
duced new, previously unconsidered factors. By mid-1942, the 
United States Government had taken complete control of Ameri­
can importation of natural rubber. By late 1943, the Govern­
ment ' s synthetic rubber capacity exceeded Malaya's prewar 
natural capacity. If there had been any question about the 
future American role in determinations of supply and price 
policies, the dominant position of the United States Govern- 
ment after 1943 made the answer axiomatic.
A brief summary of the United States entry into the 
rubber business is necessary here, if for no other reason 
than to spare the reader some of the confusion experienced 
by the United States Congress after 1945 in its efforts to 
remove Government controls. The urgency of war had resulted 
in hasty, sometimes redundant legislation, overlapping au­
thority, and a proliferation of bureaus, boards, and
1 -a
offices.
^Representatives of American industry had attended 
meetings of the IRRC but in a nonvoting "kibitzer" status. 
See "Unpredictable Commodity," pp. 61-62.
1 9 4 2 , domestic allocation was given to the Rub­
ber Reserve Board (RRB) under the Office of Production Ad­
ministration, later absorbed by the Office of War Mobiliza­
tion and Reconversion (OWMR). Purchase and foreign develop­
ment of natural rubber remained under the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation's (RFC) Rubber Reserve and Rubber Devel­
opment Corporations. However, there were reorganizations 
and minor rubber "divisions" scattered about the Executive. 
By 1947, when Congress set about decontrolling rubber, the 
trail was lost and legislation to end allocations was writ­
ten for the RFC; the State Department had to advise the
The Government's movement from a position of no in­
volvement to one of complete control of the industry was slow 
and deliberate, but borne by necessity. By 1939, the pace of 
world rearmament had begun to increase the /demand for rubber. 
In America, increasing rearmament efforts existed in an 
environment of business-as-usual. As both military and 
civilian demand increased, the national stocks of rubber, 
all privately owned, began to fall. The industry was to 
later charge that it need not have been so, if the IRRC had 
responded to requests to increase supplies. One estimate 
stated that the IRRC kept production at seventy per cent
14between 1934 and 1941 m  the interest of price stability.
In mid-1939, at the urging of the Department of War, 
the Government concluded an agreement by treaty with Great 
Britain wherein a half-million bales of American cotton were 
traded for 90,000 tons of rubber to be supplied outside of
15
IRRC quotas. Both commodities were to be stockpiled for 
war emergency only and were not to be placed on the market
Senate Subcommittee that allocation was under RRB, under OWMR 
and, in turn, under the Office of Temporary Controls. See 
Senate Hearings: Rubber Act of 1947, pp. 112-113.
^"The Unpredictable Commodity," p. 61.
15For full text, debate, and amendment see U.S., 
Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 1st. sess., July 6 , 1939, Con­
gressional Record, Vol. 84, Part 8 , pp. 8681-8682. ~
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without prior consultation. Delivery was slow and stocks 
continued to fall— the 1939 end-year level was half the 
average for the preceding eight years.^
In 1940, the alarm was taken up by the industry in 
the colorful person of John L. Collyer, President of the 
B. F. Goodrich Company, who launched a one-man campaign 
to warn of the dangers of foreign dependency. In presenta­
tions to members of the industry, he punctuated his message 
with moments of drama, such as the destruction by fire­
cracker of a toy ship sailing on a map of the Far Eastern 
trade routes. Collyer caught the attention of the Senate 
Military Affairs Committee, was invited to testify, and 
called for a stockpiling program and the immediate develop­
ment of a synthetic industry. (Goodrich was in the produc­
tion development stage of synthetic manufacturing and offered
17to run the proposed government facility.) Under the 
National Defense Act of June 28, 1940, the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation (RFC) was authorized to construct synthe­
tic facilities with an annual capacity of 40,000 tons; the 
RFC was also authorized to purchase 800,000 tons of rubber 
for stockpiling and chartered the Rubber Reserve Corporation
^ U . S ., congress, Senate Hearings On The Rubber Act 
of 1947, p. 15.
17'"rrouble In Synthetic Rubber," Fortune, Vol. 35
(June 1947), pp. 156-157.
for that purpose. Progress was slow in both efforts and
at the time of Pearl Harbor, America's total stock was
663,000 tons including 100,000 tons enroute on the high seas—
the minimum wartime estimate called for 700,000 tons per 
18year.
In June 1942, under authority of the Second War 
Powers Act, the Government took total control of all sources 
and uses of rubber. Imports by private concerns were banned; 
the authorized synthetic capacity was raised to 805,000 tons; 
and domestic allocation of rubber was given to the Govern­
ment's Rubber Reserve Board (RRB) as was authority to deter­
mine product specifications and use. The allocation of the 
small remaining supply of natural rubber among the Allies 
was given to the Anglo-American Combined War Resources Board. 
Prices to be paid by manufacturers were fixed by Anglo- 
American agreement: natural at the 1941 level of $.22%; and 
synthetic at $.18%. The RFC chartered a second company, the 
Rubber Development Corporation, whose task was to encourage 
and finance increased natural capacity, primarily in Central 
America. The growing period of the hevea tree was the
limiting factor and despite efforts to increase production,
19the total wartime supply was only 315,000 tons.
18U.S., Congress, Senate Hearings On The Rubber Act 
of 1947, p. 15.
^ I b i d . , pp. 15-16.
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In September 1942, a report by the Presidential-
appointed Rubber Survey Committee' chaired by Bernard M.
Baruch concluded:
. . . Unless corrective measures are taken
immediately this country will face both a mili­
tary and a civilian collapse . . . Unless
adequate new supplies (natural or artificial) 
can be obtained in time, the total military 
and export requirements alone will exhaust our 
crude stocks before the end of next summer.^
f i
Catastrophe was initially averted through conserva­
tion (35 mile per hour speed limit and gasoline rationing); 
tire rationing; increased use of reclaimed rubber; and strict 
limitation on the use of natural rubber. At a total Govern­
ment investment cost of $700,000 ,000, the production of syn­
thetic rubber increased rapidly; from a privately-owned 
experimental capacity of 8,0 00 tons in 1941, production rose 
to 24,000 tons in 1942, to 234,000 in 1943, and to 763,000 
in 1944. The capacity at war 1 s end reached 1,100,000 tons.,
a figure which exceeded America's 1941 consumption of 
21775,000 tons.
By 1943, it was clear that the American synthetic 
monopoly was growing in capacity and improving in quality 
and price into an obvious competitor for natural. The poten­
tial impact on post-war Malaya was not missed by the British,
2'0 lb i d - , p - 15
^ N e w  York Times, March 31, 1945, p. 21.
43
and in late 194 3, they seized upon the pending expiration of 
the IRRA as a cause for initiating discussions with the 
United States. On December 7, 194 3, the British Minister in 
Washington submitted a memorandum to the State Department 
advising that neither the Dutch Government in exile nor the 
British (the two available signators) had any intention of 
renewing the IRRA which was to expire at the end of December
!' I '
22194 3. The memorandum invited the United States to join m
a new agreement; it also included a draft agreement which
would establish an International Rubber Committee. The
American response a week later was to decline, citing as the
reason that the action as proposed was "too quick." The
American counter proposal was a suggestion that the IRRA
first be allowed to lapse, so as to assure all concerned that
2 3any new agreement had no connection with the IRRA. Of it­
self, the British draft was inoffensive describing a commit­
tee without executive authority whose chief function would be 
to gather data and to study problems.
^T h e  Department of State record of the 1943-1944 
discussions are contained in "Termination of The Interna­
tional Rubber Regulation Agreement; Participation of The 
United States. In Exploratory “Discussions For A New Agree­
ment ," U.S.., Department of State, FRUS; Diplomatic Papers 
194 4, Vol. II, General; Economic and Social Matters (Wash­
ington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Officef 1967), 
pp. 950-987 (cited hereafter as Termination of The IRRA).
2 3Dispatch.: Secretary of State to the Ambassador In
The United Kingdom, January 10, 1944, in ibid., pp. 950-951.
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The British countered the 'American hesitation with an
Anglo-Dutch offer to terminate formally the IRRA on April 31,
194 4, the date on which the grace period for renewal ex- 
24pired. Again, conclusion of an agreement prior to expira­
tion was urged. The Americans advised that representatives 
of the Rubber Development Corporation were available to dis­
cuss the matter with the British Far Eastern Emergency Rub­
ber Committee— in essence saying there was no immediate re-
25quirement to establish new international machinery. In
further exchanges, the British continued to press for an
American commitment. In what appeared to be a studied slip
of the tongue, the British added that any discussion could
2 6not confine itself to " . . . crude rubber only." The 
Americans continued to insist on the expiration of the IRRA 
as a precondition to assure that nothing was done to confirm 
American industry * s suspicion that the proposed new agreement 
was really " . . .  the old one in d i s g u i s e . I n  what could
24Ibid., p. 951.
^Dispatch; Ambassador In The United Kingdom to the
Secretary of State, January 14, 1944, in ibid., pp. 954-957.
2^Memorandum of Conversation Between the Director 
of The Office of Economic Affairs, Department of State, and 
The Commercial Secretary of The British Empire, Washington, 
D.C., March 18, 1944, in ibid., pp. 957-959.
^Memorandum Of Conversation By William T. Phillips, 
Commodities Division, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 
April 15, 1944, in ibid., p. 959.
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have been a veiled threat to reconstitute the IRRA and IRRC, 
the British noted, in late April, that they and the Dutch 
also had their industries to contend with; and, with or with­
out the Americans, Great Britain was committed to a new 
agreement with the Dutch.^8 After the April expiration of 
the IRRA, the Department of State advised the British infor­
mally that the matter had been discussed with representatives 
of the American industry who were highly suspicious of the 
proposed agreement.^9 However, the two Governments agreed to 
meet with the Dutch in London in August to discuss the matter 
further; the meeting was referred to as an "informal interna­
tional rubber study group." The August meeting produced for­
mal agreement to establish a permanent International Rubber 
Study Group (IRSG) and the first meeting was set for January 
1945.30
In December 1944, a curious incident occurred. The 
British Ministry of Supply was approached by representatives 
of the Provisional French Government who wished to join the
^Letter: Colonial Secretary of The British Empire
to The Office of Economic Affairs, Department of State,
April 26, 1944, in ibid., pp. 962^963.
^ M e m o r a n d u m  of Conversation By William T. Phillips, 
Commodities Division, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 
May 4, 1944, in ibid., p. 965.
30Ibid., pp. 984^986; and U.S., Department of State, 
Department of S t a t e  Bulletin,; Vol. XI (September 24, 1944), 
p. 328.
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IRSG a,t its first meeting. In support of their application 
for admittance, the French stated that there would be an 
estimated 200,000 tons of natural rubber available in Indo­
china at war's end. The British transmitted the French 
request to the Americans but recommended disapproval citing 
the provisional status of the French Government and the pre­
cedent that admittance could set for others wishing to join 
at this late date. Admittance for all interested parties was 
proposed for the future. The United States agreed and added 
that the French estimate of available rubber was probably 
"too high.'"31
The results of the first meeting of the IRSG was
marked by but two observations: (1) it was agreed that the :
speculative information concerning the rubber-producing
areas of Southeast Asia prevented accurate, future estimates?
and (2), any estimates would be based for the present upon
32the assumption of "no new production capacity."
The timing of the 194 3 British initiative to secure 
an agreement with the United States suggests additional
■^Exchange of Dispatches Between the Second Secre­
tary of The British Ministry of Supplies and The Office of 
Economic Affairs, December 14, 1944 and January 2, 1945, in 
Termination Of The IRRA, pp. 296-297.
32U.S«, Department of State, "The RSG: Discussion
And Appraisal of The Future Rubber Situation," Department 
of State Bulletin, Vol. XII (February 5, 1945), pp. 161-162.
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motives beyond the obvious one of post-war planning. Prior 
to December 194 3, plans had been sketched out at the first 
Quebec Conference for the liberation of Southeast Asia.
Though the timetables were tentative, the inevitability of 
Allied victory was assumed. Given that the urgencies of the 
moment were yielding to concerns for the future, the British 
initiative of 1943 regarding rubber still seems premature.
To the American Department of State, the urgency to replace 
the IRRA must have seemed odd at that particular moment; the 
French and Siamese were not available for consultations and 
the liberation of the areas was tentatively planned for some­
time in 1946. The British could, however, have gained two 
advantages in an early Anglo-American agreement. First, the ; 
agreement would have been concluded without concern for two 
of the IRRA signators; i.e., the French and Siamese. In 
short, if an agreement favorable to the British and Dutch, 
who constituted 80 per cent of world capacity, could be 
worked out prior to liberation, the remaining two would be 
left to shift for themselves at war’s end. If the fear was 
overcapacity, the British would certainly have been more 
comfortable not having to consider the requirements of France 
and Siam whose combined capacity could only have made a bad 
situation worse. There is also a possibility— if the suspi­
cion concerning British plans for a federation had any 
truth--that the British were prepared to speak for
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3 3all. That a British desire to avoid French and Siamese 
involvement and the advantage of dealing with a Dutch Govern­
ment in exile was a factor is indicated by the fact that no 
overtures were made to the French after their liberation, and 
in the British recommendation of December 1944 that French 
membership in the IRSG be deferred. A second possibility 
cannot be ignored: the British may have perceived an advan­
tage in discussing the future with the American Government, 
rather than with private American manufacturers. The British 
were aware that the Government-owned synthetic industry would 
be turned over to the private sector as soon as practicable 
after the war.^ Should the matter be left to the post-war 
period, the British could face a difficult time with a can­
tankerous American industry motivated primarily by the con­
cerns of business enterprise and the memories of the old IRRC 
price and production cartel. On the other hand, the United
33Above, pp. 14-15. A British account (written with­
out benefit of the American Government documents) recounts 
an initial plan among the British, Dutch and Indian Govern­
ments to extend the IRRA until eighteen months after the 
war's end. That scheme was rejected by the Colonial Office. 
However, it appears rejection came after the American 
response of mid-December 1944. See Bauer, Rubber Industry, 
pp. 307-308.
-^That the Government would not continue to "own" 
the industry after the war was a valid assumption. The syn­
thetic patents were privately owned; the plants were under 
private management; and Government equipment was mixed with 
private. The. discussions that followed V-J Day between 
industry and the Government proceeded from the assumption 
that the question was "when," not "if." See below, p. 105.
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States Department of State might possibly be more sensitive 
to the plight of the British economy/ the circumstance of. the 
Malayan people, and concepts of free trade. In short, be­
cause of the international focus of interest, the United 
States Government might be persuaded to keep its synthetic 
industry in check. However, no agreement was concluded and 
the international discussions concerning the future were left 
to drift in the IRSG.
That no formal American commitment could be forced in 
1944 was, at least in part, a result of the dearth of infor­
mation concerning conditions in Southeast Asia; however, a 
speculative observation can be added. It would be reasonable 
to conclude that the American Department of State might have 
breathed a sigh of relief at being able to defer the issue. 
Several of the possible problems involved ran straight to the 
heart of American hopes and plans for a reordered system of 
world trade. Since the Reciprocal Trade Agreements of 1934, 
the United States had led the effort to liberalize trade; 
i.e., to do away with trade practices that restricted through 
tariff or quota the ability of nations to buy and sell to 
fair advantage. America hed taken steps during the war to 
keep alive the objective of removing trade barriers. The 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements. Act had been extended in 1940 and 
was again extended in 1943, 1945, and 1948.
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Other steps were taken to prepare the way 
for the post-war removal of trade barriers.
Though they were declarations of intent more 
than promises to act, Point Four of the At­
lantic Charter and Article VII of the Mutual 
Aid Agreements [Lend Lease] helped set the 
stage. The latter, particularly, became a 
vehicle for some of the most important discus­
sions of international economic cooperation.
Without committing the British to end imperial 
preference— a favorite target of American 
trade policy--Point Four and Article VII pointed 
the way.35
t
The IRRA aside, Malaya was an example of the imperial prefer­
ence at work; e.g., cheap Japanese textiles, like American 
products, were kept out by tariff in preference to English 
goods; the export duties on tin were paid by all but the 
United Kingdom and Australia.^6
The possible dilemma of rubber could prove to be 
difficult: (1) if Malaya could quickly swing back to a pre­
war level of production; and (2) if synthetic could not com­
pete with natural in a free market. How then could America 
protect her Government synthetic industry short of protec­
tionist trade restrictions? And if she chose to protect, who 
but the Dutch, British and their colonies would suffer from 
the lost market? The possible problems and solutions did not 
fit the plans for liberalizing trade. That the Department 
of State was aware of the difficulties is hinted at in a
^^Campbell, USWA: ' 1945-1947, p. 384.
36Rose, Britain And South-East Asia, p. 66.
May 1945 letter to the Senate Committee on Agriculture and
Forestry. The State Department successfully urged the defeat
of a proposed bill that would have created a Federally-
subsidized program to grow a natural rubber producing plant
(kok-saghyz) as an alternative to the synthetic Industry.
The Department characterized the proposal as "premature,"
noting that the advantages could not be "properly evaluated"
because of the uncertainties of post-war conditions. It
added an observation that synthetic could prove to be both
37better and cheaper than any natural product.
The Department may also have been sensitive to rum­
blings of British dissatisfaction over the potential power of 
the United States to dictate the post-war terms of trade. In 
January 1945, a member of Parliament had asked in Commons if 
the United States was adhering to the terms of Lend Lease 
that had been imposed upon the recipients; i.e., was America
insuring that the five tires on an exported automobile con-
3 8tained no more than ten per cent British rubber? The issue 
was Lend Lease; however, the choice of the example (rubber) 
and the timing (a week after the first meeting of the RSG) 
is a provocative coincidence.
37Letter From The Acting Secretary of State to The 
Chairman, Senate Committee On Agriculture and Forestry,
May 19, 1945, in U.S., Congress, Senate, Providing And Insur­
ing A Dependable Supply of Domestic Natural Rubber, S. Rept. 
1912, 79th Cong., 2nd sess., 1946, Senate Miscellaneous 
Reports, Vol. 4, p. 3.
38New York Times, January 31, 1945, p. 4.
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The liberation of Malaya and the conditions of the 
plantations simultaneously occupied British concern. In 
July 1945, the British Government announced plans for the 
rehabilitation of the Malayan rubber industry. The Govern­
ment would purchase all available rubber, and priority would
be given to providing technical experts and necessary supplies
39to the estates. So too did the subject of rubber apparently 
rise to a new level of interest in America. On September 7, 
1945, two days after the first advance military units landed 
in Malaya, the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion 
(OWMR) formed an Inter-Agency Policy Committee On Rubber.^ 
Membership included representatives of the Departments of 
State, Justice, War, Navy and Commerce; the War Assets Commis­
sion; the Civilian Production Administration; and the RFC. 
Called the Batt Committee after its Chairman, William L.
Batt, Vice Chairman of the OWMR, this group constituted for­
mal recognition that the future had become the present, and 
that the time to begin coordinated planning had come.^  The
~^Ibid., July 23, 1945, p. 4.
^Qjbid., September 9, 1945, p. 39. The announcement 
gave the reason as "fears of serious surpluses" by 1946. The 
Committee produced two reports. See "Inter-Agency Policy 
Committee On Rubber, first and second reports" quoted in 
U.S., Congress, Senate Subcommittee Hearings On The Rubber 
Act of 1947 , pp. 6-32, (hereafter cited as The ~Batt Committee, 
First (Second) Report) .
4 3-The inter-agency approach was presumably a result 
of the realization within the Executive of the necessity 
"to assure conformity between our foreign economic operations
53
Committee's charter included: maintenance of the synthetic
capacity;- encouragement of research to expand the possible
markets; establishment of natural stockpiles; development of
a Western Hemisphere natural capacity; and the establishment
of " . . . mutually advantageous programs for import from the
42Far East." The Batt Committee was to become the Govern­
ment's authority on, and the,architect of, a post-war nation­
al rubber policy. Its two reports, published in February and 
July 1946, were to lead the way for Congressional action.
Before the Japanese surrender could be arranged, 
even before America appointed a post-war Consul, a rubber 
survey team, hastily assembled by the British Ministry of 
Supplies, had landed in Malaya. Among the members were three: 
unofficial American representatives, buyers for the Goodyear 
and Firestone Companies, and an independent purchasing agent. 
It would seem that the British and American Governments and 
industries were holding their breath in anticipation of the 
group's findings.^3
and national foreign policy"; e.g., the creation of The 
Office of Foreign Economic Administration in 1942. See 
Acheson, Present At The Creation., p. 46.
42The Batt Committee, First Report, February 19,
19 46, p. 6.
^The British, group landed on September 8, 1945. The 
surrender was taken on the 12th, the same date the United 
States appointed its first post-war Consul to Singapore. See 
New York Times, September 9, 19 45, p. 8; and U.S., Department 
of State, Foreign Service List January 1, 19 46, Department of
The problems posed by the natural-synthetic dilemma
44were buried in complexity. In one form or another, they 
touched upon at least three American policy issues. First, 
economic policy from the Atlantic Charter, through the 
Bretton Woods Act, to the American initiatives to create an 
International Trade Organization had established an intent to 
speed world economic recovery and to foster multilateral 
trade. Second, foreign policy towards British possessions 
was clearly noninterventionist. Third, there were growing 
pressures to reverse the war-time trend of Government involve­
ment in and control of private enterprise. How then to serve 
all interests: national defense, business, free trade, the
Malayan economic recovery? To attempt to serve all could be 
to serve none.
State Publication 2517 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1946).
44For agreement with this summary see "Rationalizing 
Rubber," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 28, 1946, quoted in 
U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Extension of 
Remarks by Representative John B. Sullivan, 79th Cong., 2nd. 
sess., April 28, 1946, Congressional Record, Vol. 92, Part 
10, p. 2457.
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CHAPTER III
POST-WAR PROSPECTS:- THE UNION 
AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY
Just as the relative position of British Malaya in 
the context of the prewar trading triangle makes her ill- 
suited to regional economic generalizations, so too is Malaya 
a poor choice for inclusion in a general discussion of colo­
nial governments and post-war political developments. Though 
later subjected to pressures common among her neighbors, such 
as rising nationalism and communism, the uniqueness of the 
Malayan experience accounts for the differences between 
America's relationship to Malaya, and the French and Dutch 
colonial areas. Whereas the United States was drawn into the 
post-war, colonial affairs of the Dutch and French, she 
avoided any such entanglements in Malaya— -albeit a result of 
the absence of cause, rather than conscious deliberation.
The British returned to Malaya amidst victory parades 
and triumphal arches. Though the return of the colonialists 
elsewhere may have been met with reactions ranging from hos­
tile rifle fire to the whipped-dog snarls of those who saw 
no change save the exchange of masters, a large majority of 
the Malays were sincerely pleased to see the return of their 
British mentors and protectors. The reasons for this seeming
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departure from the expected lay in the history of the British- 
Malayan experience, a history somewhat unusual among the 
annals of colonialism.
\
Although the English presence in Malaya dates to the 
late eighteenth century, British Malaya as it existed in 1941 
was the product of a series of treaties concluded between the 
Malay Sultans and the Crown in the period 1874 to 1909. The 
British originally secured the treaties to halt civil wars 
among the Sultans and acts of piracy, both of which inter­
fered with the orderly conduct of trade. However, the trea­
ties were initiated before the first rubber plantation was 
established and before large scale, modern tin mining ap­
peared. Whereas the treaties were intended to insure the 
security of trading activities, they later served to control 
and protect substantial capital investment in plantations and 
mines after 1900. Though the tin and rubber trades followed 
the ups and downs of the world economy, a general trend of 
economic development continued until 1942 at which time 
Malaya enjoyed a standard of living that was, by regional 
standards, the envy of her neighbors.-*- In part as a result 
of the mutual, if not equal, benefits of economic development,
-*-The best examples were a higher per capita income, 
basic education, and better health services. See Ginsburg 
and Roberts, Malaya, pp. 363-367; and Mills, The New World 
of Southeast Asia, p. 181.
and partially as a result of the fact that the British ruled 
through the Sultans, the maintenance of colonial control re­
quired little use of force. The absence of the heavy hand 
produced a relationship founded in a considerable amount of 
mutual respect and a Malay tolerance for and trust in the 
British. Though not a relationship of equals, rather the 
relationship of a benevolent father for children, it did not 
contain that rawness of the master-servant relationship which 
breeds hatred and characterized the British elsewhere and the 
Dutch and French almost everywhere.
British Malaya is a deceptively simple term which 
fails to suggest what was, in fact, a most complex, plural­
istic collection of states, colony, and people. In 1941, 
there were nine Malay States described in the jargon of the 
British Colonial Office as "protected states." Eight of 
the nine were located on the mainland: Kedah, Perak,
Kelantan, Trengganu, Pahang, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and
Johore. The ninth, Brunei, was located in the central coast-
2
al area of British Borneo. Four of the mainland states—
2 . •Referred to by the American State Department m  its
1945 estimates as "anomalous," British Borneo is a subject 
unto itself. It consisted of three units: (1) Sarawak was
controlled by the English Brooke family who ruled as Rajas 
from the early nineteenth century; (2) Brunei, the British- 
protected state; and (3) North Borneo, owned by the North 
Borneo Company. Both Sarawak and North Borneo were handed 
over to the British in July 1946 and became Crown Colonies; 
repair of war damage was beyond the resources of private inter­
ests. Both were incorporated into Malaysia by 1963. Brunei
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Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang— -had been loosely 
joined since 1896 as the Federated Malay States, which oc­
cupied the central portion of the Malay peninsula and includ­
ed the richest tin and rubber producing areas. Each of the 
nine states was technically sovereign; however, under the 
treaties concluded with the Crown, Sultanic authority was 
limited to those matters concerning the Mohammedan religion 
(the faith of the Malay) and Malay custom. In all other 
matters, both foreign and domestic, the Sultans were bound 
to accept the advice of the Crown, the quid pro quo being 
British guarantees of Sultanic succession and a generous 
annual income.
The Straits Settlements (referring to the Malacca 
Straits) comprised the British Crown Colony of Malaya and 
consisted of: the island, port city of Penang and the adja­
cent coastal area, Province Wellesely; Port Swettenham; the 
city-port of Malacca; and the island, port city of Singapore. 
The essential difference between the "protected states" and 
the Crown Colony, other than the obvious degree and visabil- 
ity of British rule, was citizenship. An individual born in 
the Straits Settlements was a British subject, while one 
born in the States was a British protected person.
remained a protected state. See Gould, The United States In 
Malaya, pp. 78-79; and Cady, History of Post-War Southeast 
Asia, p. 647.
In a descending hierarchal arrangement, the lines of 
British colonial authority differed slightly among States and 
Colony. The senior British authority for all of Malaya was 
the Colonial Governor of the Straits Settlements who ruled 
from Singapore. He was assisted in administering the Settle­
ments by Legislative and Executive Councils. The power of 
the Legislative Council, however, was subject to the Governor 
in that membership was subject to his concurrence, as were 
legislative proposals. In regard to the Federated States, 
the Governor of the Straits Settlements also served as the 
High Commissioner for the Federated Malay States and, in 
this capacity, he presided over a Federal Council headquar­
tered in Kuala Lumpur, the Federation Capital. Coucil mem­
bership consisted of a British Federal Secretary, the four 
British residents, and four unofficial Malay members nomi­
nated by the Secretary. In the Unfederated States, the Bri­
tish advisor served directly under the Governor and presided 
over councils which were variations of, and modeled on, the 
council system used in the Settlements.
During the war, the decentralized organization and 
assumptions of British colonial rule in Malaya were found 
adaptable for the purposes of the Japanese. Because of the 
feudal reverence and fealty of the Malay for his Sultan and 
the existence of a native civil service, the Japanese for­
mulated no plans to alter substantially the arrangements;
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i.e., whatever was required in the Malayan States would be 
worked out between the Japanese and the Sultans while Singa­
pore, joined with Sumatra for a brief time, was ruled di­
rectly by Japan. The maintenance of the Sultans' sovereignty 
and the survival of the native civil services worked to great 
advantage in facilitating the post-war recovery process.
By comparison with the Dutch and French experience,
then, the British return to Malaya was less traumatic for both
the Malays and the British. In summary, the causes were:
First, the British, like the Americans in the Philippines,
were able to insert a military force sufficient in size to
assure an orderly transfer of control, whereas the French and
Dutch were incapable; second, as already mentioned, the basic
structure of the prewar colonial arrangement remained intact;
third and of primary importance, the Malay people had no
desire to pursue the future without their British protectors.
The most fundamental difference between Malaya and the rest
of Southeast Asia was that the Malays or "people of the
3
country" were a minority in their own land. As a result of 
the growth of the rubber and tin industries, and the need for 
a large labor force, Chinese and Indians had come to Malaya 
in the millions. Therefore, any scheme or desire for self- 
government would require a reckoning with, the foreign
^P. T. Bauer, "Nationalism And Politics In Malaya," 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25 ( A p r i l  1947), p. 515.
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majority, a reckoning the Malays were unwilling to face.
The term "British protected" had originally meant 
protection of Malay from Malay and Malaya from external en­
croachment; however, the term had new meaning as early as 
1920. The boom in rubber and tin had found the Malay people 
ill-suited by temperament, being farmers and fishermen by 
tradition, and insufficient in4 numbers to work the mines and 
plantations. To fill the void, the British had encouraged 
the immigration of Chinese and Tamil Indians. By 1941, the 
population, swelled by immigrants, had grown to an estimated 
five million, a four-fold increase over the estimated popula­
tion at the turn of the century. Fifty-five per cent of that 
population was non-Malay, 45 per cent being Chinese and 10 
per cent Indian. The Malay accounted for only 4 3 per cent. 
(The remaining 2 per cent were British, Europeans and 
Eurasians.) In the Federated and Unfederated States, the. 
figures were slightly different: 38 per cent Chinese, 11 per
cent Indian, and 49 per cent Malay. Most dramatic was the 
Chinese majority in Singapore: 77 per cent Chinese, 12 per
cent Malay, and 7 per cent Indian. The population increased 
during the War, though at a retarded rate, to 5,849,000; but 
the ratio among the three Asian races remained unchanged.^
^These figures were published after formation of The 
Federation of Malaya in 1948; therefore, the populations of 
the Straits Settlements, other than Singapore, were included 
with the adjacent State; the total for Malaya is the sum of 
the populations of the nine States (including adjacent
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The Chinese were the more successful of the immi­
grants. Many entered commerce and trade, and supervisory 
positions in the British and European-owned mines and planta­
tions. Unlike the Indians, who usually stayed in Malaya for 
no more than three years, the Chinese remained indefinitely. 
Prior to 1911, the law of Imperial China viewed migration as
illegal and the threat of punitive action discouraged return.
1
In the inter-war period, the uncertainties caused by the 
Kuomintang rise to power in the 1920s, followed by the Sino- 
Japanese War of the 1930s, served both to encourage migration 
and discourage return. In addition, the conditions of insta­
bility gave rise to investment of capital by the Chinese in 
the more tranquil areas. By 1939, the Chinese investment in 
Malaya was estimated at $200,000,000.^
The religious and social habits of the Chinese were 
considered by the Mohammedan Malay to be of a lower order 
bordering on the barbaric. (The only lower society was the 
Indians who were looked down upon by both the Chinese and
Straits Settlements) and Singapore. For complete analysis 
based on the Malayan Census of 1947 and 19 55 see Ginsburg 
and Roberts, Malaya, pp. 47^6 3.
5The figure apparently refers to the capital worth of 
Chinese in Malaya, regardless of the original source of 
capital or citizen status, since the figure is given sepa­
rately and is not included in estimates of total foreign 
investment. See Mills, NeW World of Southeast Asia, p. 184; 
and Rose, Britain and South-East Asia, pp. 81-82.
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Malays.) This, coupled with Chinese success and superiority 
as petit bourgeois, gave rise to intense resentment among 
the Malays. The Chinese remained socially isolated and 
politically interested in Kuomintang China. Outright hostil­
ity and violence between Malay and Chinese races was, how­
ever, minimal prior to World War II, a tribute to the British 
ability to keep oil upon troubled waters.
The general theme of British rule was that the Crown 
governed at the request of the Malay people and, therefore, 
rule entailed by a responsibility to preserve the rights and 
primacy of the Malays, the true "people of the country." In 
the twenty years preceding 1941, there had been some incon­
clusive discussion of the future which generally spoke to the 
issue of eventual self-government in terms of the administra­
tive mechanism of transition. The first step to precede any 
planning for self-government was to be the establishment of a
capable civil service which would eventually emerge from a
*
shadow status and become the nucleus of a Malayan government:
As this service developed, British administra­
tion would fade out by stages rather like the 
Cheshire cat. The British would first surrender 
their executive power and revert to the status 
of advisors as in the Unfederated States; then 
the main body would be withdrawn leaving depart­
mental consultants; and finally there would be a 
complete transfer and even the smile would go.6
^Rose, Britain And South-East Asia, pp. 81-82.
Between the World Wars, two schools of thought devel­
oped around the question of whose "smile" would replace that 
of the British. The first, the pro-Malayan or devolutionist 
school, saw Malaya as a collection of states ruled by Sultans 
wherein the Malay had a position of privilege and the 
Chinese and Indians were but tolerated guests. The second, 
the pan-Malayan school, viewed the country as a multi­
racial nation which came into existence after 1900 in which 
the Malays were but one of several races with no special 
claim to primacy over the Chinese-Indian majority. The 
pro-Malayan school was the more popular among the British 
colonials who, for the most, had a genuine fondness for 
the usually gentle, well-mannered Malay; the British colon­
ial had a decided dislike for the more aggressive and often - 
troublesome Chinese. The English sense of fair play favored 
the weaker race and saw little justice in any plan that 
would cast the Malays to an uncertain fate under the inevit­
able dominance of the numerically superior Chinese. There 
was also a businessman's argument for either school. For 
the pro-Malayan: the Malays were not business competitors
of the Britisher whereas the Chinese were. For the pan- 
Malayan : the Chinese could provide acumen and leadership in
business, industry and civil service at a fraction of the 
cost of English and Europeans charged with such tasks— if 
the Malays could be brought to accept subservience to the
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Chinese. The pro-Malayan school remained the preferred ap­
proach among the Colonial Service administrators through the 
19 30s although no concrete plan for self-government emerged. 
It would seem, however, that the idea of self-government and 
the pro-Malayan view wefe mutually exclusive. To accept the 
one with the other was to doom the first to failure; i.e., a 
western style democracy ruled by an elite group selected from
t \
among a minority. At any rate, until World War II, the Bri­
tish had acted to protect the primacy of the Malays, and the 
Malays, with few exceptions, were content to have it so.
The Japanese interlude had served to intensify the 
racial animosity between Malay and Chinese. As the majority 
of overseas Chinese remained loyal to Kuomintang China, 
resistance to the Japanese was accepted as a proper Chinese 
activity. In turn, the Japanese viewed the Chinese Malayans 
as enemies and treated them as such. On the other hand, the 
Japanese did not treat the Malays as conquered enemies. The 
Japanese propaganda ran thus: the Malays had been exploited
by the British, an enemy defeated and driven from the coun­
try. The Malays had been equally exploited by the Chinese, 
a race still locked in combat with Japan. The intent was to 
whip up hatred for the British, and to capitalize on the 
latent Malay hatred and distrust of the Chinese merchant,
^Among others see ibid.; Gullick, Malaya, pp• 75-76; 
and Bauer, "Nationalism And Politics In Malaya, pp. 505-506.
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8money lender, and foreman. They failed in the former but 
succeeded in the latter with the unwitting aid of the Chinese.
The Chinese assumed the task of resisting the Japan­
ese in Malaya. Malay participation was minimal and accounted 
for less than ten per cent of a force estimated to be six or 
seven thousand at its strongest. Other than rescuing a few 
Allied fliers and killing an .occasional Japanese, the MPAJA 
spent most of its efforts in acts of banditry and extortion 
against Malayan villagers. To add a final twist in a seem­
ingly unending tangle of circumstances, the MPAJA fell under 
the control of the MCP which owed its ideological foundings 
to the Chinese Communist Party. In addition to terrorizing 
the Malays, the MPAJA also turned their efforts to dealing 
with Kuomintang Chinese. When Mountbatten landed in Septem­
ber 1945, the first order of business was to suppress the 
civil disorder which had increased during the last weeks of 
Japanese rule. Malays were cutting the throats of their 
Chinese creditors in the urban areas, while MPAJA units free- 
booted about the countryside murdering Chinese and Malay 
alike, and settling old political and personal scores.
^By all accounts, the treatment of the Chinese during 
the war was a touchy subject.. The Malays, particularly the 
police, cooperated to the point of collaboration while the 
Japanese brutalized the Chinese. See Gullick, Malaya, 
p. 90.
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Although it took the remainder of 1945, general order was 
restored by SEAC f o r c e s . ^
In October 1945, the British Colonial Secretary an­
nounced plans to reorganize Malaya into a Malayan Union, the 
first step in beginning the preparations of the country for 
self-government as promised in the December 19 4 3 declaration 
of policy. The scheme soundedireasonable enough: the
Federated and Unfederated States would be joined in a Malayan 
Union; the Straits Settlements (Singapore excepted) would be 
absorbed by the adjacent states; and Singapore would be re­
tained as a Crown Colony (neatly dodging the problem of the 
overwhelming Chinese majority). There was to be a new Union 
citizenship for all born in the States, though those who 
held British citizenship by virtue of colonial status would 
retain it. To effect the reorganization, new treaties had 
to be negotiated with the Sultans " . . . which will enable
His Majesty to possess and exercise full jurisdiction . . .
[and] once done . . . [it is] intended in Order in Council
to constitute the Malayan Union.
Sir Harold MacMichael, a former High Commissioner for 
Palestine, was dispatched as Special Envoy to secure the 
treaties. In less than 90 days, MacMichael was back in
9See above, pp. 59-60.
l^George Hall, Colonial Secretary, quoted in New 
York Times, October 11, 1945, p. 3.
68
London; apparently, there had been little negotiation. The 
Sultans were in no position to argue any proposal. All had 
remained on their thrones during the occupation, and British 
confirmation of their status was not guaranteed. Several of 
the Sultans had cooperated with the Japanese to the point of 
collaboration and were not anxious to test MacMichael1s
authority to press the matter. The treaties were formal
! \l
renunciations of all nominal sovereignty; i.e., they formal­
ized the de facto authority held under the old treaties. The 
important difference was that, to all effect, the status of 
the States changed from protected state to colony. The 
legality of the treaties was questionable: (1) because of
the possible duress imposed by MacMichael; and (2) because 
two of the states, Johore and Trengganu, were constitutional 
monarchies whose Sultans were technically without authority 
to surrender sovereignty. However, the legal questions were 
ancillary to the outcry that came* upon publication of 
MacMichael's report and the British White Paper of February 
194 6 that promulgated the Union. The report established as 
one purpose of the reorganization to give a new status to 
the Chinese and Indians:
Although the special position of the indi­
genous Malays needed to. be safeguarded, 
reforms were overdue in the system of
representation in order to permit the claims 
of other races . . .  to receive reasonable 
satisfaction.il
The White Paper proposed Union citizenship for all persons 
who had lived within Malaya for ten of the fifteen years 
preceding the establishment of the Union? thereafter, citi­
zenship would require five years residency.
The Union was a complete "volte face of the pro- 
Malayan policy, and aroused a storm of protest among the 
Malays." The result was the unplanned "miracle" of 
MacMichael1s mission— it aroused a spirit of national iden­
tity among the previously disinterested Malays. Under the 
leadership of the British educated Data Onn bin Jaafar, 
Mentir Besar (Chief Minister) to the Sultaji of Johore, local 
Malay opposition groups sprang up in village and town 
throughout the peninsula. The reaction was the result of 
several factors. First, the four northern States had had a 
taste of autonomy during the war when the Japanese honored 
Thai claims to the area; neither had really bothered to rule. 
Second, the wartime activists of the predominantly Chinese 
MPAJA and their post V-J Day spree of terrorism had raised 
Malay anti-Chinese feelings to fever pitch. Third, the 
educated Malay civil servants and teachers who followed
11Sir Harold MacMichael, "Report on a Mission to 
Malaya," Colonial No. 194, London: His Majesty's Stationery
Office, February 1946, quoted in Bauer, "Nationalism In 
Malaya," p. 509.
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Dato Onn realized the inescapable, that the citizenship plan 
would inevitably lead to Chinese domination. By April 1946, 
Dato Onn had organized the first viable, politically-oriented 
group in the Malay's history, the United Malay National Orga­
nization (UMNO). The UMNO was not without allies among the 
English. There was a considerable outcry against the Union 
from the old-hand, Colonial Service Revolutionists. In 
November, the Labor Government conceded that the proposal was 
fatally flawed and proposed a constitutional conference to
include the leaders of the UMNO and their advisors, plus
. . . 12leading members of the Union administration.
The crystalization of a Malay cause celebre into a 
political force, in turn, caused the creation of a counter- 
force. When the British Government yielded to UMNO demands 
to withdraw the most controversial clause of the Union pro­
posal, i.e. the citizenship scheme, non-Malay groups joined 
in opposition to the UMNO. Fearing a formalization of Malay 
dominance, numerous non-Malayan communal and ideological 
groups joined together to form the All Malayan Council^ of
1.
Joint Action (AMCJA) . Before it shattered into pieces in
■^For various accounts see ibid., pp. 508-510; Mills, 
Malaya, pp. 34-4 2; Rose, Britain And South-East Asia, 
pp. T29-130; Mills, New World of Southeast Asia, pp. 204-205; 
and Ginsburg and Roberts, Malaya, pp. 46 3-465.
l^Among the groups joined in the AMCJA were the 
Malayan Democratic Union, Malayan Indian Congress, Pan- 
Malayan Federation of Trade Unions, and MPAJA-Ex-Service 
Comrades. The common strain was opposition to the UMNO while
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the communist uprising of 1948, the AMCJA did participate in 
the drafting of a proposed Federal constitution in May 1947 
that was to have some influence on the document which was 
finally adopted and established the Malayan Federation in 
January 1948.
The attempted Union was not the* only mistake made by 
the British Labor Government in their early post-war appraisal 
of the needs of Malaya. Unlike Churchill, the Government of 
Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee was not dogmatically opposed 
to communism in all its possible forms. Though well meant, 
but not exactly applicable in the nonindustrial Asian con­
text, the Labor Government encouraged reconstruction and 
expansion of trade unionism in Malaya. In keeping with the 
then general strategy of world communism, MCP leaders 
directed their early post-war efforts to infiltrating and 
gaining control of the unions. The disbanded MPAJA and its 
civilian supportive arm, the MPAJA-Union, reformed into the 
MPAJA Ex-Service Comrades Association and The People's Demo­
cratic Movement. As the only effectively organized political 
group, the MCP members emerged as leaders of the General 
Labor Union (GLU) from its inception in late 1945. The first
the forces for dissension were a Chinese majority and at­
tempts by the communists to dominate. See Ginsburg and 
Roberts, Malaya, pp. 464-4 65.
14Ibid.
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test of strength came in February 1946 when the GLU called a 
general strike ostensibly a holiday honoring the MPAJA veter­
ans. Mountbatten responded decisively, prohibiting the 
strike, but the British won this first confrontation as much 
a result of popular disinterest in the strike as they did 
through the government ban. Reviving a 1940 Trade Union 
Enactment Ordinance which required actual trade employment as 
a condition of holding union office, the British forced the 
breakup of the GLU, but it was soon reorganized into an 
equally communist-dominated Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade 
Unions (PMFTU). By mid-1948, the PMFTU controlled the major­
ity of key positions in some 277 registered unions and was
affiliated with the communist-led World Federation of Trade 
ISUnions
If the political events in Malaya into 19'4 8 drew any 
particular interest from the United States, it was not appar­
ent. Considering such events as those in progress in China 
and Indonesia, those taking shape in Indochina; and the 
relentless pressures in Europe, all of which were communist 
inspired if not directed by Moscow, it is understandable. To 
the American Department of State, the proposed Union; the
l^For the best summary of the MPAJA's post-war trans­
formation see ibid., pp. 462-467. The degree of communist 
influence in the PMFTU became obvious after it and the MCP 
were declared illegal in 1948 and the number of unions 
dropped from 399 to 162.
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formation of the UMNO and its opposition, the AMCJA; and the 
British policy of accommodation, demonstrated in the proposal 
for a constitutional conference, might have seemed one of the 
few situations in the world that was going well. The Bri­
tish were apparently in tune with the American policy to 
"favor a policy" leading to increased participation of depen­
dent people in governing their own affairs.
Beyond the common experience of the Japanese presence, 
the trial of each of the Southeast Asian countries had varied 
considerably in the details and effects of conquest/ occupa­
tion, and liberation. A few examples serve to illustrate.
The Philippines, Burma, Malaya, and the Netherlands East 
Indies had been taken in 19 41 and 194 2 in military operations 
which involved the clash of Japanese and western and colonial 
forces. In contrast, Indochina fell within the Japanese ring 
through negotiation with Vichy France, and thus escaped the 
destructiveness of major combat operations. When the tide 
turned against the Japanese, Burma, the Philippines, and,, 
portions of Borneo again became battlefields in the death 
struggle between Japan and the West. However, Malaya and 
Indochina were spared the intense destructive battles of 
liberation by the precipitous Japanese collapse. Cities such
l^One opinion is that :the British attitude of con­
ciliation and reasonableness was influenced by a desire to 
avoid action which might bring adverse American public opi­
nion. T. H. Silcox, "Forces For Unity In Malaya," 'inter­
national Affairs, Vol. XXV (October 1949), p. 462.
as Saigon and Kuala Lumpur survived the War unscathed, where­
as Manila was described as being the most devastated city of 
World War II, a distinction shared only with Warsaw.
The damage to Malaya had been extensive, though not 
fatal. The tin mines had fallen into ruin; mining equipment 
had been wrecked in the British retreat or wantonly destroyed 
by the Japanese. The tin smelters of Penang, the grandest in 
the prewar world, had met a similar fate. Bridges destroyed 
by the British remained down. Railroad tracks on the east 
coast had been ripped up and moved by the Japanese in an 
attempt to build a line to relieve Burma in 1943. By 1945, 
the rubber plantations had begun to recede into the jungles. 
The Japanese had literally choked on the riches of Malaya. 
Their industrial needs did not approach the world-supply 
capacities of their captive. Had the need existed, Japan had 
early-on lost both the security of the sea routes and the 
merchant fleet needed to move the materials. All the ad­
vancements, both social and economic, that had made Malaya a 
dynamic if primative country, suffered under the inept man­
agement and stupidly destructive practices of the Japanese.
Prospects for economic recovery were mixed. The 
ability of the great, entrepot ports of Singapore and Penang 
to become again centers of commerce and shipping would depend 
upon the reconstitution of world and regional markets and 
the ability of the mines and plantations to begin producing.
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For the mainland Malay States, recovery would be tied 
directly to the recovery of rubber and tin.
The most immediate problem facing the British upon 
their return to Malaya was an acute rice shortage. Starva­
tion was already a reality in some areas and malnutrition 
was widespread. Prewar Malaya had not made an attempt to
match population growth with increased rice production,
' ^
choosing to put farmland into the more profitable rubber 
tree and depending instead upon imports from the rice sur­
plus countries of Thailand, Burma and Indochina. In 19 39, 
Malayan rice production had been only forty per cent of 
annual consumption. At the time of liberation, Malaya's 
rice stocks were down to thirty-seven per cent of the 1940 
level. Efforts by the British Military Authority, the inter­
im government under SEAC, were able only to avert immediate 
disaster. Rationing was imposed and the British Government 
assumed responsibility for government-to-government pur­
chases. Although widespread famine was narrowly averted, the 
problem of rice supplies and prices remained to plague Malaya 
into the 1950s. As supplies increased, controls were relaxed 
and prices increased at a rapid rate into 194 8 when an ap­
proximate balance in supply and demand was achieved and 
prices began to stabilize in near free-market conditions. 
Though at a slowed rate of increase, prices continued to rise 
in the general inflationary environment. The high price of
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rice became, and continued to be, a major factor in the 
inflationary push which was to cause continual labor demands 
for wage increases, an issue that later served as fertile 
ground for both anti-British and communist agitation.-^
As previously explained, the recovery prospects of
the tin industry were gloomy; however because it remained a
shortage, strategic material, what tin could be produced was
at least assured a market; and, as a result of later British
and American military stockpiling programs, was assured
price stability. Yet, due to the diminished size of the
industry, it could not assume a leading role in the recovery 
18effort. The reconstitution of the shipping industry of the 
entrepot had to overcome the war losses to British shipping, 
a matter complicated by the precipitous termination of 
Lend-Lease in August 1945. The problem was somewhat amelio­
rated by the charter of liberty ships on cash terms worked 
out with the United States.
l^Cady, in Southeast Asia, Henderson, ed., pp. 15-16; 
Gullick, Malaya, pp. 85-86; Mills, Malaya, pp. 31-32; and 
Rose, Britain And South-East Asia, p. 192. Thailand profited 
most from the Malayan rice shortage; Siam had a rice surplus 
and did not hesitate to sell at exorbitant prices. See 
James C. Ingram, "Thailand's Rice Trade And The Allocation of 
Resources" in The Economic Development of Southeast Asia,
C . D . Cowan, ecH (New York: Frederick H. Praeger, 1964) ,
pp. 105-107.
•L S^ee above, pp. 31-33, n. 7, p. 33.
19Campbell, USWA: 1945-1947, p. 34 8.
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By mid-October, the survey of damage to the rubber 
areas was nearly complete and was encouraging; less than ten 
per cent of the more than 3,000,000 acres in hevea had been 
destroyed by the Japanese in their futile efforts to increase 
rice production. The trees had actually grown stronger dur­
ing the rest period, though the nonproductive years repre­
sented a loss of over $200,000,000. The British Ministry of 
Supply had located some 70,000 tons of rubber stored in
Straits ports, and the first shipment left for England on
o n
September 16th.
Several long-range problems were to slow the recovery 
of rubber to full production. Bridges and railway lines had 
to be repaired to regain plantation-to-port transportation. . 
The major problem, which would prove to be the limiting factor 
in the rate of recovery, was labor. The backbone of the 
plantation labor force had been the Indian immigrants who 
had moved back and forth between the two countries since 1910 
with the rise and fall of rubber fortunes. During the war, 
thousands had been conscripted by the Japanese to build the 
"railway of death" into Thailand. The survival rate among 
the Indian rail workers had been one in three. The appalling 
mortality and general population dislocation which occurred
^ New York Times, September 17, 1945, p. 3; Octo­
ber 3, 1945, p. 9; and Mills, New World of Southeast Asia,
p. 201.
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during the occupation had reduced the plantation labor force 
by thirty to fifty per cent, depending on the area.^
The unsettled conditions immediately following the 
Japanese surrender were anticipated and, by Anglo-American 
agreement, the wartime Controls of rubber procurement and 
allocation were unchanged. The two Governments continued to 
purchase for their domestic industries, the prices of natural
I V
and synthetic remained fixed at the wartime levels, and
international allocation was determined by the Combined War
Resources Board; however, the Board was to be terminated,
22at American request, on December 31, 1945.
Almost as soon as the first shipment of Malayan rub­
ber left for England, the British producers began to call for 
a removal of the price ceiling. The RFC's Rubber Reserve Cor­
poration was authorized to sell natural to the American con­
sumers only at the set price of $.22%. The British producers
^Ginsburg and Roberts, Malaya, pp. 323; 329-330;
John F. Cady, The History of Post-War Southeast Asia (Athens, 
Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1974), pp. 1 3 - 1 4 and New York
Times, October 31, 19 45, p. 9.
22The process of decontrolling world trade was swift; 
however, certain strategic shortage items, notably rubber 
and tin, were placed under international allocation commit­
tees after the War Resources Board was dissolved; e.g., Com- 
bined Tin and Rubber Committees, European Coal Organization, 
International Emergency Food Council ClEFC). By mid-1947, 
other than the IEFC, only the Combined Tin Committee re­
mained. See Campbell, USWA: 1945-1947, p. 352; New York.
Times, September 20, 1945, p. 33; and November 27, 19 45,
p. 10.
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argued as early as September that the price was too low; that 
the British industry was already paying $.30 for Ceylonese 
and South American rubber; and, in view of the need for 
dollar exchange, the British Government was being too coopera­
tive in agreeing to sell to America based on the Rubber
23
Reserve Corporation's break even price. In what could have 
been a reference to the future vof rubber price agreements, 
the Colonial Secretary in his announcement of the Union pro­
posal, leveled a warning at the consumers of Malaya's re­
sources as well as the owners of the mines and plantations.
The Secretary stated:
No one must rely upon privilege or regard 
Malaya simply as a source of material wealth 
. . . while it is to the advantage of all the
world and not only Malaya that the production 
of her mineral and agricultural resources be 
restored and developed by industry and research, 
it is right that the Malayan people should be 
assured of their full share in the rewards of 
their industry.24
Though part hyperbole— the majority of the mines and estates
were owned by British interests--the "full share" could only
have been a reference to an increase in the total price of
the resources, thereby yielding a net increase in wage and
revenue income of direct benefit to the people of Malaya.
That is quite different from increasing the Malayan "share"
23New Yor k Times, September 25, 19 45, p. 28. 
24Quoted in ibid., October 11, 1945, p. 3.
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which would require a decrease in somebody else's share; 
the question being, whose? The return on privately invested 
capital must be paid, or capital retreats, and that return 
has a finite floor. An increase in wages, revenues and 
operating expenses must be accommodated by the only remaining 
variable in the equation: selling price.^5
In November, the IRSG met for the second time in 
London with France sitting as a new member. The basis for 
predictions was more solid than it had been in January: a
minimal loss to Malayan capacity; no damage in Indochina; 
however, due to the inability of the Dutch to restore civil 
order, the extent of damage in Indonesia was still unknown. 
The IRSG concluded: the current price of rubber was too low
to bring out Malayan rubber; the estimate for 1945 was two to 
three hundred thousand tons; and the cost of synthetic pro­
duction was down to a level that would make it cost-
p c
competitive. There were rumors, emphatically denied, that
^Seventy per cent of the total (prewar) foreign in­
vestment in Malaya was British. There was considerable con­
centration: over half of the large rubber estates (over 100 
acres) were owned by London's Guthrie & Company; a third of 
the tin mines were controlled by the London Tin Corporation. 
The prewar return on a total investment of approximately 100 
million pounds sterling had been about ten per cent. See 
Rose, Britain And South-East Asia, pp. 6 3-64; and Mills, 
Malaya, pp. 19-20.
26u .s ., Department of State, "Report on The Second 
Meeting of The Rubber Study Group," The Department of State 
Bulletin, Vol. XIII (November 25, 1945), p. 840. For a 
British estimate of just how price-competitive synthetic 
was see Bauer, Rubber Industry, pp. 296-300.
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the American State Department had come with "deals" to pre­
sent to the producers, such as shutting down inefficient syn­
thetic plants (thus reducing production) in return for nat­
ural price guarantees. The estimates of the IRSG would sup­
port the necessity for "deals" since the prediction was that 
the estimated total supply of natural and synthetic rubber 
would exceed 2,700,000 tons by 1948— twice the prewar world 
consumption rate. The official American response was that 
synthetic production was a domestic matter, not within the 
province of the IRSG, and a question that must wait for the 
Batt Committee's report.^7 Apparently as a result of the 
facts and figures then coming from Southeast Asia, the issue 
of synthetic production cooled for the moment. The most 
optimistic estimate put the date for natural's recovery into 
1948; for the immediate future, rubber would remain a short­
age material and all, both synthetic and natural, would be 
needed. On the occasion of the first arrival of Malayan 
rubber in New York, the. RFC announced that the world alloca­
tion of natural would be determined by a six-nation Combined
^ New York Times, November 27, 1945, p. 10. In fact, 
the RFC was closing down some of the oldest, higher-costing 
operations, but the reason was inefficiency. High cost nat­
ural purchasing programs were also being ended; e.g., wild 
hevea hunting in the Congo and Amazon regions. See New York 
Times, January 17, 1946, p. 42; and Raymond Dennet and 
Robert Turner, eds., Documents On American Foreign Relations, 
Vol. VIII, July 1, 1945 - December 31, 1945 (Norwood, Massa­
chusetts: Princeton University Press, 1948), p. 172.
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Rubber Committee (Russia and China were to sit with the
2 othree producers and the United States).
The damage done to Malaya appeared to be repairable 
within a reasonable period of time, giving hope for a rela­
tively rapid economic recovery. Part of the capital needed 
for recovery would come from prewar revenue surpluses worth 
$216*000,000 and war damage Compensation schemes designed to 
assist the rubber and tin industries.29 December 1945,
the British Government announced a ten-year grant program for 
colonial areas of the Empire totaling about 120 million 
pounds sterling, five million of which was earmarked for 
Malaya. That the announcement was made, one day prior to 
passage of the Anglo-American Loan Agreement in the House of 
Commons with a flourished reference to the burden the program 
would place upon the meager financial resources of GreatI
Britain begs a comment,^
There are indications that some of the early post-war 
British decisions concerning or affecting Malaya were influ­
enced in part by the proposed Loan Agreement; still approval 
of the Loan by the American Congress was not a certainty.
^ New York Times, December 25, 1945, p. 1.
^Mills, Malaya, pp. 200-201.
^The grant was announced on December 12, 1945; the 
Loan was approved in the House of Commons the next day. See 
New York Times, December 13, 1945.
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It would, therefore, be reasonable to assume that British 
actions would be tailored to either support, or at least 
minimize objection to, the $4.4 billion credit proposed in 
the Agreement. Accepting that view offers a possible, 
partial explanation for three British decisions. First, the 
British agreed to supply the United States with Malayan rub­
ber at near bargain prices through the temporary continuation
of the wartime agreements despite objections from the Bri-
31tish producing industry. This suggests an unwillingness on 
the part of the British Government to engage in price hag­
gling while the Loan was still uncertain. Second, the an­
nouncement of the grant to Malaya, though a small part of a 
large program, may have been designed to encourage speedy 
passage of the Loan through the American Congress. Given the 
condition of the British economy in December 1945, it would 
seem that the ability to meet the full commitment to the 
dependent colonial areas would hinge on securing the Loan. 
Third, the reasonable and accommodating response to the Malay 
opposition to the Union proposal, and the permissive approach 
to anti-British groups suggested to at least one observer 
that a partial explanation lay in the desire to avoid any
3 9action that could generate adverse American public opinion. ■
^See below, pp. 86-89, for price agreements prior to 
and following American approval of the Loan.
^^Silcox, "Forces For Unity In Malaya," p. 462.
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This is not to say that there was a direct conscious connec­
tion between America and Malaya via the Loan, rather that 
the British view of Malaya was to some degree influenced by 
England's need to avoid any situation which could antagonize 
her potential creditor.
• ' '  v
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CHAPTER IV
MALAYAN RECOVERY AND THE RUBBER ACT OF 1947
The early post-war recovery effort in Malaya was 
launched with considerably more dispatch and success than in 
the Dutch and French areas. While the French and Dutch were 
forced to expend precious time and energy in restoring order, 
a necessary prelude to economic recovery, the British were 
able to concentrate their energies on restarting the income 
producing sector of the economic system.^ The tin mining 
and processing industries having been badly crippled, the 
burden of recovery fell upon the virtually undamaged rubber- 
producing industry.^ For the immediate future, at least 
until the pent up demand for rubber was met, a market for
-^By the end of 1946, the Dutch had managed only to 
restore a modicum of order in the urban areas of Java and 
Sumatra and the outer islands. The rubber-producing interior 
areas were left to nationalist guerilla factions. The Dutch 
insistence on regaining full political control remained the 
prime objective throughout the last all-out, unsuccessful 
Dutch police action in late 1948. See Cady, Post-War 
Southeast Asia, pp. 36, 46-48. By November 1946, the situa­
tion in Indochina had deteriorated to open fighting between 
French troops and Vietnamese communists. See ibid., pp. 50- 
52. For a graphic portrayal of the frequency of conflict 
in the two areas see "Chronology of Events" in Campbell,
USWA: 1945-1947, pp. 557-565.
^See above, pp. 31-33 and n. 7, p. 33.
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all that Malaya could produce was guaranteed. The remaining 
key variable in the rubber-recovery equation was the market 
price. The last time demand had so far exceeded supply had 
been in the years immediately prior to World War I at which 
time prices had soared to over $3.00 a pound.^ Had there 
been a free market in 1945, there is little question that the
price would have risen to a 1945-equivalent level. However,
1 \
as a result of a continuation of war time cooperation between 
the Governments of America and Britain, the question of a 
free market was deferred. Paramount among the differences 
between 1945 and 1914 was the dominant position of the United 
States, a position secured by the dependency of the colonial 
nations upon America for assistance in their economic recov­
ery. There was little the European colonial nations were 
capable of doing without American aid and cooperation and, 
therefore, agreement.
Because of the dominant place of rubber in the Malay­
an recovery potential, and the dependency of rubber upon the 
American market, the relationship between the two was direct. 
A decision in Washington concerning the price of natural rub­
ber, the specification of rubber used in a tire, or the pro­
duction and price level of synthetic rubber had direct and 
immediate impact in Malaya. What the United States decided 
would affect levels of employment, wages and revenues, and
^Yates, Forty Years of Trade, p. 113.
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the rate at which dollar exchange would flow through Malaya 
to London.
With the termination of the Anglo-American War Re­
sources Board set for the end of 1945, new arrangements for 
distribution and pricing of natural rubber were required. 
Under Government-to-Government contracts negotiated in Decem­
ber 1945 and January 1946, it was agreed between the British 
and American Governments that the British Board of Trade 
would remain the sole authorized purchaser of Malayan rubber,
and that the RFC would continue to pay the Board $.20% per
4 .pound. That level assured price stability for the American
manufacturers at near the wartime level. The contract
was good until the end of March 1946, temporary continuation
of the wartime price level having been agreed to as being
in the interests of all concerned until the prospects for
recovery became clearer. At the same time, the six nation
Combined Rubber Committee set the American quota at fifty per
. 5cent of Southeast Asia’s production.
The January agreement, good through March 1946, was 
later extended through June 1946 on the same terms. However, 
renewal of the contract at $.20% brought immediate protest
4
New York Times, December 25, 1945,p. 1; and 
January 29, 1946, p. 28.
^Ibid., June 4, 1946, p. 36.
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aimed at the British Board of Trade from London rubber 
interests.^ Again the Labor Government was criticized for 
allowing a source of dollar exchange to slip away. The Lon- 
don-headquartered British Rubber Growers Association stated 
that the price was too low to support both the cost of opera­
tions and the cost of the recovery effort which in their view 
was being "thwarted by low prices and politicians." In May, 
in a move to still growing producer resentment, the Board of
Trade raised the price they would pay to $.30% (equalling
7the price paid m  Ceylon). London then called for a meeting 
with the Americans, Dutch and French to negotiate new price
7
agreements. Though the British were forced, at least 
through the end of June, to sell to the United States at a 
loss, the Americans could be persuaded only to raise the 
price to $.23%. In return, the RFC was authorized to make 
direct purchases of its allocated amounts, rather than buying 
through the Board of Trade's agents.8
^Ibid., April 8, 1946, p. 33; and April 26, 1946, 
p. 17. The protest was made through the British press, the 
Government having declined to comment perhaps due to the 
critical phase of the Loan's passage through Congress. The 
complaint had basis inasmuch as the price of rubber remained 
at the 1941 level while the price of rice was 5 to 10 times
1941 levels. See ibid., November 30, 1946, p. 23; and above, 
pp. 75-76.
7New York Times, May 7, 1946, pp. 28-29; and June 4, 
1946, p . 36.
8Ibid., June 21, 1946, p. 31. The advantage was 
being able to select quota shares. The RFC bought through 
private agents under contract.
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By August, authorities were predicting a recovery to
seventy per cent of Malaya's prewar capacity by the end of 
91946. For reason not precisely clear, the Rubber Growers 
Association requested that a free market be restored upon 
expiration of the British-American contract at the end of 
1946. Though the Association admitted the probability that 
the price could fall, the reason given was that it was time 
for the price to "find its own l e v e l . T h e r e  are several 
possible explanations for the apparently risky proposal by 
the Growers Association. They must have known that the 
American Government's stated commitment to the synthetic 
industry was limited to the maintenance of an on-line capa­
city sufficient to the national defense requirement, a capa­
city one-fourth the size of the million ton facilities built 
during the war and less than half the 1946 production level. 
The level of production had been and was to continue to be 
reduced as supplies of natural rubber became available; i.e., 
the level of synthetic production was being fitted to the 
demand situation as a supplement to natural. The great ques­
tions were? how much of the Government's national capacity
9Ibid., August 12, 1946, p. 32. Passage of the Loan 
in July, removing it as a cause for concern, may have em­
boldened the growers,
10The Batt Committee, Second Report was made public 
on July 28, 1946. See ibid., July 29, 1946, p. 25? and 
below, pp. 96-97.
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would be absorbed by private industry, when, and at what 
level would they produce? If a privately-owned American syn­
thetic industry was to compete with Malayan natural/ other 
things being equal/ then the choice would be based on price. 
In the conditions of 1946, the price of synthetic was lower 
than natural/ the price of natural having been fixed by 
Anglo-American agreement.^ If free market operations could 
be restored before the American Government began to divest 
itself of its synthetic monopoly, and natural was reduced to 
a price that rendered synthetic noncompetitive, American 
manufacturers would not step forward and absorb an unprofit­
able industry. In short, a price fall in natural in 1946 
could cool private industries1 interest and "scotch the 
synthetic snake. On the other hand, the British producers
may have meant exactly what they said; i.e., it was time to 
discover the worst. Supplies were increasing faster than 
originally anticipated. The Combined Rubber Committee's 
fourth quarter Malayan allocation to the United States had 
been met easily with a month to spare, and estimates showed 
that Malaya would produce more than had been allocated for
l^The wholesale RFC price to industry in August 19 46 
for synthetic and natural was $.18% and $.25% respectively. 
There was a $.0 3% premium in natural; i.e., it cost $.0 3% 
less to process than synthetic; natural, therefore, still 
cost $.04 more than synthetic.
12"Trouble In Synthetic," p. 165.
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the last quarter of 1946. As early as September 1946, then, 
Malaya was facing the threat of overproduction in terms of 
total allocated, or committed d e m a n d . T h o u g h  the United 
States immediately agreed to take additional supplies in the 
fourth quarter, the Malayan Rubber Grower's Association 
(meeting for the first time in Singapore since 1941) asked? 
what action would the British Government take to assure ab­
sorption of the rising supplies?^ Before the question could 
be answered, stocks of rubber began to back up in Malaya, and
Singapore banks suspended loan operations secured by unal-
14located rubber. The British Board of Trade immediately 
agreed to purchase all unallocated rubber; called for a meet­
ing with the United States? and announced plans to restore
15free market operations by the end of the year. The Board 
of Trade was then quickly faced with a new problem. Because 
of the uncertainty of the moment, only the United States and 
Great Britain had taken delivery of their allocated share.
The Board of Trade was now forced to absorb additional sup­
plies with no guarantee that buyers could be found? i.e.,
/
-^New York Times, August 12, 194 6, p. 32? and August 
23, 1946, p. 9. One problem ignored was the need and ability 
of the non Anglo-American consumers to absorb stocks. The 
consuming industries in Europe; e.g., Italy, had to be first 
brought into production.
^ Ibid. , September 9, 1946, p. 54.
l^Tbid., September 26, 1946, p. 2.
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the unsold allocated supply plus the unallocated supply were
raising stocks in the United Kingdom.
At the September meeting between representatives of
the Board of Trade and the State Department, the Americans
drove a hard bargain, agreeing to purchase additional amounts
of rubber but at $.20% rather than the earlier contract price 
16of $.2 3%. However, should the amounts not be available in
Malaya, any shortage was to be made up from United Kingdom
17stocky but at the $.20% figure* Apparently, the American 
representatives blamed the British for the tangle; i.e., by 
allowing the growers to publicly raise the spectre of a free 
market, the British had forced the rest of the consumer 
world to adopt a wait and watch policy.-^
The Board of Trade *s problems were not yet over. In 
October, authority was given for London rubber brokers to 
contract for supplies to be delivered to countries other 
than America and Great Britain, and in November, the London 
Rubber Exchange in Mincing Lane was reopened.-^ As a result, 
the unallocated supplies in Malaya were snapped up at just 
over $.20% and Malaya was unable to deliver on the September
-^Ibid., September 25, 1946, p. 34.
17Ibid., October 2, 1946, p. 49.
^Ibid. , OcLober 7, 1946, p. 34.
Ibid. , October 11, 1946, p. 38; October 27, 1946, 
p. 41; and November 19, 19 46, p. 46.
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RFC contracts. Before the terms of the contract were met,
using supplies from United Kingdom stocks, the British Govern-
ment lost $7,000,000.20
If the Malayan rubber producers did not have enough
to concern them, the American elections of November 1946
added to their worries. At the third meeting of the IRSG,
held in November, the British expressed concern over the
Republican majority that had been elected to the United States
Congress. Would the traditional party of laissez-faire, high
tariff and protectionism move to put synthetic into the
private sector, and then protect the infant industry against
21cheap natural rubber? The answer to the British question 
would have to wait. The legislative authority for the 
United States Government to produce synthetic rubber as a 
Government monopoly was due to expire at the end of March
1947, and the task of proposing new legislation would fall to
2 2the new Congress.
Meanwhile in Washington, the Batt Committee had been 
at work since September 1945 attempting to develop an
20Statement of Alan Grant, Senate Subcommittee Hear­
ings On The Rubber Act of 1947, p. 125.
^ New York Times, November 23, 1946, p. 26; and 
November 30, 194 6, p. 26. At the third IRSG meeting, France 
announced an end to government purchase for January 1, 1947. 
The IRSG also invited any who wished to do so to attend 
further meetings.
^See above, pp. 40-41.
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integrated policy approach to the problems of natural and 
synthetic rubber. In the Committee's first report, published 
in February 1946, it was recognized that an interim approach 
was all that was possible for the moment; the still unsettled 
conditions in the Dutch and French areas and the sketchy pic­
ture of the rate of recovery in Malaya still clouded the 
future. The Committee's recommendations were more or less 
adopted as they were being formulated: continue high levels
of synthetic production to keep the total supply and the 
demand of rubber in balance; continue international alloca­
tions as determined by the Combined Rubber Committee; main-
!
tain price stability (a free market would serve only to dis­
criminate in favor of the United States); declare surplus 
that part of the synthetic industry excess to a capacity of
600,000 tons (the figure had double significance as the 
estimated minimum capacity for a sustained national emergency 
and the estimated consumption for 194 6); maintain a Govern­
ment stockpile of natural; continue domestic Government 
allocation and specification controls and request legislation 
to replace the Second War Powers Act, due to expire in March 
1947; relax the controls on natural specification as supplies
increased; and, study ways to secure private ownership of the
2 3 .synthetic industry. As already noted, these recommendations
^Batt Committee, First Report, pp. 22-31.
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were reflected in the price and allocation agreements that 
were concluded in January, March and June of 1946, and the 
continuation of Government controls.
The second Batt Report, published in mid-July 1946, 
dealt in considerably more detail with the problems which 
were already beginning to take form. The Committee recog­
nized that the time when synthetic would be forced into com­
petition with natural was approaching faster than originally 
anticipated. Therefore, if in the interest of national 
security the synthetic industry had to be maintained at a 
given level of production, by what means and to what extent 
would the Government protect the industry? The dilemma was 
to legislate production and assure consumption of synthetic 
while at the same time retaining "conformity with our inter­
national obligations and economic foreign policy."^ In 
short, how could America deny a portion of the world*s rub­
ber market to the Far Eastern producers and, at the same 
time, lead the way toward an end Of trade preferences and 
the creation of a multilateral system of world trade?^4
In an effort to cover all possible alternatives, the 
Committee evaluated the traditional tools of protectionism, 
but categorically rejected each. Direct tariff was labeled
24An example: prewar France was a prime user of
discriminating import tariffs. In May 1946, the United 
States had persuaded France, in negotiations concerning a 
loan, to revise the tariff downward. See below, p. 100.
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"a blunt instrument for the purpose desired" that would in­
vite the complacency that infects protected industry, and 
would have a generally adverse effect on foreign and domestic
9 c
trade. J Import quotas were found to be no more than another 
way to achieve the results of tariff, but with the added 
disadvantage of depressing world production. Other methods 
considered included a domestic excise tax on natural products 
(forcing a synthetic preference); a vastly complicated certi­
fication plan whereby natural would be allocated on the basis 
of synthetic consumption; and a Government subsidy to the 
synthetic industry.27 It is worth noting that in the solu­
tion evaluation-selection process of the Batt Committee's 
considerations, the assumption that synthetic was a quality 
and price competitor of natural was not fully accepted. On 
the contrary, in the rejection of the more radical proposals, 
such as import tariffs and quotas, the rationale included 
" . . .  domestic consumer preference for natural rubber be
9 Q
ignored."
The Batt Committee's preferred solutions gave equal 
attention to the three major problems. First, maintain a 
minimum required level of synthetic production in the interest
^^Batt Committee, Second Report, pp. 44-45.
26ibid., p. 45, 27Ibid., pp. 46-49.
28Ibid., p. 44.
of national defense only, thus minimizing the adverse ef­
fects of forced consumption and Government monopoly of a con­
sumer industry. Second, terminate the Government's natural 
purchasing monopoly as soon as possible in the interest of
free trade. Third, get the synthetic industry into the
29hands of private ownership as soon as possible? that would, 
in view of the Committee, require careful supervision. The 
Government should sell to private industry facilities capable 
of maintaining the national defense production level of
250,000 tons; or, if bidders could not be found, retain own­
ership and continue production under RFC direction. Sale, 
of course, assumed that the capacity could be marketed on a 
profit level acceptable to industry. An additional 350,000 
ton capacity should be sold? or, if bidders could not be
found, retained as Government assets and placed in a nonpro-
30ducing, stand-by status for use m  a national emergency.
Although the movers and shakers among the Batt Com­
mittee's membership cannot now be readily identified, it is 
reasonably apparent in the record of later Congressional
^ Ibid. , p. 50.
30Batt Committee, First Report, p. 26. The estimated 
requirement for synthetic production in 1947 was .35-.4 
million tons based on the assumption of equal recovery rates 
in Malaya and in Indonesia. The estimate proved correct but 
for a> different reason? Malaya exceeded expectations while 
Indonesia lagged.
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examination of the rubber policy question that the State 
Department representatives championed the recommendations to 
terminate exclusive Government purchase, and rejection of the 
use of tariff or quota to protect synthetic. William T. 
Phillips and Donald D. Kennedy were the Departments ex­
perts. 31
During 1946, there were two items high on the State
Department's list of priorities which touched implicitly
upon the issues being wrestled in the restricted context of
the Batt Committee. The first was the on-going, wholly
American initiatives to establish a multilateral system of
world trade through establishment of a United Nations Inter-
32national Trade Organization (ITO) The second item was
llphillips, Chief of the Commodities Division, parti­
cipated in the Washington discussions with the British con­
cerning termination of the IRRA in 1943-44. Kennedy, Chief 
of the International Resources Division, led the American 
delegations at the IRSG meetings and price talks in 1946.
Both were alternate representatives of the State Department 
to the Batt Committee for their Chief, William L. Clayton, 
Assistant Secretary of State For Foreign Economic Affairs. 
Clayton's advocacy of Hull's ideas on multilateralism and the 
principles of free enterprises are reflected in his leader­
ship during negotiation of the British Loan, the proposed 
International Trade Organization, and the General Agreements 
On Tariffs And Trade. Clayton's tempered opinion that the 
prewar British preferential system of trade should not be 
reconstructed must have filtered through Phillips and Kennedy 
into the deliberations of the Batt Committee. For a well- 
balanced summary of Clayton and his economic views see 
Richard N. Gardner, Sterlinq-Dollar Diplomacy: The Origins
and the Prospects of Our International Economic Order, New 
Expanded Edition (New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1969), pp. 195-199.
^Gardner's "minimum" definition of a multilateral 
system is adopted: " . . .  one in which barriers to trade
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securing Congressional passage of the British Loan which, 
including formulative negotiations, took from September 19 45 
until July 1946. Each was dependent upon the other in one or 
another way. Two of the terms of the British Loan were di­
rectly influenced, if not dictated by, the ITO Proposals.
On the other hand, progress of the ITO Proposals depended 
upon passage of the Loan since any meaningful international 
discussions of trade would be dependent upon Great Britain's 
financial state of health. Since both Britain's monetary 
position and the terms of international trade directly af­
fected Malaya, and inasmuch as the State Department was the 
formulating agency for both American policies, it followed 
that the Department would seek to assure that the rubber 
policy to be enunciated by the Batt Committee would not con­
flict with either. By the time the Committee was well into 
its task, it had become increasingly evident that, due to the 
continued instability in the Dutch and French areas, the dis­
cussion of Far Eastern rubber was for all practical and im­
mediate purposes a discussion of Great Britain's Malayan in­
dustry .
and payment are reduced to moderate levels and made nondis- 
criminatory in their application. In monetary policy . . .
[it] does not require . . . elimination of all . . . ex­
change control . . .  It does require the 'convertability' 
of currencies . . .  In commercial policy . . . [it] does not
mean the elimination, but only the reduction of tariffs and 
other trade barriers . . . Barriers remaining after this re­
duction must be non-discriminatory in . . . application."
Ibid., p . 13.
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In February 1946, the United States had submitted 
Proposals for Consideration by an International Conference 
on Trade and Employment to the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council which, in turn, adopted the proposals and 
established a Preparatory Committee to draft a convention for 
international consideration. The agenda for the committee, 
which did not meet until October due to delays in passage of 
the Loan, was based primarily upon the American Proposals.
The Department of State had diligently sought to secure 
agreement for the principles embodied in the Proposals among 
the trading nations prior to the first meeting of the Prepa­
ratory Committee. For example, in the negotiations concern­
ing the British Loan in the fall of 1945 (prior to submission 
of the Proposals to the United Nations), the British had been
prevailed upon to indorse the Proposals as part of the condi-
33tions of the Loan. In negotiations with the French in 
May 1946 concerning the conditions of a loan and settlement 
of Lend-Lease accounts, an agreement in principle had been 
elicited.
■^"Article 9: Import Arrangements," Financial Agree­
ment Between The Governments Of The United States And The 
United Kingdom quoted in ibid., Appendix. For a brief 
account of British acceptance of the principles see Campbell, 
USWA; 1945-1947, pp. 384-385. For a complete discussion 
see Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 188-223.
■^The French expressed "complete agreement" and an 
intention to change duties to an ad valorem basis with no 
increase over prewar levels. See Campbell, USWA: 1945-1947,
pp. 385-386.
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Two principles of the Proposals were clearly re­
flected in the Batt reports. The first concerned the problem 
of surplus commodities. During American preparations for the 
ITO Preparatory Committee, there had been a difference in the 
approaches of the Departments of State and Agriculture. The 
State Department favored only selective, protective exclusion 
of certain surplus commodities (primarily foods) from the 
multilateral trading scheme envisaged for an ITO charter.
The Department of Agriculture disagreed, favoring a protec­
tive commodity provision that would have committed the United 
States to buffer stock plans, two-price systems and compre­
hensive commodity agreements. The State Department objected 
on the grounds that the proposed, selective ITO rules, de­
signed to handle only "burdensome surplus," would lose all 
meaning; and that use of devices, such as the buffer stock, 
could be subjected to political pressure from producer- 
interests to use them as a means of raising, rather than 
stabilizing, prices. Though the State Department's view pre­
vailed, the issue between the two Departments was not resolved
until the eleventh hour before the October meeting of the
35Preparatory Committee.
The second ITO issue related to the Batt Committee's 
deliberations was the use of quotas. Many countries, parti­
cularly the underdeveloped, wanted freedom to use quotas
^5Ibid., pp. 340-343.
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expressly as a means to protect their infant industries. The 
Department of State prevailed in the debates in the Prepara­
tory Committee and the ban on the use of quotas was accepted 
as the rule; although, as in the case of commodities protec­
tion, provisions for the exception were adopted.^
Both principles are evident in the second Batt Com­
mittee report. There was no consideration of price stabili­
zation devices for the natural rubber surpluses which were 
predicted to appear after 1948. That the ITO principles 
regarding surplus commodities were entering the status of 
operational policy was also reflected in the hard bargaining 
of the United States in September 1946, wherein America low­
ered the price to be paid for rubber in the face of the, 
albeit artificial and temporary, surpluses of Malayan rub­
ber. A second indication that the principles of the Pro­
posals prevailed in the Batt Committee was the reportedly 
unanimous condemnation of continued Government purchasing as 
constituting a "price cartel" and a recommendation that the
O O
program be abandoned at the end of 1946.
36Ibid., pp. 388-389. Examples included Australia, 
China and Latin American nations.
3^Above, pp. 99-100.
38»Trou]:)ie In Synthetic," pp. 116-117; and U.S., Con­
gress, The Rubber Act, H.J. Res. 118, 80th Cong., 1st. sess., 
March 17, 1947, Congressional Record, Vol. 93, p. 2151.
There was later indication that the condemnation was less 
than unanimous. Batt had sent a letter to the Chief of the 
Rubber Reserve Board (RRB), the allocation authority, in 
which he solicited RRB1s support for continued purchase
In the post-war 1945 negotiations concerning the Bri­
tish Loan, two points had direct relevance to the monetary 
relationship of England and British Malaya, and, therefore, 
an indirect relationship to American-Malayan trade. The 
first was the so called "sterling area dollar pool." During 
the war, London had secured voluntary agreement among the 
sterling area countries that all American dollars would be 
held in a common pool? i.e., no country was free to spend its 
dollar earnings. The pooled dollars were released by the 
British Government to best effect in the effort to control 
the huge, wartime imbalance in trade with America. Two 
effects were achieved: (1) dollars were conserved and spent
only for items deemed essential to the war effort? and (2)
the dollar holdings of Great Britain were kept at a level not
39 .otherwise possible. The second point in the Loan negotia­
tions was the maintenance of the "blocked sterling balances." 
Again a wartime expedient, the sterling area countries ran up 
considerable balances in the supply and provisioning of Great 
Britain (in short, British debts outstanding)? however, these 
debts were not paid? rather, they were carried as balances,
40offset by reverse trade, to be settled at the end of the war.
before Congress. Batt wrote that by so doing "Government can 
wield an effective price influence on Far Eastern rubber mar­
kets." See Statement of Alan Grant, Senate Hearings: The
Rubber Act of 1947, p. 124.
39Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 214-215.
40Ibid., p. 205.
The effect of the dollar pool and blocked sterling 
balances, if allowed to continue after the war, were incom­
patible with the goals of the proposed ITO. In the example 
of Malaya, the effect would have been a classic example of 
bilateralism. The dollars to be earned in rubber could not 
be spent by Malaya in dollar markets. The value of Malayan 
products sent to England would be paid for in the form of 
sterling balances, redeemable in reverse trade from England; 
or, if drawing was permitted at all, only in nonconvertible 
sterling currency— meaning that the best use of the currency 
would be within the sterling area. Such a system of trade 
would be open to America at one point and in one direction 
only. Malaya would export to the United States but would 
import from the sterling area. It would be a revised, strict­
er version of the prewar trade triangle with the added burden 
imposed of reconstituting British area markets in addition 
to earning dollars. Suffice it to say that it was the 
imperial preference achieved through monetary restriction 
rather than trade restriction. Under the terms of the Loan, 
however, the British agreed in principle to end both practices.
In addition to its relationship to the ITO Proposals, 
the application of the two conditions of the Loan Agreement 
to this discussion of Malayan-American. trade is important, 
though not critical, because the United States was to later
41 . .Article 7 and 10, Financial Agreement, m  ibid.,
Appendix.
105
question British compliance with the Agreement. It is a 
very involved issue clouded by the fact that neither nation 
ever agreed to the other's characterization of "pooling" and 
"blocking"; therefore, compliance was equally debatable.42 
However, the American question was to be raised in the con­
text of Malayan rubber because that trade was again to be­
come the sterling area's largest earner of dollar surpluses, 
and Malaya was to build up a considerable sterling balance 
in the Bank of England.4  ^ Without getting any further afield, 
the point to be made here is that the Batt Committee's 
Reports indicate that the eyes of its State Department mem­
bers were fixed on the ITO Proposals, that the State Depart­
ment's view prevailed, and that the Committee's recommenda­
tions were structured and selected in large measure in ac­
cordance with their compliance with the principles of the ITO 
Proposals. It could be said that the rubber policy was an 
experimental application of the principles of multilateralism, 
rubber being a suitable laboratory subject inasmuch as it 
remained one of the few commodities under Government control.
Returning to August 1946 and the British growers' call 
for restoration of a free market for natural rubber, some
42Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 214-215.
^Andrew Roth, "Britain's Secret Sterling Balances," 
The Nation, Vol. 174 (February 23, 1952), pp. 174-175.
note must be taken of the reaction of the American manufac­
turers. Within a week of the British growers1 proposal, 
Collyer of the B. F. Goodrich Co. answered with a public re­
quest for termination of exclusive RFC purchase by the end 
of 194 6 . ^  However, his request contained elements of a 
challenge; Collyer also called for an end to all controls and 
the sale of the synthetic industry to private interests. He 
noted that at the current price levels, Malayan rubber would 
have to fall from the August wholesale level of $.25^ to less 
than $.17 to be competitive with synthetic, and expressed 
confidence that synthetic could "stand on its own two f e e t . " 4 5  
Long a leading spokesman for an early return to a free market 
in natural, decontrol of the synthetic industry, and an end
to Government ownership, Collyer was quickly joined by other
4 6industry leaders. As one observer put it, "imitation . . .
in the U.S. rubber industry has always been so prompt as to
verge on the simultaneous."4  ^ Herbert E. Smith of the U.S.
Rubber Co. added:
We favor free markets in both natural and syn­
thetic . . . in applications totaling more than
250,000 tons [the National Defense minimum] . . *
synthetic rubber today can hold its own in com­
petition with natural on a price and quality
basis.
44New York Times, August 14, 1946, p. 33. 45Ibid.
46por Collyer-quotes spanning 1944-46 see "Trouble 
In Synthetic," p. 118.
47Ibid., p. 157. 48Ibid., p. 116.
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The lines were straightening. The British producer 
was ready to endure the expected price drop presumably to 
reestablish a market and preference for natural before syn­
thetic could try its wings. The American manufacturer was 
ready to take the synthetic industry out from under Govern­
ment protection and use its capacity to meet current demand 
to depress the price of natural while simultaneously estab­
lishing a market for synthetic. That the British gauntlet 
was thrown prematurely was evident in the immediate market 
confusion which resulted in the September market glut and 
the price loss in the RFC contract to absorb the glut.
Though not evident for several months following the American 
industry's challenge, it developed that the American call for 
free markets and free enterprise was also premature and badly 
miscalculated. By February, when Congressional hearings be­
gan to consider America's policy beyond expiration of the 
Second War Powers Act, the industry was to come before the 
House and Senate Committees and, almost to the man, ask for 
a continuation of Government controls including purchase 
as being in the best interests of National defense and the 
consuming public.
The "Big FOur" of the American rubber industry had 
become convinced that the synthetic rubber products of 1946 
were equal to the natural product of 1941; more importantly, 
the industry believed that the consumer was equally
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49 .convinced. The Goodrich Co. had launched an extensive 
advertising campaign, initiated by competitors, designed to 
convince the public that a tire made mostly of American syn­
thetic was superior to the prewar natural product. The first 
indication that all was not well came with reports of a 
"whisper" campaign among competing retailers implying that 
their product was actually 100% natural; sales reflected the 
amount of natural claimed. A faux pas by the well-intentioned 
President of Seiberling Rubber Co., J. Pennington Seiberling, 
caused an industry furor. Known in the trade as L 'affaire 
Seiberling, he had publicly warned consumers not to drive over 
fifty miles an hour on synthetic tires during the coming warm 
months of 1946:
He was told [by his peers] he had committed 
a deplorable act that would trammel the 
hands of the U.S. delegation, about to go 
into bargaining with the British [the June 
1946 meetings] on the price of the next 
batch of rubber.
A second blow fell in October in L 1 affaire DeVoto when Benard 
DeVoto, travel editor of a major American magazine, recounted 
how Mhe blew through 10,000 miles . . . and out through five 
brand-new synthetic tire casings." An industry marketing 
study confirmed the worst; " . . .  70 per cent of the public 
preferred natural rubber tires, and only 8 per cent synthe­
tic . . The industry was faced with a real dilemma— if
^ The "Big Four” are B. F. Goodrich Co.; Firestone Tire 
and Rubber Co.; Goodyear Rubber Co.; and United States Rubber 
Co.
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the Congress was to grant their August request for an end to
Government controls:. Should hut one manufacturer break ranks
and produce a natural-tire, competition would drive the
others to follow suit, the price of natural would soar, and
the infant synthetic industry would collapse:
There is no question that the boisterously 
free enterpriser of rubber would prefer to 
get out from under the umbrella held by 
government over the infant synthetic indus­
try— if only they could be assured that 
synthetic would not fold up with the umbrella.
Congressional Hearings were conducted in February and 
March 1947 on Joint Resolutions To Strengthen The Common 
Defense By Maintaining An Adequate Domestic Rubber-Producing 
Industry, first in the House of Representative's Committee 
On Armed Services, then in the Senate's Committee On Banking 
And Currency. The Batt Committee's second report of July 
1946 served as the legislative proposal and, with the excep­
tion of the recommendation to terminate the Government's 
purchase program, survived the mark-ups with little contro­
versy. in the Hearings/ the center of debate was whether or 
not the Title III of the Second War Powers Act, which pro­
vided for exclusive Government importation of natural/ should 
be allowed to lapse at the end of March 1947. The two
^The discovery of the consumer preference for nat­
ural and other blows to confidence in synthetic are recounted 
in "Trouble In Synthetic," pp. 116-118, 157.
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Congressional Rubber Subcommittees followed the Batt Commit­
tee's lead to restrict the purpose of legislation to assure 
an American production capacity only insofar as the interests 
of national security required. However, the industry's re­
presentative argued strongly for acceptance of their newly- 
developed thesis that national security was threatened by a 
free, natural rubber market, and would impose an unfair 
burden upon the American consumer. The issues of patriotism 
and consumer interest were reenforced by ancillary arguments 
concerning charges of British manipulation of the market, 
and the threat of unemployment among American synthetic 
workers should the synthetic industry be curtailed in the 
face of mounting natural supplies. The industry claims con­
cerning the past, and warnings for the future were found 
lacking when Government witnesses challenged some of Big 
Rubber's claims. First, since V-J Day, the industry had 
enjoyed significant expansion of their domestic market and 
profit margins over the prewar experience, the larger part 
of the profit increase being a direct result of the price
C 1
stability insured by the Government's supply monopoly. x 
In addition to unprecedented price stability, the industry 
had been able to abandon the prewar practice and cost of
^Estimates published in mid-19 47 show sales among 
the Big Four rose from $755 million in 1941 to over $2 
billion in 1946. Profit on sales rose from 4.9 per cent to 
7.3 per cent. See "Trouble In Synthetic," pp. 118, 161-163.
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carrying a five-month raw material inventory. Assured of .
52
supply by tbe RFC, they. carried but two months. Second, 
the warnings of the vulnerability of national security to a 
repeat of the crisis, of 1942 lost much of its impact when 
expert testimony was given that there had not been a critical 
shortage of rubber after 1942 other than new natural— wartime 
needs had been met with reclaimed and synthetic. In fact, 
after 1942, the tire shortage had been induced through ra­
tioning to curtail nonessential, private use as a means to
53reduce the consumption of gasoline. Third, it had long 
been a claim that the RFC synthetic operation did not cost 
the Government anything; i.e., synthetic was sold at the 
break-even price. That was true in late 1946 with the phas­
ing out of low-efficiency plants but had not been true for 
the majority of the history of synthetic. It was also 
claimed that the Government's purchase operation cost the 
tax payer nothing and that continuation would protect him 
because of its price influence. However, the chief of the 
Rubber Reserve Corporation's buying operation explained that 
such was true only on ex-dock sales. The practice was that 
the RFC held the stocks for sixty or more days until needed
52See Statement of John C. Houston, Jr., Commissioner 
of The Civilian Production Administration, Senate Hearings: 
Rubber Act Of 1947, p. 65.
^3Ibid., p. 66.
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by the industry— the RFC bore the costs for maintaining over
half the industry supply inventory. The practice could
" . . . only be described as a sweet set-up for the industry
5 4and just the reverse for the American tax payer."
Representative Fred L. Crawford, Chairman of the 
House Subcommittee On Rubber, led the fight for termination 
of Government purchase. He pointed out that since the end of 
British purchase and allocation by the Combined Rubber Com­
mittee (both ended 1 January), Malayan rubber was flowing 
away from the United States. Faced by the RFC's maximum bid 
price of $.20^, the Malayan dealers simply tried everybody 
else at $.20-5/8 first, and they usually got it. Not only
were supplies shrinking, but what did come to the RFC agents 
55was inferior. Crawford found an unexpected ally among 
rubber's Big Four when Harvey S. Firestone, Jr. of Firestone 
Tire and Rubber Co. supported termination. Firestone dis­
missed his peers stating, "they fear a price rise":
There is both a moral and economic issue . . .
Do we kill the Malayan goose, the golden egg 
of the export market and throw the economy of 
British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies out 
of kilter?56
^Statement of Alan Grant in ibid., pp. 124-133.
-^Statement of The Honorable Fred L. Crawford in 
ibid., pp. 62-63.
^Statement of Harvey S. Firestone, Jr. in ibid., 
pp. 168-170., It is worth noting that Firestone owned or 
controlled a 75,000 ton natural capacity in Liberia. The
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In a strong letter in support of termination, Acting
Secretary of State Dean Acheson dismissed industry charges
that the British were out to recall the days of the IRRA:
On this point the British Government has 
stated . . . that there is no truth in 
allegations that there are any regulations 
'which set up a seller's market or that 
the United Kingdom has any arrangement 
with the Dutch affecting the sale or price 
of natural1 . . .57
The advocates for continuation of the purchase plan 
asked for extension until at least September 1947 on the 
argument that by then Indonesia would be settled and the flow 
of rubber increased to. a point which would dampen the expected 
price rise. This group included all of the major producers 
(except Firestone) and represented some seventy per cent of 
American consumption.^^ Though there was an attempt to amend 
the Bill in the House, the termination of Government purchase
only other American-controlled operation of significance was 
the U.S. Rubber Co.'s Malayan Rubber Co. which totaled only
20,000 acres.
57Letter to the Committee from the Honorable Dean 
Acheson read by Robert C. Hill, in ibid., pp. 111-113.
5^The most vociferous advocate was Paul W. Litchfield 
of the Goodyear Tire And Rubber Co. Known in the trade as 
"Stability Litch," he leveled charges that the Far East 
producers were holding back stocks waiting for the free 
market, and predicted that if purchases were continued until 
September 1946 synthetic and natural would be in "settled 
competition" by March. 1947. Testimony, ibid., pp- 94-102.
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remained a key provision of the Act. There was no con­
certed effort among the rubber interests to end the Govern­
ment monopoly of synthetic. The advocates of free enterprise 
were not willing to take the capital risk necessary to pur­
chase an industry that, for the moment, had little market 
security. The industry consensus was that if a natural tire 
was placed on the 1946 market " . . .  the U.S. synthetic 
industry would last only a few weeks . . ."60 jn addition to
continued Government purchase, the industry also called for 
an increase in the required amount of synthetic to be used. 
This appears to have been an attempt to insure that a signi­
ficantly large portion of the synthetic capacity was kept in 
operation against the day when synthetic gained consumer 
confidence, at which time the industry would be willing to 
buy the Government facilities rather than build their own. 
However, the Bill provided that the ratio would be adjusted
^U.S., Congress, The Rubber Bill, H.J. Res. 118,
80th Cong., 1st. sess., March 17, 1947, Congressional Record, 
Vol. 93, pp. 2156-57.
60»»Trouble In Synthetic," p. 116.
61specification had limited natural use; e.g., in 
1944-45, the allowable percentage in a tire was 11 per cent; 
by 1947, the amount was about 23 per cent. Under the Act of 
1947, specification would apply to synthetic only with a 
sliding minimum adjustable by the Executive to 25 per cent. 
The reason for ’the slow relaxation despite the rising rate 
of natural supplies was the phenomenal demand (tires were 
produced at a rate of 100 million per year by the first 
quarter of 1947).
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as natural became available, but would not fall below a 
level which would insure consumption of 250,000 tons, the 
national defense figure. The argument was over what that 
figure should be; the Government estimated the lowest figure 
at 25 per cent based on a million ton consumption. The in­
dustry counseled 30 per cent.
Inasmuch as the question of Government purchase was
answered, the future of the synthetic facilities remained the
unknown. Since a capacity of at least 400,000 tons was
estimated as needed until natural production fully recovered?
and, inasmuch as the private industry expressed no desire to
purchase the facilities, the question was deferred pending
6 2further Congressional study. The Rubber Act was, there­
fore, termed "interim legislation" with an expiration date of 
April 1, 1948. In the interim, the power to determine speci­
fication was delegated to the Executive, and the RFC retained 
ownership of facilities with a total capacity of 600,000 tons.
The Rubber Act of 1947 passed both houses of Congress 
by March 24th and was signed into law on March 31, 1947.
g 2
Statement of John L. Collyer in Senate Hearings: 
Rubber A c t  o f  194 7, pp. 82-85. Collyer was the exception and 
worked three sides of a triangle. He favored continued pur­
chase for price stability; thirty per cent specification to 
insure the highest guarantee of synthetic consumption; and 
public sale of the synthetic facilities presumably because 
Goodrich had held the technological lead, held the largest 
part of the domestic market in special synthetic products, 
and operated a large share of the facilities. See above, 
pp. 40-41 and "Trouble In Synthetic," p. 157ff.
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No case can be made that there was any discernahle political 
partisanship involved in the Act? on the contrary, it was of 
little public or political interest. The issues were left 
to the experts.^3 Once the industry was heard and the Govern­
ment *s experts had reached a consensus, there was little 
expertise in any other quarter that could be brought to bear. 
Though there was a difference among both the industry*s and 
Government's experts on the issue of continued purchase, 
that difference was blurred. In examination of the possi­
bilities of disposing of the synthetic facilities, the Gov­
ernment noted the problem of "scrambled" Government and 
privately-owned equipment. Just so, the Government and pri­
vate experts were "scrambled." Batt returned to Capitol Hill 
as the President of SKF Industries to support his Committeefs 
recommendation for termination. Conversely, William J. Sears 
of the Rubber Division of the Office of Temporary Controls, 
and a former executive of the U.S. Rubber Co., testified for
63<rhe Batt Committee Reports remained the blue print 
for Congressional action. With the exception of the attempt 
to amend the Bill CH.J. Res. 118) in the House, the debates 
in both houses were uninspired and at times uninformed.
Time in the House was yielded for a lengthy tribute to Saint 
Patrick, and the discussion went to the comparative virtue 
of synthetic and natural golf balls on two occasions. In 
addition to the House Debate already cited see also U.S., 
Congress, Senate, Debate on H.J. Res. 118, 80th Cong., 1st. 
seas., March 24, 194 7, Congressional Record, Vol. 93, 
pp. 2437-2448.
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continued purchase, a position opposite to that of his
. 64Government superior.
Despite the fears of skyrocketing prices, the price 
of natural rubber remained relatively stable following pas­
sage of the Rubber Act of 1947. Harvey Firestone took credit 
for the return to free enterprise in newspaper ads, and was 
given credit for being correct in his prediction that the 
price would not go through the roof. What was not given any 
particular notice was the fact that the tire industry had 
overproduced prior to March 31st; by early June, the indus­
try was reducing inventories by selling tires at a ten per 
cent discount, and had laid off some 3,000 rubber workers.
The industry also curtailed new purchases of natural, a 
temporary method of controlling price as effective as any, 
while they waited for production to bring supply and demand 
into balance.^^
In a general comment covering the post-war period,
The Council on Foreign Relations was to observe later that
Statement of William L. Batt, Senate Hearings; 
Rubber Act of 194 7, p. 141; and U.S., Congress, House,
Mr. Fred L. Crawford quotes Sears* testimony before House 
Armed Services Committee in debate on H.J. Res. 118, 
Congressional Record, Vol. 93, p. 2151.
^Although the industry may have overproduced to 
ease the transition into a free market, it appeared that 
there was also some truth to claims that the Malayan growers 
were holding back. The result was that in June the price 
broke, falling from $.21 to $.15; a further drop to $.10 was 
feared. See "Rubber, The Bad Old Times,” Time, Vol. 49 
CJune 23, 1947), p. 86.
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economic policy was " . . . more effected by special groups
than any other phase of foreign policy." The Council 
noted that legislation often reflected the " . . .  the per­
suasiveness of those who stood to gain or lose rather than 
the over-all requirements of foreign policy." Since the 
decision to end Government purchase was a major policy deter­
mination affecting a high-value commodity, some judgment is 
necessary. In this case, the determination was guided by 
a very small group of legislators and administrators who 
accepted the view that the United States should not continue 
a course of positive action that would control a free market 
to the expressed advantage of an American industry. That 
the decision was in opposition to a large industry says 
something for the virtue of the legislative system.
^Richard P. Stebbins and others, USWA: 1950 (New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), pp. 85-86.
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CHAPTER V
MALAYA IN TRANSITION AND THE RUBBER ACT OF 1948
By the end of 19 47, Malaya was returning to normal.
In the main, the potential for difficulties, posed by the 
Union reorganization initiated in 19 46 had been defused 
through ongoing negotiations among the British Government and 
representatives of the Malayan races. Indications were that 
the proposed alternative to the Union, the Federated Malayan 
States, would provide the centralized organization necessary 
to the movement of Malaya toward increasing home rule, and 
would be acceptable to a majority of those who had opposed 
the Union. Of importance equal to the relative political 
calm was the success of the economic recovery borne on the 
recovery and expansion of the rubber-producing industry. 
However, modification to the terms and direction of prewar 
trade reduced the possible benefits of the recovery; i.e., 
each advantage was counterbalanced to a varying degree by a 
disadvantage.
By comparison with the Dutch and French areas,
Malaya*s recovery was phenominal in terms of gross figures.
In 1947, Malaya registered both an increase in the value of 
exports and an increase in her share of the area's exports
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relative to prewar days. The value of 1947 exports from 
Malaya, Indonesia and Indochina was $875,000,000? Malaya ac­
counted for 70 per cent of the total. This startling domi­
nance by Malaya was the net effect of opposite forces.
Whereas Malaya registered gains in the value of exports over 
prewar days, Indochina and Indonesia registered losses. 
Measured against the value of 19 36 exports, 1947 values 
showed that: Malaya's exports increased 59 per cent
($612,500,000 over $364,100,000); while Indonesia decreased 
56 per cent? and Indochina decreased 64 per cent. In addi­
tion, the position of Indonesia and Indochina among regional 
traders had changed. In 1936, the order of magnitude among 
the five leading exporters had been: Malaya? Indonesia?
Indochina; Ceylon? and Siam. In 1947, the order was:
Malaya? Ceylon? Indonesia? Siam? and Indochina.^
Because of the requirement to import manufactured 
goods (all three countries)? food (Malaya and Indonesia)? and 
industrial products for recovery (all three); the trade ad­
vantage of prewar days was lost. Again, however, Malaya was 
by far in the better condition. In 1947, Malaya's exports 
equaled 94 per cent of imports; Indonesia's exports were 67 
per cent? and Indochina's exports were only 49 per cent of 
imports. A truer indication of just how bad conditions were
1Brodie, "Postwar Patterns of Trade," pp. 125-126.
in Indonesia and Indochina emerges when it is noted that 
imports were also far below prewar levels.
Despite the value increases in Malayan exports, her 
trade advantage evaporated solely in the changes in her trade 
with the United States. There was little change in Malaya's 
trade with the rest of the world. Excluding the United 
States, Malaya's exports in 1936 amounted to 66 per cent of 
imports: imports consisted primarily of rice from the surplus
areas of Southeast Asia, manufactured goods from England 
and Japan, and tin ore and rubber imported for reexport. In 
1947, the figure actually improved to 70 per cent, a reflec­
tion of the general scarcities among traditional exporters. 
However, in trade with the United States, Malaya's imports 
increased from 3 per cent of exports in 1936, to 31 per cent 
in 1947. In short, the increased importation of goods from 
America had changed Malaya from a trader with a $69,100,000 
surplus in 1936 to a trader with a $34,300,000 deficit in 
1947.2
The source of strength for the Malayan recovery lay 
in the rubber production industry. More rubber was produced 
in 1947 (645,000 tons) than in 1940 (547,000 tons).^ However,
2Ibid. In South Asia, including India and Ceylon m  
addition to Southeast Asia, Siam was the only country to show 
a trade surplus and an increase in both exports and imports.
3
The Federation of Malaya Annual Report, 1948, pp. 50, 
67 cited in J. M. Gullick, Malaysia (New York: Frederick A.
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the advantages of increased rubber production were somewhat
offset by the slow recovery of tin production, which reduced
■>
the total possible export value? in 1947, tin production was
only one-third of the 1940 level.^ The greatest disadvantage
to Malaya was, however, the change in the terms of trade.
The approximate loss in purchasing power to the South Asia
region was 13 per cent, meaning that 13 per cent less could
be purchased with each dollar earned in export than could
have been purchased in 1 9 3 6 . 5  However, the terms of trade
were far worse for Malaya as an exporter of rubber and tin
and an importer of rice:
The average export price of rubber in 194 7 was 
only 113 per cent of the 1936 price? of tin,
162 per cent of 1936 . . . Prices of such major
imports as textiles and grains, however, were 
roughly 400 and 425 per cent higher in 1947 
than in 19 36.5
In terms of the two key items in Malaya's trade, the
loss was considerable. In the 1930s, a pound of rubber
bought five pounds of rice? "the ratio was about one for one
in the late 1 9 4 0 s . T h e  total effect of the increase in
rice costs plus the slow recovery of domestic production put
Praeger, Inc., 1969), p. 102. (Malaysia is a revised re-
titled edition of Gullick's earlier Malaya.)
4Ibid.
5Brodie, "Postwar Patterns of Trade," p. 124 i 
6Gullick, Malaysia, p. 103.
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the total 1947 supply at 50 per cent of the 1940 level.^ 
Though a simplification, suffice it to say that despite in­
creases over prewar days of 59 per cent in the value of ex­
ports and 20 per cent in rubber production, Malaya was in 
deficit and still in a rice shortage. However, the trends 
were all in the proper direction giving promise of return to 
a surplus trade status in 1948.
The position of the United States in the economy of 
British Malaya had clearly changed. As the majority consumer 
of Malaya's largest trade item, the American manufacturer had 
an influence upon the price of rubber heretofore denied by 
the old IRRA. The price of rubber varied but slightly above 
the American bid. In addition, Malaya was now part of an ex­
panding American market in the Far East but, because of its 
small size relative to total American export trade, Malaya 
had no influence on the price to be paid for American goods. 
As such things are measured, the conditions of trade were to 
the advantage of the United States and of considerable dis-
g
advantage to Malaya.
7Total supply in 1940 was 970,000 tons; in 1947, it 
was 494,000 tons. Federation Annual Report, pp. 51-52 cited 
in ibid.f p. 101.
8Brodie explained the causes as the changes in the 
debtor status of South Asia and the advantage of the United 
States to exploit the markets ahead of other sellers immedi­
ately after the war in "Postwar Patterns of Trade," pp. 132- 
133.
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The Rubber Act of 1947 had done little to clarify the 
future prospects of natural rubber. Though natural was 
traded in a free market after April 1, 1947, the larger ques­
tion of the future of the American synthetic industry was 
still unanswered, having been deferred. Despite the tempo­
rary price losses of June 1947, the general conditions of the 
market were stable and brought little audible complaint from 
the British producers. One Malayan planter, commenting on 
the American reduction in buying in the summer of 1946, 
recalled the days of the IRRA and the disadvantaged position 
of the Americans at that time, and allowed that the United
States could not be blamed for "not wanting it to happen 
9twice." Despite the lower price, the Malayan industry 
registered significant activity in 1947. Malaya exported 
953,697 tons of rubber in 1947, over half of which went to 
the United States.^ Earlier estimates had predicted that 
the demand for rubber would slacken in mid-1947 as the pent- 
up demands of wartime were met; however, as seemed so often 
the case, the predictions were wrong and demand remained 
high, thus guaranteeing a market for Malaya natural, and the
9"Rubber: The Bad Old Times," p. 86.
^ New York Times, January 10, 1948, p. 28. The total 
of Malayan exports was always higher than production would 
indicate^because of entrepot imports, processing, and re­
export. Indonesia was estimated to produce only about
350,000 tons in 1947, most of which went through the Malayan 
entrepot. See ibid., November 30, 1946, p. 23.
United States1 synthetic capacity which was still producing
above the national defense minimum. In fact, in anticipation
of the predicted slackening of demand and the increasing
supply of natural, the RFC began to curtail its synthetic
operations, reducing the on-line capacity to about 400,000
tons. By early 1948, in the face of continued demand, the
Government had to reimpose allocation controls on synthetic
11to insure an equitable distribution among manufacturers.
By early fall 1947, the price of natural had recovered 
from the summer slump to approximately $.23. The total earn­
ings for British rubber shipped to America for 1947 was 
$339,000,000 and resulted in a dollar surplus to the British 
Commonwealth of approximately $200,000,000. Malaya had again 
become the leading earner of dollars for the sterling area.
If 1947 had been a good year for the Malayan production in­
dustry, it had been even better for the American manufacturing
12industry which exceeded $3 billion in sales.
In regard to the progress of Malaya toward self- 
government within the Commonwealth, the tactical errors of 
the Malayan Union were approaching correction in late 1947.
^ Ibid. , February 14, 1948, p. 23.
12See Address by William T. Phillips to the Chemical 
Engineers Club of Washington, D.C. quoted in U.S., Congress, 
House, Extended Remarks of Fred L. Crawford, January 22, 1948, 
Congressional Record, Vol. 94, pp. A420-A421; and New York 
Times, January 2, 1948, p. 31.
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During the constitutional conference of 1946, the British 
Colonial Office and the UMNO had agreed upon changes to the 
Union scheme. On the matter of general organization, it was 
agreed that the nine States would constitute the Malayan 
entity and that Singapore would remain a British Crown Colony. 
There were two key concessions granted to the Malays in the 
constitutional proposals of 1946. First, the citizenship 
rules were tightened to grant automatic citizenship only to 
those born in the area of the new Federation States. All 
others were required to apply for Federal citizenship and had 
to have resided in the Federation area for fifteen of the 
preceding twenty years. Second, the pre-Union prerogatives 
of the Sultans were reinstated and expanded. The British 
retained authority only in the areas of finance, national 
security, and foreign affairs. As observed by Gullick, the 
Sultans were no longer to be subject to advisors and resi­
dents, but would be subject to new pressures from the people 
working through the constitutional prerogatives of represen­
tative government.  ^^
Before initiating the new Federation, the British 
wisely submitted the draft constitution to the various
l^Gullick, Malaysia, pp. 105-108; and Ginsburg and 
Roberts, Malaya, p. 44 6. As a technical matter, the Union 
was formally created in April 1946, replacing the British 
Military Authority under Mountbatten with the Union headed 
by Sir Edward Gent. The Union organization proceeded with­
out imposition of the citizenship rule.
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communal associations for their perusal and advice so as to 
avoid the appearances of fait accompli which had been a 
factor in the reaction to the Union announcement. As men­
tioned earlier, the opposition to the UMNO and the reestab­
lishment of the Anglo-Malay prerogatives consisted primarily 
of the AMCJA, a strange collection of political bedfellows 
consisting of racial groups, communists and various other 
assorted interests. The AMCJA demands included unification 
of Singapore and the States; an elected legislative body; 
equal rights for all residents of the country; a return of 
full sovereignty to the Sultans; Malay control of custom and 
official status for the Moslem religion, and programs to 
advance the economic development of the Malay community.
These last three demands were a concession on the part of the 
Chinese-Indian majority to the Malay members of the AMCJA. 
Almost as soon as the British agreed to scrap the Union 
scheme in November 1946, the most influential Malay group, the 
Malay National Party (MNP), withdrew from the coalition and 
formed the Malay Council of Joint Action (MCJAl• The domi­
nance of the Chinese and Indian majority, and the strong 
influence of the MCP were more than the Moslem/ Malay MNP 
could comfortably tolerate. The MCJA was short-lived as it 
was joined by other Malay anti-British or anti-UMNO groups 
and reformed into a Peoples' United Front (Pusat Tenga 
Ra1 ayat or PUTERA) . The AMCJA and PUTERA maintained a loose
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alliance of expedience into 1948. By mid-1947, then, there 
was some clarity: the AMCJA-PUTERA coalition was united
inasmuch as it opposed the proposed constitution of the 
Federation. However, the AMCJA was opposed on the grounds 
that the new constitution separated Singapore, and that the 
citizenship laws were unfavorable to the Chinese and Indians, 
while the PUTERA was more in opposition to the dominance of 
the elitist, civil servant, and Sultan characteristics of the 
UMNO.14
The opposition to the Federation plan was a failure.
The weakness of the AMCJA-PUTERA coalition was 
its inherently negative character. Its own 
program was an uneasy set of compromises be­
tween irreconcilable points of view which 
carried little conviction or popular appeal.
What appeal it might have had was undermined by the strong 
influence of the MCP, which had members in both factions and 
resorted to such heavy-handed tactics as strike and intimi­
dation of any in opposition. An attempt to show strength and 
unity through a general strike in October 1947 showed the 
disarray within the coalition? " . . .  the moderates in this 
coalition were not prepared metaphorically to man the bar­
ricades." The plan for Federation was, in fact, supported 
by the British, the Sultans, the Malay upper-class, and most 
of the Malay peasantry. The opposition was simply too
14Victor Purcell, Malaysia (New York: Walker And
Company, 1965), p. 109; and Ginsburg and Roberts, Malaya, 
pp. 466-468.
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factionalized to oppose successfully. Faced with British 
resolve to form the Federation in February 194 8, the Malay 
PUTERA accepted the inevitable and the coalition dis-
1 c:
solved.
From 194 5 until formation of the Federation, the MCP, 
working through its domination of the PMFTU, was producing 
increasing disenchantment among the British Labor Government. 
The policy of restraint, based on the hope that the Malayan 
labor movement would mature, gave little promise of fulfill­
ment. The Labor Government went so far as to send represen­
tatives of the boiler-makers, printers, and railway men's 
unions to Malaya to advise the Commissioner. The English 
labor leaders were appalled at the propensity of the PMFTU 
and its affiliates to call strikes for little reason, though 
they paid no strike benefits.
Although a thorn to Malayan recovery, the MCP was 
unable to gain popular support, primarily because of the lack 
of a cause. True, the price of rice was terribly high and 
wages were an issue, but that was not enough. Attempts at 
raising the ire of the people against the British, even to 
the extent of digging up the question of British abandonment 
of Malaya in 1942, were unsuccessful. The Malays were for 
the most part indifferent to such issues and, after all, 
recovery was moving along, people were working, the Sultans
15Gullick, Malaysia, p. 109.
were on their thrones, and the British were proceeding with 
plans for increasing participation in government. Similarly, 
despite the AMCJA, the majority of the Chinese were still 
Kuomintang loyalists and therefore shunned the communist-
infected AMCJA, being content to remain clear of Malayan
, . . . 16politics.
On January 21, 1948, the Sultans signed pacts with 
the Crown which ended the Union and established the Federa­
tion. The event was marred only by an ineffectual MCP-led 
protest strike of 30,000 Singapore workers on February 1,
1948, the day on which Sir Edward Gent was sworn in as the
High Commissioner of the Federation of Malayan States at 
17Kuala Lumpur.
American interest in the events in Malaya in 1946- 
1947 was minimal, if any. The relative calm that accom­
panied the internal political maneuverings and the transition 
to the Federation were overshadowed by the deteriorating 
events elsewhere. The attempts by General George C. Marshall 
to gain a working truce between the Communists and Nationalists
16Hessell Tiltman, "Letter of The Week; Singapore New 
Deal," New Republic, Vol. 116 (April 21, 1947), p. 3ff; and 
Gullick, Malaysia, pp. 109-110. The AMCJA had one partial 
success in 1947 when it allied with the Singapore, Chinese 
Pan-Malayan Council For Joint Action to boycott city elections 
as a protest against the Federal constitution. Less than 
one-fifth of eligible Chinese cast ballots.
17New York Times, January 22, 1948, p. 16; and 
February 2, 1948, p. 7.
in China had been abandoned in early 1947 and by July, the 
Nationalists were in a state of full mobilization. In 
Indonesia, the hopes of the Cherbon Agreement, signed by the 
Dutch and the Republic of Indonesia, were shattered by a 
failure of the two to reach a working.agreement. By July 
1947, the Dutch mounted military operations against the 
Republic, and American attempts to provide good offices were 
abandoned a month later. In August, Ho Chi Minh rejected 
France’s "last" offer to incorporate all of Vietnam into the 
French Union, France to retain control only in the areas of 
foreign policy and security. However, at the middle and 
lower levels of the United States Government, British Malaya, 
the rubber producer, was still under scrutiny as the House 
Armed Services Committee went to work on revisions to the 
Rubber Act of 1947 which was due to expire at the end of 
March 194 8.
Within a month of passage of the Rubber Act of 1947, 
the Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee began 
preparations for consideration of replacement legislation.
This time, however, the committee was to rely upon its own 
study and analysis, rather than those offered by the Executive 
as had been the case with Batt Committee's reports. Following 
informal meetings with Government and industry experts, which 
began in May 1947, the Subcommittee toured synthetic plants 
in Texas, Kentucky, and Ohio where hearings were conducted.
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The questions posed by the Subcommittee were much the same as 
those posed in the earlier interim legislation: how much on­
line synthetic production must be maintained and what should 
the standby capacity be; how was absorption of the on-line 
capacity to be assured; if the plants were to be turned over 
to industry, by what method; "What protection against foreign 
imports . . . should be established," and what effect would 
synthetic have on the world market?-^
The unpredictable representatives of industry came 
before the Congress in considerable disagreement. There was 
Big Rubber, a majority of the production capacity; the re­
claimed rubber industry, and local industry interests. In 
Texas, the Subcommittee heard an impassioned and chilling 
account of the effects of Government control. The reduced 
consumption of rubber following the glut of tires on the 
market in mid-1947 had led the RFC to begin reducing synthe­
tic output. The decrease later proved to be temporary, a 
false indication that the predicted leveling of demand (which 
did not occur) was taking effect. As a result, curtailment 
of production had caused the lay-off of Beaumont workers; and, 
almost simultaneously, the price of natural, which bottomed
Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking And 
Currency, National Rubber Policy, Hearings before a subcommit­
tee of The Committee on Banking And Currency, on S. 2187 and 
H. Res. 5314, 8GthCong., 2nd. sess., February 24th and 
March 2nd, 1948, p. 15 (hereafter cited as Senate Hearings: 
Rubber Act of 1948).
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19at $.14 in July, quickly rose to $.23. In a slightly 
oblique attack on Government control, the representatives of
the reclaimed rubber industry complained that use of synthetic
20depressed the use of reclaimed rubber.
In hearings conducted in Akron, Ohio, the Subcommittee 
joined by Representative Lyndon B. Johnson, ranking member of 
the full Committee, heard Big Rubber propose the selling of 
the RFC's facilities to those who wished to buy. The pro­
posal was based on arguments that the time had come for the 
industry to take its place in the free enterprise system.
The proposed method of plant disposal drew close questioning 
from Johnson, who displayed considerable anomosity toward the 
"free enterprisers," noting for the record that three of the 
potential buyers, the Goodrich Rubber, Firestone, and General
Rubber and Tire Companies, were under Federal indictment for
21price fixing m  the tire business. The proposed method of 
disposal of the plants became capsulized in Johnson's lexicon 
as the "markdown, peel-off, and walkaway," a litany to be
-^Statement of Judge J. M. Coombs in U.S., Congress, 
House, Committee On Armed Services, Synthetic Rubber, Hear­
ings before a subcommittee of The Committee on Armed Ser­
vices, H. Rpt. 220, 80th Cong., 1st. sess., November 7th and 
15th, 1947, p. 500 (hereafter cited as House Subcommittee 
Hearings; Rubber Act of 194 8).
2QIbid., pp. 5Q0-5Q1. See also Statement of William 
Welch, Senate Hearings; Rubber Act of 1948, p. 36..
2-*-House Subcommittee Hearings; Rubber Act of 1948,
p. 5273.
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22repeated several times before a bill would be passed. The 
plants were to be written off and sold at bargain prices over 
a period of time as industry was disposed to absorb them, but 
should the venture prove improfitable, the owner could aban­
don the facility as a bad investment. In short, Big Rubber 
was willing to take the RFC's facilities so long as there was 
no substantial capital risk involved. However, the proponents 
of sale also advocated the continued specification of synthe­
tic use as the one sure means of keeping the national defense, 
minimum production capacity on-line. As Johnson was later
to report on the floor of the House, " . . .  what they wanted
fwas for the Government to step out of their end, the produc­
ing end, while still keeping control over the consuming 
2 3end." J Apparently, the "markdown, peel-off, and walkaway" 
proposal "closed out of town," for no such proposal came 
before the more formal hearings held in Washington.^4 How­
ever, Johnson's greatest objection was based upon his suspi­
cion that the Big Four were the only ones capable of absorbing
^ Ibid., p. 5426.
23u.S., Congress, House, The Rubber Act of 1948, H.R. 
5314, 80th Cong., 2nd. sess., March 5, 1948, Congressional 
Record, Vol. 93, p. 2256 (hereafter cited as House Debate, 
Rubber Act of 194 8).
^U.S., Congress, House, Committee On Armed Services, 
Full Committee Hearings on H.R. 5314, To Strengthen National 
Security . . . By Providing For The Maintenance Of An Ade­
quate Domestic Rubber Industry . . ., H. Rpt. No. 2 30,
February 17, 1948, 80th Cong., 2nd. sess. The full committee 
approved the bill without change.
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the plants, and by so doing would create a monopolized indus­
try.
The House Subcommittee was chaired by Representative 
Paul Shafer who had chaired the Subcommittee in 1946-1947. 
Though Crawford, the sponsor of the Rubber Act of 1947 re­
mained, Shafer took the reins and sponsored the proposed 
replacement legislation, H.R. 5314, A Bill to Strengthen 
National Security . . . By Providing For The Maintenance Of
An Adequate Domestic Rubber-Producing Industry. The require­
ment for a synthetic production capacity as necessary to the 
national defense, and the minimum level of on-line and stand­
by capacity were assumed. The questions at issue were: 
should specification and allocation be continued; and should 
the RFC's facilities be turned over to private industry?
The bill, as proposed by Shafer, incorporated all the 
needs of defense and the mechanisms to insure that they were 
met. However, in treating the question of plant disposal, 
the Shafer Bill authorized sale of the plants after April 1, 
1948, but only with Congressional approval, such approval to 
be requested by the President upon recommendation of the 
National Security Resource Board. S^fer found himself meet­
ing head-on with Johnson who was adamantly opposed to making 
any facility available to the industry. Johnson threatened 
to introduce counter-legislation that would prohibit sale
until after June 1950. Although he opposed sale on the 
grounds that it benefited the purchasers to the distinct 
disadvantage of the nonpurchasers, the proposed blocking 
legislation spoke of the need to "remain free of foreign de­
pendency . . . [and to] be protected from crude [natural]
rubber cartels . . . including excessive increases in 
25price." Though the Shafer Bill cleared the full committee 
with the disposal provision intact, an understanding must 
have been reached between Shafer and Johnson for Shafer 
amended the Bill on the floor of the House to include a two-
2 g
year delay in plant disposal just prior to passage.
Unlike the Rubber Act of 1947, the consideration of 
H.R. 5314 was accompanied by a small measure of Government 
lobbying against the proponents of sale. Crawford gave the 
Congressional view. Noting the continuing disorder in Indo­
nesia he predicted continued shortages of natural rubber. In 
support of the retention of the Government’s facilities, he 
pointed to the price impact upon consumers of tires made with
synthetic produced by other than the RFC and sold at other
27than a Government-fixed low price. Admiral Charles E.
25New York Times, January 31, 1948, p. 10.
2 fiHouse Debate, Rubber Act of 1948, p. 2265. For full 
text of H.R. 5314 see ibid., pp. 2261-2264.
27 .
Address by Honorable Fred L. Crawford to the Chemi­
cal Engineers Club of Washington, D.C., January 13, 1948 in 
U.S., Congress, House, Extension of remarks by Crawford, 80th 
Cong., 2nd. sess., January 1948, Congressional Record, Vol.
94, pp. A423-A424.
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Braine, Chairman of The Army-Navy Munitions Board and spokes­
man for the national defense argument, stated that the United 
States did not wish to "ruin any country" by continuing 
Government production but warned that, regardless of the 
desire to cooperate, " . . .  we must always be in a position
where decisions regarding our national defense are in our 
2 8hands." Phillips of the Department of State spoke of the 
effect the rubber policy could have on world trade. His ap­
proach was slightly more articulated. Assuming the need to 
assure a minimum level of synthetic production, he warned of 
the need to keep mandatory consumption to an absolute minimum. 
He cited the gains being made in the establishment of the ITO 
but noted that restrictive trade agreements were creeping 
back into the system. Indicating a concern not previously 
raised, Phillips went on to caution against the use of Govern­
ment stockpiles as a means of depressing price.29 There was 
also some muted opposition to the proposed continuation of 
specification and allocation in the general context that 
Government control of any sort was "Socializing Industry.
^Address by Rear Admiral C. E. Braine to the Chemical 
Engineers Club of Washington, D.C., in ibid., pp. A350-A352.
29"international Implication of Our Rubber Policy," 
Address by William T. Phillips to the Chemical Engineers Club 
of Washington, D.C., in ibid., pp. A420-A421.
•^"The Trend: Socializing Industry," Business Week,
No. 963 (February 14, 1948), p. 120.
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The Shafer Bill passed in the House on March 5th, 
followed by hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate 
Banking And Currency Committee. Although the industry mus­
tered its biggest guns in an effort to delete the two-year 
delay on sale of the RFC * s facilities, the only point of 
real discussion turned on a last moment of confusion among
O 1
representatives of the Executive.J In a letter to the Sub­
committee Chairman, Senator John W. Bricker, Presidential 
Assistant John R. Steelman, formerly of the OWMR, requested
that the authority of the legislation be granted "indefin-
32itely" m  lieu of the two-year period. The request was 
supported by the Department of Commerce suggesting a rekind­
ling of the dispute between the Departments of State and 
Commerce over the use of commodity controls in the ITO 
P r o p o s a l s . 33 However, upon the recommendation of Kennedy of 
the State Department and the RFC, the two-year delay was 
retained. Kennedy indicated that the Department favored 
Government control over the next two years to insure that 
synthetic was not used to depress the price of natural, but
31See statements of Harvey Firestone, Jr./ J. P. 
Siberling, and Robert S. Wilson, officers of Firestone, 
Siberling and General Companies in Senate Hearings: Rubber
Act of 1948 , pp. 26ff, 31ff, and 43ff.
32Ibld., p. 52.
33Statement of Everett G. Holt, Advisor, Department 
of Commerce in ibid., p. 46. For a summary of the disagree­
ment see New York Times, March 3, 1948, p. 33.
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favored the June 1950 termination date as a means of insuring 
an "automatic review" of the rubber situation.34
As passed by the Senate on March 23rd, the Rubber Act 
of 1948 was, in effect, a continuation and confirmation of 
the Act of 1947. The powers to produce, sell, specify and 
allocate synthetic were delegated to the Executive. However, 
the continuation of Government control of the synthetic in­
dustry, backed by the clear intent contained in the legisla­
tive history that the purpose of the Act was to insure only 
that the defense minimum capacity be maintained, gave assur­
ance to the producers of natural rubber. The American syn­
thetic capacity would not be set free to be used as a weapon 
to control prices. The British registered their pleasure 
with the Act of 1948, seeing it as a means of injecting 
stability into the price picture. It could "pave the way in 
further buying developments," a reference to increasing 
demand as a result of European rearmament and American plans 
to increase purchases of natural for military stockpiling 
purposes.35 The matter of natural versus synthetic was 
apparently settled until June 1950. The prediction was that, 
by then, the full natural capacity would be restored and that 
improvements in natural production efficiency would allow a
34Statement of Donald B. Kennedy, Senate Hearings: 
Rubber Act of 19 48, pp. 75-76.
35NeW York Times, April 5, 1948, p. 30.
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decrease in price to a level capable of competing with, syn­
thetic. Though the Rubber Act of 1948 reflected a combina- 
tion of defense consciousness, adherence to the principles of 
the ITO Proposals, and a slight distrust of Big Rubber's 
motives, it was a decision with potentially distinct advan­
tages to the immediate economic future of the Malayan Federa­
tion in that it gave some stability to the general market 
picture.
141
CHAPTER VI
V JUNE 1948 - JUNE 1950
Until mid-1948, the relationship of America to Bri­
tish Malaya can only be described as indirect, the effect of 
one upon the other being the result of causes not entirely 
connected to or aware of the effect. For example, the re­
tention of the synthetic industry by the RFC was a result of 
concern for national defense; the effect upon Malaya was not 
intended, rather the opposite, as policy sought to minimize 
any effect. The withdrawal of the American Government from 
the rubber markets in 1947 resulted in a price decline for 
Malayan rubber; however, the intent was to adhere to the 
principles of the ITO Proposals. Part of the reason for the 
indirectness of the American-Maiayan contact lay in the fact 
that as a possession, Malaya had voice only through Great 
Britain. The relationship was much the same as the relation­
ship might have been between the United States and/ for 
example, Wales. The interests of Malaya (or Wales) were 
subservient to the interests of the Empire; e.g., as sug­
gested above, the British Government chose to fefrain from 
official complaint concerning the American bid price for 
British rubber in 1946, so as to avoid the possibility of
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jeopardizing or delaying Congressional passage of the much 
needed Loan.
Excluding the question of economic policy, the gene­
ral foreign policy of the United States regarding the, inter­
nal affairs of Malaya was in consonant with the 1945 policy 
statement which declared the principle of nonintervention in 
the British areas of Southeast Asia. However, the aura of 
American detachment towards Malaya must be characterized. It 
was nonintervention by permissive accident rather than by 
practiced, conscious effort. There simply was no crisis or 
threat of crisis in Malaya prior to 1948 which might have 
given rise to concern in the American Department of State. 
There was no occasion for the United States to suggest a 
course for the British, or to offer assistance. Even the near 
occasions of the sin of intervention, which sometimes accom­
panies the most humanitarian of aid, were avoided.^ The 
British provided such aid as was needed in Malaya and did not 
request any special, American assistance. It could be argued 
that America provided indirect aid through the Loan; however, 
that view is to stretch a point. The Loan provided the,^Bri­
tish the means to aid Malaya; the terms of the Loan did not 
specify the use of proceeds.
10ther than grains shipped immediately after the war 
under UNRRA, no American aid of note went to Malaya.
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The uprising of the MCP in the spring of 194 8 would 
suggest a reevaluation of the American view. That it did not 
requires comment.
The most generally accepted explanation for the com­
munist rebellion in Malaya and the rest of Southeast Asia is 
that it was, in reality, a Soviet-directed attack on the eco­
nomic recovery of western Europe which was then beginning to 
show promise under the stimulus of the Marshall Plan, the 
European Recovery Program (E.R.P.). It was presumed that the 
Soviet intent was to wreck the productive capacity of South­
east Asia; the desired effect was to deny to Europe the raw 
materials and dollar exchange flowing from the area. Malaya 
was a target of primary importance as it was already a thriv­
ing source of materials for England and America and the 
largest source of dollar exchange for the sterling area,
whereas Indonesia and Indochina represented only the potential
2to imitate the success of Malaya.
There were ancillary Soviet benefits to be gained by 
fishing in the troubled waters of Southeast Asia. First, by 
attacking colonial control in Southeast Asia, energy needed 
for European recovery could be bled-off in the colonialists*
2Among others see Harry Miller, A Short History of 
Malaysia (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 173; 
Gullick, Malaysia, p. Ill; and Cady, Post-War Southeast Asia/ 
pp. 62-63. For a contemporary analysis see B. H. M. Velke, 
"Communism And Nationalism In South East Asia," International 
Affairs, Vol. XXV (April 1949), pp. 149-154.
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effort to retain their possessions. Second, there was the 
possibility of adversely affecting relations between the 
United States and the colonial nations, if the colonialists' 
response could be made to appear as a heavy-handed suppres­
sion of nationalist aspirations. Third, in regard to non­
colonial Southeast Asia, the pro-west, if not west-dependent, 
governments of the Philippines, Burma, and Thailand could
also be discredited, weakened and subjected to communist 
3pressure .■
The order for the Southeast Asian communists to go on 
the offensive was reportedly transmitted by the Cominform at 
the Southeast Asian Democratic Youth Conference, sponsored by 
the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions and held in 
Calcutta in February 1948. The resort to overt action was a 
shift from the post-war Soviet strategy of peaceful coopera­
tion with and subversion of nationalist groups. As described 
earlier, this took the form in Malaya of first subverting the 
labor movement, and later, subversion of the political orga­
nizations which formed in opposition to the Union, the UMNO, 
and finally the Federation. Space here does not permit a 
full recounting of the uprisings of 1948; however, some
^Richard P. Stebbens and others, USWA; 194 9 (New 
York: Harper and Brothers for The Council On Foreign Rela­
tions, 1950) , pp. 423-431. See also "Peril For U.S. In 
Malayan Unrest,1 U .S . News And World Report, Vol. 25 
(August 29, 1948), pp. 24-25.
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analysis is necessary for, as in other matters, the Malayan
experience is again unique.
The Communist-instigated risings of 1948-1951 
in Southeast Asia, historically considered, 
were both ill-timed and ineffective. In most 
cases, the non-Communist elite still maintained 
a measure of faith in alternative social innova­
tions and nonrevolutionary means of implementing 
political change.^
It appears now that the Soviet plan held little con­
cern for the success of the rebellions; rather, the primary 
objective was to retard European recovery. In short, it was 
a spoiler's plan. The Southeast Asian communists were hurled 
into the breach with little concern for their chances of 
survival or success. The various rebellions of 1948, which 
broke out in Malaya, Burma, Siam and Indonesia, and the resur­
gence of communist efforts in Indochina and the Philippines 
received little else than moral and vocal support from the 
USSR. In the main, the revolutionaries lacked organization 
and popular support, and became primarily a disruptive but 
expensive nuisance. There were exceptions; e.g., the tena­
cious Viet Minh and the Burmese communists. However, the 
Viet Minh resistance to the French had long predated 194 8, and 
the general chaos in Burma was as much a result of the Karen 
and Shan tribes minority problem, which simply provided an 
exploitable cause in the absence of British, imperialism and
4Cady, Post-War Southeast Asia, p. 81.
was as good a vehicle as any to serve the purposes of driving 
the government to the left.^
Malaya was exceptional from at least two points of 
view. First, the MCP' s avowed purposes of driving the Bri­
tish out and securing political dominance had, perhaps, the 
least promise of success. The terrorist forces consisted 
almost entirely of the former Chinese members of the MPAJA.
A change in name, first to the Malayan Peoples' Anti-British 
Army (MPABA) and later to the Malayan Races Liberation Army 
(MRLA) altered nothing; the MRLA remained the Chinese enemy 
to the Malays. In addition, the rebels alienated the vast 
majority of the middle-class, urban Malayan Chinese who re­
mained either the "Queen's Chinese" or Kuomintang loyalists. 
The announced objective of driving out the British had little 
popular appeal for either noncommunist Chinese or Malay .-.
The Malays had no desire to risk dominance by the Chinese, 
let alone Chinese communists; and, the noncommunist peninsula 
Chinese were at least secure among the hostile Malays so long 
as the British remained. As a result, the MRLA was forced 
from the outset to rely upon whatever support could be 
secured through coercion, extortion, and terror. Suffice it 
to say that the MRLA was destructive and cost both the Bri­
tish and Federation Governments billions in military and
^The moderate government of Thakin Nu was forced to 
resign, January 20, 1949.
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police actions; but, as a political movement,, communism was 
unable to leave the sanctuary of its jungle hiding place.
MRLA military efforts never advanced beyond the tactic of 
hit-and-run attacks against the mines and plantations.
Though the enemy was the British, the victims of the ter­
rorist attacks were more often Malays and Kuomintang Chinese
v c
employed as managers and overseers.
The second unique aspect of the communist attack in
Malaya was its tenacity and longevity despite its lack of
appeal. Whereas, for example, the rebellion in Indonesia
was quickly put down and the threat in the Philippines was
contained, the substantial efforts of the British in' Malaya
7did not yield results until after 1951. The initial strength 
of the communists in 1948 was approximately 5,000, but it 
grew until 1950 when it reached an estimated 8,000. The 
stubborn resistance of the MRLA was a result of a combination 
of factors: (1) the MRLA was able to continue to recruit
from among young, unemployed, frustrated Chinese; (2) the 
MPAJA had laid plans and secreted weapons for just such an 
occasion following the Japanese collapse; and (3) the MRLA
^Gullick, Malaysia, pp. 112-117. The pattern of 
attacks; i.e., attacks against plantations and mines, was 
recognizably early. See "Malaya: Civil Wat/"' News Week,
Vol. 32 (July 9, 1948), pp. 32-33.
'■ 7Though the Emergency officially lasted until July 
1960, the rebellion was broken by 1953, primarily as a result 
of a program to resettle Chinese away from the jungle areas 
and the reign of extortion visited by the MRLA.
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did not have to build a terrorist organization. It was 
merely a case of the MCP personnel moving to preappointed 
jungle hide-outs in May and June of 1948, taking up their
8
arms, and resuming life as it had been under the Japanese.
A final point is a question in equipoise. It is 
debatable as to which side, the MCP or the Labor Government, 
miscalculated to the other1s advantage. The MCP had, until 
1948, counted on a measured, restrained British response to 
their actions. There is some evidence to support the 
opinion that at the outbreak of the rebellion the British 
initiative was lost because the High Commissioner, Sir Edward 
Gent, was indecisive, thereby allowing the MCP sufficient 
time to go underground and reform as the MPABA. He did not 
react to the increases in labor strikes and acts of lawless­
ness, which occurred in April through June, despite the 
advice of his military chiefs to take decisive action. Gent 
preferred not to exercise extraordinary powers without 
express direction from Whitehall.1  ^ One report has it that 
at the time of his death in an aircrash in July, while 
enroute to London, Gent was contemplating resignation.'1''1'
^Gullick, Malaysiay- pp. 117-119.
^NeW York Times, July 24, 1948, p. 4.
10"Malaya: Civil War," pp. 32-33.
'^New York Times, July 5, 1948, p. 1; and "Malaya: 
Civil War,71 p.. 32.
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However, any MPABA hope for confusion or hesitation on the
part of the Labor Government quickly dissolved. The British
sent reenforcements within a month of the June declaration
of the Emergency; and, while it ^ took several years to render
the MRLA impotent, the rebels were unable to mount a decisive
offensive operation or secure and hold a so-called liberated
area. It was forced instead to spend most of its efforts in
sustaining meager supply lines and defending itself against
increasing numbers of Commonwealth regulars, and Malayan
12police and home guards.
During the first year of the MCP*s rebellion, the 
British mounted strong countermeasures and gave no hint that 
the situation would require aid from outside the Commonwealth. 
The British correctly concluded the inevitability of the MRLA 
defeat; though they initially underestimated the effective­
ness of the guerilla tactic, and were forced to alter the
13countertactic several times. . That the British did not
l2Gullick reports 40,000 regulars, 70,000 police, 
and 225,000 home guards at the height of strength in 1950- 
1951, Malaysia, p. 112.
13Major General Charles H. Boucher acknowledged in 
early July 1948 that the rising had been expected. In late 
July, he admitted some rebel success, but added " . . .  it 
won't last," and stated that compared to experiences in 
Greece and India the MPABA was the " . . . easiest I've ever 
tracked." See New frork Times, July 6, 194 8, p. 6; July 19, 
1948, p. 32; and July 28, 1948, p. 2. By August, Boucher 
was predicting a two-phase, fifteen month operation. New 
York Times, August 6, 1948, p. 4.
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request American aid requires some explanation. First, the 
decline of the eastern colonial empire had been rapid. India, 
Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon had been granted independence by 
January 194 8. There was political criticism at home that 
under the Labor Government the Empire was "running off almost 
as fast as the British Loan."^4 Second, the MRLA challenge 
was a direct confrontation, a situation avoided in the free­
ing of the other areas; therefore, the British were forced to 
stand if prestige and authority were to be maintained before 
the rest of the Empire. Third, Malaya was of vital interest
to Great Britain as the "golden goose" of the dollar-earning
15 .sterling area. The stand m  Malaya is in contrast to Bri­
tish economy elsewhere; for example, the withdrawal from 
Greece in February 1947 and the granting of independence in 
January 1948 to Burma, which chose to remain outside the 
Commonwealth. In both instances, the cost of forcibly main­
taining British dominance outweighed any gain to be secured
l4Campbell, USWA: 1947-1948 (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1948), p. 218. As early as November 1948, James V. 
Forrestal, the American Secretary of Defense, was told by 
Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff that should war 
break out in the Far East, the British were fully committed 
in Malaya and could make no further contribution. See 
Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Dairies (New York: The
Viking Press, 1951), p. 525.
15Barbara Willingham-Jones, "Should Britain Quit 
Malaya?"., The Contemporary Review, Vol. 178 (July 1950) , 
pp. 14-18. Willingham-Jones concluded, "The interests of 
Malaya . . ., no less than dollar pressure, preclude any
British Government from contemplating withdrawal at any 
foreseeable date." Ibid., p. 18.
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by that effort. In Malaya, the stakes were high and the 
odds were right.
The American perception of events in Malaya is dif­
ficult to assess. There is little doubt that the United 
States accepted that the rebellions of 1948 were led by South­
east Asian communists. That the United States accepted the 
claim that the rebellions were coordinated parts of a scheme 
being directed by Moscow as an attack on ERP is not so clear. 
In explaining the issuance of licenses for the export of 
small arms to protect the American-owned rubber plantations 
and the single American tin mine, the State Department stated 
that the applications were:
. . .  approved in accordance with a policy of 
viewing the disorder as caused by outlaws 
rather than as a full-scale political revolt 
against the Government.^
There were opinions that the uprising in Malaya was inspired
by the successes of Mao Tse-tung, if not directed by the
Chinese Communist Party. Others opined that the uprising was
a local decision explaining that the spread of rebellion
elsewhere was a result of one local group being inspired by
another. It appears that the United States did not
•^New York Times, July 26, 1948, p. 12. The British 
made the requests for small arms direct to Pacific Tin Con­
solidated, owner of the single American mine, and the U.S. 
Rubber Co., subsidiary owner, of the Malayan Rubber Co., thus 
avoiding the "red tapeM of a government-to-government arms 
request. See also New York Times, July 24, 194 8, p. 4; and 
August 26, 1948, p. 2.
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17categorically accept the world-plot explanation. By exam­
ple, a Department of State summary of conditions in Malaya, 
written in 1953, gave the causes of the 1948 rebellion as 
the strong British reaction to the Communist-controlled PMFTU, 
and the frustration of the MCP in its inability to counter the 
establishment of the UMNO-dominated Federation. The immediate 
cause was cited as the Federation's order, issued in April, 
that all trade unions register with the Government and reveal 
the sources of their funds. There was no reference to the 
Calcutta Conference, or a Soviet plan to wreck the ERP 
through the destruction of the Malayan economy:
The Communists1 specific objective now was to 
destroy the existing political organization 
of Malaya, drive the British out, and ultimately 
take control of the country for c o m m u n i s m . 18
Part of the explanation for the American reluctance to ac­
cept the claim that the Berlin blockade and the Malayan rebel­
lion were all part of the same Soviet-directed world plan may 
lie in a belief that the British were using the communist
world-plot thesis as a means to mask the repression of a 
  6
■^Tillman Durdin, "Revolt In Malaya Local Redfs 
Work," ibid., August 1, 194 8, p. 17.
18y.s ., Department of State, Malaya: Trouble Spot
In Southeast Asia: Background, Pub. 5061, Far Eastern
Series, No. 57 (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office,
1953), pp. 2-3. For a like account by a Congressional source 
see U.S., Congress, House, Committee On Foreign Affairs, 
Special Study Mission To Southeast Asia And To The Pacific, 
reported by the Hon. Walter Judd, 83rd Cong., 1st sess. 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954),
pp. 70-71.
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Chinese-led, Pan-Malayan nationalist movement which sought 
only to hasten the British departure.-^ Though this suspi­
cion may have had some foundation, a judgment should be made; 
the evidence weighs for the Moscow-directed, Calcutta-ordered 
resort to rebellion.
As early as June 1947, at least one observer put the 
issues of rubber prices paid by the American industry and the 
survival of a noncommunist Malaya into a dependent relation­
ship. "If the U.S. Lets The Rubber Market Go To Pieces - 
Kiss Malaya Goodby."20 This rather pessimistic report saw 
Malaya as all "that was left" in Southeast Asia and placed 
the blame for the tenuous Malayan situation of June squarely 
on the United States for failing to recognize the realities 
of the day, and allowing the industry to keep the price of 
rubber at prewar levels. The United States Government, or 
at least its economic representatives, were apparently 
unmoved. In January 1948, under agreements worked out by the 
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the United States 
had agreed to purchase rubber from the British Government for
19See Gullick, Malaysia/ n. p. Ill; Tillman, "Revolt 
in Malaya"; and "Malaya: Majority of Guns," Time, Vol. 53
(July 12), 1948, p. 33.
^Gilbert Burck, "Report From Singapore: If the U.S.
Lets The Rubber Market Go To Pieces - Kiss Malaya Goodby," 
Fortune,; Vol. 37 (June 1948) , pp. 92-95ff. Also see "Peril 
For U.S. In Malaya Unrest,"; U.S. News And World Report, .
Vol. 25 (August 27), 1948, pp. 24-25.
military stockpiling purposes. The purposes of the ECA 
agreement were twofold: first, the primary objective was to
increase the flow of dollars to Europe; and, second, to 
stimulate the strategic materials production industries. The 
quid pro quo was to increase the available supplies of stra­
tegic materials and to increase the American defense stock­
piles. The British made note of the need to give "full con­
sideration of the producers in the colonies and the rubber 
market" and set the price at $.27. The United States de­
clined, and it was not until September that a bargain for
30,000 tons was struck, but at the market price of $.22. The 
remainder of the United Kingdom stock of 88,000 tons was then
taken off the market to be held in the British strategic
21reserve.
In August 1948 , an- observer noted the interrelation­
ship between the American policy and the British struggle 
in Malaya. This commentary focused upon the problem of 
Malayan wages which were being held down because of low 
rubber prices despite the sharp increase in the cost of 
living caused by the Emergency. Since April, the price of 
rice had increased by a factor of fifteen. The cause of 
part of the problem; i.e., the low price of rubber, was 
attributed to the United States policy and its continued
21New York Times, January 21, 1948, p. 41; Septem­
ber 4, 1948, pp. 4,13.
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22production of synthetic rubber. A muted criticism of the 
synthetic industry was also made by Malcom MacDonald, British 
Commissioner General for Southeast Asia, in November. How­
ever, his criticism included the British Government and
industry for their failure to take any action to limit the
23increasing production of natural.
Despite the disruptions of 1948, Malaya maintained an 
increase in rubber production. It rose to the historical 
high of 697,000 tons and accounted for the major portion of 
Malaya's 1948 dollar earnings of $130 million.2  ^ However, 
the volume increase in production was offset by declining 
prices. Malaya was repeating the mistake of the past: 
overproduction. In 1948, America's total consumption actual­
ly decreased by nearly 100,000 tons in comparison to 1947? 
the result was a decline in the price of natural to about 
$.20 at year's end. A second reason for the decline in 
dollar earnings from rubber, totally unrelated to the United 
States, was the illegal shipment of rubber to "sterling grey
22Andrew Roth, "Malaya: Besieged Dollar Arsenal,"
Nation, Vol. 167 (August 7, 1948), pp. 150-151. In addition 
to the rubber problem, Roth, also notes the resistance of 
planters and mine owners to Gent's moderate, pre-Emergency 
policies, and the Soviet-Calcutta-MCP-ERP version of the 
uprising.
23"Basic Problem Remains As Malaya Quells Communists," 
Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. XXVIII (November 12, 1948),
pp. 18-20.
24"Southeast Asia: A Glossary," Fortune, Vol. 39
(March 1949), p. 90; and New York Times, May 9, 1949, p. 33.
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areas"; that is, the buying of rubber in Malaya with soft
currency and the trans-shipment to nonsterling areas for
2 5resale m  dollar markets. However, the loss of dollar 
exchange remained, in the British mind, the fault of the 
United States.
After 1948, through the worst years of the Emergency 
and into the Korean War, the American contact with Malaya 
remained indirect and, with few exceptions, limited to a con­
tinuation of discussions concerning the effect of the Ameri­
can rubber policy. However, the continuing encouragements to 
restrain synthetic production to the advantage of natural 
* rubber included the new incentive; i.e., to buy natural 
rubber at a price comparable to other commodities was to aid 
in the fight against communism.
By mid-1949, the price of rubber was down to $.16.
The British argument for American action to reverse the trend 
was articulated by the Leader of the Conservative Party, 
Anthony Eden, in May 1949. First, Moscow was categorically 
branded as the instigator of the Malayan rebellion. Second, 
the burden of the rebellion had driven the Malayan cost of 
living to such a level that plantation labor was demanding
25por a complete explanation of how this yielded the 
trans-shijper a 5-15 per cent profit see Frederick Kozle, 
"Export-Import Problems In Southeast Asia," Southeast Asia 
In The Coming World, Philip W. Thoyer, ed. (Baltimore: The
Johns HOpkins Press, 1953), pp. 113-125. Also see "The World 
Outlook In Rubber," U.S. News And World Report, Vol. 28 
(January 6, 1950), p. 40.
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wage increases of up to. 200 per cent; at the same time, the 
price of rubber remained below prewar levels. In an argu­
ment containing a considerable amount of unassailable logic, 
the former Foreign Minister expressed a lack of " . . .
enthusiasm for America's costly synthetic industry . . . " and
added that " . . . if the price [of natural] were allowed to 
rise the U.S. might pay more for rubber but less for aid." 
Third, the stability of Southeast Asia was "indispensably" 
tied to the prosperity of Malaya. Malaya's success in the 
fight against communism could serve as " . . . a  prop and 
guide" to her neighbors and the results would be to every­
one's advantage " . . . including the U.S.". The key to
success was a fair price for rubber, and " . . .  a salient 
topic for discussion between Britain and America." °
The statement at that particular moment gave some 
hint of the strain the Emergency continued to place on the 
British economy. It may also have been designed to serve as 
a signal to America that Great Britain was contemplating a 
request for direct assistance. Eden's reference to a higher 
price for rubber as an alternative to more foreign aid may 
have been aimed at that portion of American public opinion 
which was growing less generous in its view of costly foreign
^Anthony Eden, "Asia's Welfare Is Held Vital To 
Southeast Asia: Current Price of Rubber Is Problem," New
York Times, May 2, 1949, p. 8.
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aid. In either event, the British had come to. the realiza­
tion that the Emergency was not going to be solved quickly 
and, within weeks of Eden's plea, the British Government had
to float a bond issue to raise eight million pounds sterling
27for Malayan assistance.
The British appeal of May 1949 was apparently noted 
by Representative Shafer. In August, he had completed an 
examination of the operation of the rubber policy established 
by his Subcommittee in February 1948. It was his evaluation 
that the various parts of the Rubber Act of 194 8 had become 
disconnected from each other through bureaucratic mismanage­
ment and had become counterproductive, in several respects.
In his view the intent of the Act to minimize the effect of 
the National defense objective upon the world's natural 
market had been circumvented. Shafer was surprised to learn 
that the Department of Commerce, which had assumed responsi­
bility for allocation and specification from the OWMR in 
August 1948, was requiring synthetic consumption above the 
minimum defense level. In 1948, the mandatory level had been
54,000 tons above the minimum despite the voluntary consump­
tion of an additional 167,000 tons by industry. In short, 
the RFC made and sold 221,000 tons more than was necessary 
under law; this amount constituted an equal loss to natural 
producers. In the summer of 1949, the Government was still
^7Ibid., May 9, 1949, p. 33.
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requiring consumption at an annual rate of 46,000 tons in 
excess of the defense minimum. He further noted that in a 
period of declining natural prices, the Government had not 
seized the opportunity to purchase natural for stockpiling 
purposes. The stockpile was still below the desired level. 
Overproduction of synthetic; the failure to buy natural for 
the stockpile; the leveling of demand; and the summer low in 
demand caused by the industry's annual inventory liquidation; 
had combined to drive the price of natural to a new low of 
$.16. The result was a lowering of the living standard in 
Malaya and an estimated loss of dollar exchange for Great 
Britain and Malaya of $100,000,000. In consideration of the 
British dollar position and the struggle in Malaya, Shafer 
proposed an immediate suspension of all mandatory synthetic 
consumption and an acceleration of natural rubber purchases 
for the stockpile. He noted the threat to Southeast Asia 
posed by the successes of the communists in China, and the 
offsetting effects of gains made in Europe under ERP and 
losses in Asia, such as the tenuous situation in Malaya.
The advantages to be gained by Shafer's proposal were: the
strategic stockpile would be increased; the British dollar 
position would be improved; and, the increase in natural 
demand would "create a happier condition in the rubber 
countries." In the alternative of no action, he cautioned,
160
" . . .  the U.S. could be called on for aid that could wreck 
the economy"; i.e., " . . .  the financial strain of saving 
Asia."28
Opponents of the Shafer proposal, most notably Senator 
Robert A. Taft, spurred by protests from among the industry 
leaders, could see little justification for curtailing the 
output of an American industry " . . . simply to assist Great 
Britain to get dollars from Malaya." In Taft's view, suspen­
sion of mandatory synthetic consumption would cause only un­
employment among American workers and a rise in the price of
29natural rubber at a cost to the consumer. In rebuttle, it
was pointed out that America had a choice, "outright grants
or trade"; to speak of aiding friends in the absence of a
willingness to do either was to try to "have our cake and 
30eat it too." Shafer's plan was not adopted, most probably 
due to the controversial domestic aspects of suspending man­
datory synthetic consumption. In addition, Taft's view was
28U.S. , Congress, House, Remarks and Report, "Our 
Rubber Policy" by the Hon. Paul W. Shafer, 81st Cong., 1st. 
sess., August 9, 1949, Congressional Record, Vol. 95, 
pp. 1136-39.
29U.S., Congress, Senate, curtailment of requirements 
for synthetic rubber, 81st Cong., 1st. sess., September 23,
1949, Congressional Record, Vol. 95, pp. 13211-13. Though 
little can be made of it, Taft's comments on the proposal
served his Ohio constituency as well as his general view of 
American assistance schemes which imposed costs upon the 
> American public.
30Senator Claude Pepper, ibid., p. 13211.
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supported by the National Security Council whereas Shafer's 
proposal received support from the Department of State, which 
was more a hinderance than a help. The Department was coming 
under increasing criticism from Congress for the general 
management of foreign policy.^
Just prior to the presentation of Shafer's proposal, 
there was a report that Great Britain was preparing to ask 
the United States for aid for Malaya in the form of capital 
investment. Britain realized the improbabilities of anything 
approaching an Asian version of the Marshall Plan, but hoped 
to receive aid through the International Bank For Reconstruc­
tion and Development, or the Export-Import Bank under the 
principles of assistance outlined in the Point-Four program.32 
Whether the request was discouraged and never formally made, 
or submitted and disapproved is not clear, but Britain may 
have abandoned the request having observed the reaction to 
Shafer's less ambitious proposal. The explanation for the 
disappearance of the British-proposed request for aid may 
also lay in the confusion that surrounded Point-Four.
Following its announcement in January 1949, the Administra­
tion was repeatedly required to explain to Congress and 
expectant recipients of aid alike, that Point-Four was not
Jlg^nator Taft,: ibid., p. 13213.
33Benjamin Welles, "British Want U.S. To Invest In 
Asia," New York Times, September 1, 19 49, p. 10.
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intended to be a massive, economic aid program comparable to 
ERP, rather it was to be aid in the form of limited technical 
assistance. J
The British economic situation continued to worsen 
through 1949. In July, the United Kingdom, followed by the 
Commonwealth members, announced a restriction on dollar ex­
penditures in an effort to conserve the United Kingdom's 
reserves which, by July, had fallen below the danger level.
In September, in a move to increase the ability to earn 
dollars by decreasing the value of export items, the pound 
sterling was devalued. However, due to the intricacies of 
the world monetary system, the effect on Malayan rubber was 
less than hoped for although an improvement in rubber sales 
was a prime objective in the devaluation move. The idea was 
to reduce the price to a level which would stimulate American
33Acheson described the "fourth point" of Truman's 
Inaugural Address of January 20, 1949 as the "hyperbole of 
inaugural oratory" which ignored the realities of the foreign 
aid budget. It was included in the Address as an after­
thought without the State Department's knowledge. See 
Acheson, Present At The Creation, p. 265. It was misunder­
stood to be an ERP-type commitment and required clarification 
in the U.N. Economic and Social Council. See "Statement By 
William L. Thorpe," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 20 
(February 25), 1949, pp. 283-288. For a commentary and ex­
planation see Annette Barker Fox, "The Fourth Point And The 
United Nations," United Nations International Conciliation, 
No. 452 (June 1949), pp. 459-503. Point-Four, administered 
by the Technical Cooperation Administration fTCA), was not 
funded until late 1950. For a summary of TCA through 1952 
see U.S. , Department of State,: Point-Four: What It Is -
How It Works, Pub. No. 4863, Economic Cooperation Series,
No. 39, February 1953. Total aid to the Federation through 
1952 was $4 00,000 in road-building equipment and technical 
assistance.
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buying on the theory that a> price cut would reduce voluntary 
synthetic buying, the loss to be made up on volume. However, 
the devaluation of the pound sterling was offset by an almost 
equal, upward revaluation of the Malayan dollar. The net 
effect of all forces involved increased buying and raised the 
price to $.17^; however, neither to the extent desired.34
The issue of American foreign policy towards the Far 
East, rose to new levels of importance in 1950. Despite the 
successes in Europe, such as the breaking of the Berlin 
blockade, the advances of the ERP and the signing of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO), all were diminished by 
the defeat of Nationalist China and the October 1949 estab­
lishment of the Peoples' Republic of China. The controversy 
that followed in America is beyond the scope of this paper; 
suffice it to recall that the Truman Administration and, in 
particular the Department of State, was subjected to criti­
cism for the loss. At any rate, Asian policy took center 
stage and, in January and March 1950, Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson delivered two major addresses in an effort to explain 
America's commitment to securing the remainder of the area 
from communism.35 First, the idea of massive military and
34See John L. Collyer's explanation in "World Outlook 
On Rubber," p. 40.
3^U.S., Department of State, "Crisis In Asia - An 
Examination of U.S. Policy: Remarks by Secretary Acheson
Before The National Press Club, Wash., D.C., Jan. 12, 1950,"
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economic aid was dismissed. Neither, as Acheson pointed out,
36had saved China. Second, America did not oppose communism
on a purely ideological basis; rather, the United States saw
communist expansion in Asia as a device of the new imperialism
37of Soviet Russia. In defense of the charges that the State
Department lacked a clear policy, Acheson explained that the
complexities of the area; i.e., the diversity of people and
3 8histories, defied a single policy. American policy must,
therefore, be tailored to each circumstance. In a statement
aimed at any advocate or potential recipient of American aid,
Acheson made it clear that Asia must choose for itself, and
that America would assist those who chose to resist communist
attempts to dominate. "U.S. aid is good only when it is the
missing component in a situation which might otherwise be
solved . . . [The U.S.] can’t make the engine, it can just
3 Qprovide the gas..  ^ In a reference to Malaya, Acheson indi­
cated American satisfaction with events there. "The British 
have and are discharging their responsibility harmoniously
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXII (January 23, 1950), 
pp. 111-118; and "United States Policy Toward Asia: Address
by Secretary Acheson Before The Commonwealth Club of Cali­
fornia, San Francisco, Calif., March 15, 195Q," Department 
of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIII (March 27, 1950), pp. 467-472.
3 6 A c h e s o n ,  "Commonwealth Club Address," p. 471.
37Acheson, "National, Press Club Address," pp. 112-
113.
38Ibid., pp. 111-112. 39Ibid., p. 113.
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with the peoples of Malaya and are making progress.
Activity in the first half of 1950 regarding planning
for future aid to Southeast Asia was limited to considering
and selecting likely projects to receive Point-Four aid. In
addition, Truman appointed Gordon Gray, a former Secretary of
the Army, to conduct a survey of America's total, foreign
41economic policy.
The continued resistance of the MRLA, which was now 
costing Great Britain and the Federation at a rate of 100 
million pounds sterling per year, in combination with the
40Ibid., p. 115.
The Gray Report recommended a combination of pri- 
vate investment, public loans, technical assistance, and 
grants. See "Text of Summary of Recommendation In Gray's 
Report On Foreign Economic Policies," New York Times, Novem­
ber 13, 1950, p. 12ff. The opponents of foreign aid viewed 
the recommendations as an attempt to continue ERP-levels of 
aid beyond the termination date, 1951. See U.S., Congress, 
Senate, Senate Committee On Appropriations, Special Subcom­
mittee On Foreign Economic Cooperation, Analysis of The Gray 
Report, Subcommittee Print, 82nd Cong., 1st. sess., 1951.
For a typical opponent reaction see "The Gray Report Extends 
Crackpot Socialist Programs" in Senate, Extended Remarks of 
Senator George W. Malone, 81st Cong., 2nd. sess., 1950, Con- 
gressional Record, Vol. 96, p. A7865. There were two schools 
of thought concerning aid through capital investment: public;
e.g., that contemplated by. the British and preferred by poten­
tial recipients to avoid private interference in government; 
and private investment which business preferred, provided tax 
incentives and protection from expropriation were guaranteed 
by the American Government. See Richard P. Stebbins, and 
others, USWA: 1950 (New York: Harper and Brothers for The
Council On Foreign Relations, 1951), pp. 87-88. For an 
interesting look at the issues see U.S., Department of State, 
Pacific Coast Conference On Private Investment In Interna­
tional Development: Summary of The Discussions, Pub. No.
479 5, Economic Cooperations Series, No~ 36 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 19 52) .
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weakened position of the British economy, forced the Labor 
Government to consider requesting American military assis­
tance in the Malayan struggle. Following preliminary dis­
cussions between the British and Americans at a foreign 
ministers meeting in May 1950, the British were persuaded to 
abandon the request. A request for aid at that time, the 
British were told, had little hope for approval in the Con­
gress and could prove to be a political embarrassment to the 
Administration. Congressional and public sentiment were run­
ning high against Great Britain as a result of that Govern­
ment1 s January 1950 extension of de^  jure recognition to the
4 9Peoples' Republic of China. At the same time as aid for 
Malaya was denied, a French request for military aid to be 
used in Vietnam was granted; approval was secured, in part, 
by the French decision not to recognize Communist China so 
long as it continued to supply aid to the Viet Minh.4  ^ As 
Acheson later implied, the decision to aid Indochina was made 
with little consideration of the future. "We could not think 
of a better course then or later . . .  we tried to muddle 
through." The decision to aid Indochina was, in his view, 
the only alternative to the unacceptable choice, " . . .  [to] 
do nothing."42
42Raymond Daniell, "Britain Not To Ask U.S. Aid In 
Malaya,"; New York Times, May 9, 1950, p. 2.
43Acheson, Present At The Creation, p. 673.
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The decision to deny Great Britain specific help in 
her struggle with the MPLA appears to be one of those inci­
dents in diplomatic history which involves little mystery.
The moment could not have been worse. To expect the Depart­
ment of State to go before Congress with a request on behalf 
of England following that Nation*s recognition of Red China 
was a political impossibility. The State Department was 
already on the defensive against the nonsense of Senator 
Joseph R. McCarthy and could ill-afford running the risk of 
inviting the additional wrath of those possessed by anti- 
British sentiment. On the other hand, the discouragement of 
the Malayan aid request also suggests a decision with little 
risk. There was nothing to suggest that the British were
weakening in their resolve, or that the effort was in danger
4 c
of collapse without American aid. J At any rate, though 
there is little to suggest a parallel between American in­
volvement in Indochina and Malaya— should aid have been 
granted— the possibility of a similar course became a subject
^5ln June 1950, the British promised more aid to 
Malaya but stressed the need to develop a long-range program 
for social and economic development. See statement of James 
P. Griffiths, Secretary of State For The Colonies, in the 
House of Commons in New York Times, June 22, 1950, p. 10. In 
October 1950, Britain announced the Colombo Plan for Economic 
Development in South and Southeast Asia, a cooperative pro­
gram similar to Point-Four, for Malaya, North Borneo, Paki­
stan, India, and Ceylon. See U.S., Department of State, "The 
Colombo Plan: New Promise For Asia," by Wilfred Malenbaum,
Pub. 4764, Economic Cooperation Series, No. 35 (Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1952).
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for hindsight history after May 1950. Beyond that date, 
Britain knew full well that her job as part of the American- 
led United Nations' battle against communism was to "muddle 
through" alone.
CHAPTER VII
THE AMERICAN RUBBER POLICY AND 
THE RUBBER BOOM OF 1950 - 1952
In the interest of completeness it is necessary to 
recount the continued, but changed, application of the rubber 
policy, first formulated in 1947, and its effects upon Malaya, 
Great Britain, and the United States. As a result of the 
intensifying Cold War, world rearmament, and the Korean War, 
natural rubber was to rise to a level of importance after 
1949 not seen since 1942, and was to bring America and Britain 
into arguments reminiscent of the old IRRC days. Inasmuch as 
the rubber policy reflected the principles of the ITO to a 
considerable degree, it is best to start with the American 
rejection of that blueprint for multilateralism. Between 1946 
and 1950, a Charter had been drafted by the Interim Commis­
sion on ITO at meetings held in Switzerland, the United 
States and Cuba. At the time the Charter was submitted to 
Congress in April 1950 for the purposes of providing legis­
lative authority for United States' participation in the ITO, 
only Australia and Liberia had formally ratified the Charter. 
The Administration's proposal had little chance from the 
outset in a recalcitrant Congress now divided into factions 
with varied axes to grind, all anti-Administration; e.g.,
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the China Lobby, those opposed to free trade, and those who 
were distrustful of the Department of State. Whatever chance 
ITO might have had evaporated in the outbreak of the Korean 
War and America's shift to near full-scale mobilization. It 
is difficult to assign the failure to a single cause; perhaps 
it is simplest to say that in 1950, it was an idea whose time 
had passed. The American Congress of 1950 was taking a cri­
tical look at the effects of the work done by the Congresses 
of 1945 and 1947 and was in no mood to be rushed into a 
scheme which placed America on equal trade terms with all the 
nations of the world.^ For one thing, the concerns of the 
early post-war period, respecting world trade, were changing. 
In 1947, the United States had had a trade surplus of $11.5 
billion, an improvement over the nearly $13 billion figure 
for 1946, but still a clear indication that the restoration 
of world trade was lagging. However by 1949, primarily as a 
result of Marshall Plan aid, the trade surplus had declined 
to $2.9 billion with signs of further reduction. America
1For descriptions of the factions, moods, and incon­
sistencies in the Congress see Richard Stebbins, USWA: 1950,
pp. 45-57, 85-90. ITO participation was characterized by the 
opponents of multilateralism, and the egalitarian aspects of 
it, as American submission to " . . . domestic and foreign
trade governed by 50 countries . . . [making] . . . the U.S.
the same as Cuba or Siam." See, for example, Senator Malone's 
remarks and "The Gray Report Extends Crackpot Socialist Pro­
grams" in Congressional Record, Vol. 97, p. A7865.
^Joseph Loftus, "Foreign Aid Program Enters A New 
Phase," New York Times, November 19, 1950, p. iv.
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had reached a point at which the focus of concern was begin­
ning to swing back to the maintenance of America1s trade 
strength, whereas it had previously been occupied with the 
weakness of others.
The Department of State made its last plea for the
ITO in April 1950 in a statement delivered by Dean Acheson
to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Having outlined
the purposes to " . . . create conditions in the world in
which the private trader can buy and sell where he pleases
. . . to his best advantages," Acheson concluded:
The choice, therefore, which the Congress is 
about to make is not only whether the United 
States will accept membership in the Inter­
national Trade Organization, but whether 
there will be an International Trade Organi­
zation . 3
The question of ITO participation was overshadowed by the out­
break of war in Korea:
Upon completion of the hearings, no further 
action was taken on the measure . . .On 
December 6, 1950 the press reported that the 
United States decided 'to shelve indefinitely 
further plans for American participation [in 
ITO]' . . . Further, President Truman acting
upon the recommendations of the Department of 
State had agreed that the proposed charter 
should not be resubmitted to the C o n g r e s s . 3
3"Statement by the Secretary of State (Acheson) be­
fore the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Repre­
sentatives, April 19, 1950: Excerpts," Raymond Dennet and
Robert K. Turner, cd., Documents On American Foreign Rela­
tions , Vol. XII, January 1 - December 31, 195Q (Binghamton, 
New York: Vail-Ballow Press, Inc., 1951), pp. 290-291. The
shelving of ITO was a refusal to subject American trade to 
the authority of a world-governing body. However, efforts
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The shift in commitment away from multilateralism, to 
the extent envisioned in the rejected ITO, was reflected in 
the post-1950 application of the national rubber policy. As 
noted by Shafer, there was a period of confusion, if not 
governmental neglect, between passage of the 19 48 Act and its 
renewal in 1950. As mentioned earlier, the American demand 
for rubber had begun to level in 1948 while supplies of 
natural continued to rise. Following the Congressional cri­
ticism of the maintenance of mandatory synthetic above the 
level required for defense purposes and the lag in the pur­
chase of natural for stockpiling, the requirement for synthe­
tic consumption was eased downward toward that needed to main­
tain the defense minimum. The adjustment in the rising supply 
market of natural was only slight, and the price of natural 
remained below $.20. At the beginning of 1950, the price 
was stable at about $.19. However, despite the continued low 
price, the American Government failed to take advantage to 
bring the stockpile up to the desired level. Though the 
Executive was later to be criticized by Congress, there were 
at least two contributing causes: (1) the annual Congressional
appropriations for stockpiling operations had been lower than
to reduce trade barriers continued with the extension of the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements and the General Agreement On 
Tariffs And Trade. Though both had been viewed as interim 
measures pending the ITO, they remained usable tools and 
represented an improvement over, the prewar methods of trade 
negotiation.
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requested; and (2) the Government had an obligation to 
exercise caution when entering the market lest it raise the 
price. In addition to.the lower than desired stockpile, the 
voluntary use of synthetic above the required level had 
declined to its lowest post-war level in January 1950.^ In 
fact, the RFC had made plans to take a 30,000 ton-capacity 
plant out of service in June. At the same time, NATO was 
beginning to receive assistance for rearmament through the 
Mutual Defense Assistance Act passed in October 1949. As a 
result of NATO rearmament programs, the demand for natural 
began to increase in 1950 at an accelerating rate. The 
American industry, presumably looking for bargains, had begun 
to negotiate with producers in Indonesia, which had at last 
been set free by the Dutch in December 1949 as the United 
States of Indonesia. However, the new Government devalued 
its currency by fifty per cent and the Indonesian rubber pro­
ducers held their stocks off the market in the hopes of an 
upward stabilization. The Americans turned back to Malaya 
only to find themselves in competition with other nations, 
including Russia and China, for Malaya's rubber.^ When the
^Between 1947-1949, the demand for tires was insati­
able. Inventories caught up in 194 9 and the rubber supply 
went into surplus as the tire market fell off thirty per cent. 
See Paul W. Litchfield's explanation in "Rubber Needs For 
Peace and War," U.S. News And World Report, Vol. 28 (March 24, 
1950), pp. 32-35.
5"Rubber Demands Outstrip Supply," New York Times, 
June '4,-1950, p. 8.
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Korean War broke out in June, there was a general world rush 
to build up supplies. The result was a boom in Malayan rub­
ber which saw the producers using destructive strip-tapping 
methods in an effort to meet demands, and a price rise that 
carried rubber from $.19 in January 1950 to $.05 in March 
1951. Despite all its plans, America was caught short; the 
stockpile was low and synthetic production was down. It was 
in the presence of these conditions that the Rubber Act of 
1948 was extended. There was nothing to do but to purchase 
heavily in a demand market and pay the skyrocketing price.
It would be a year before the RFC's stand-by synthetic plants 
could be brought back into production.^
By the end of 1950, the shortages and high price of 
natural drove the United States Government to action that 
would have been unthinkable two years earlier and which had 
never been contemplated in the Rubber Act of 1948. Intent 
notwithstanding, the authority to control imports did exist 
in the authority delegated to the Executive; the authority 
really intended was the control of imports to prevent unfair
^For summary of rubber-related events and what the 
Government did and did not do, see U.S., Congress, Senate, 
"Synthetic Rubber Output Article by Charles Lucey," 82nd 
Cong., 1st. sess.,June 19, 1951, Congressional Record, Vol. 
97, pp. 2 792-2793; and Congress, House, "John L. Collyer - 
Letter to Eric Johnson, Administrator, Economic Stabiliza­
tion Agency dated March 3, 1951," Inflation and Government 
Policy, Extension of Remarks of Hon. William H. Ayres,
March 22, 1951, Congressional' Record, Vol. 97, pp. A1647- 
A1649.
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competition against the American manufacturer who was forced 
by law to use synthetic. In December 1950, importation of 
nautral rubber by private concerns was banned and the General 
Services Administration (GSA) became the sole authorized pur­
chaser for the United States. Further, the authority to 
bring the stand-by synthetic plants back into operation was 
granted and capacity began to expand toward a level that was 
to approach 950,000 tons before the crisis passed in 1952.
The effect of the reinitiation of Government purchase began 
to take effect in early 1951, following a brief American 
withdrawal from the market, and the price of natural started 
a gradual decline that was to take it back to near the 1949 
level by the end of 1952. The GSA remained the sole pur­
chaser until June 1952.7
7
'The demand market was extremely sensitive in 1950. 
Private purchase stopped in December 1950 and the price 
dropped to $.66 as the GSA sold out of the stockpile. As 
soon as GSA entered the market, the price jumped $.10. See 
"Government Price In Rubber Puzzle," New York Times, Decem­
ber 30, 1950, p. 3. The tactic evolved by the Government was 
to reduce natural purchase and increase synthetic production, 
in combination with strict controls on consumption. During 
1951, the United States took only twenty-four per cent of 
Malaya's output compared to the historical, above-fifty per 
cent. The price remained high but in slow decline during 
1951,,-a net effect of reduced American consumption offset to 
a degree by a rise in world consumption to nearly two million 
tons. In 1951, synthetic output was increased from 270,000 
tons to over 900,000 tons. By June 1952, the price of 
natural was down to $.28 and within $.02 of synthetic which 
had been raised to $.26 in 1951. Again, the natural supply, 
which had been expanded in the boom, was in surplus primarily 
as a result of Indonesian recovery (Indonesia was to surpass 
Malayan production in 1953). See Joseph Fromm, "Britain Has 
Her Korea Too," U.S. News: And World Report, March 2, 1951,
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The results of the rubber boom in Malaya proved to be 
far less beneficial to the Federation than the long-time Bri­
tish advocates of a "fair price" had assumed. Fortunes were 
made by speculators but the proceeds were invested overseas 
or sunk into land acquisition rather than in projects to 
expand the capital base. ^ Wages rose rapidly. There could 
be no argument against wage increases as rubber prices con­
tinued to climb. However, as wages rose, so did prices, and 
the rate of inflation, already spurred by world inflation, 
soared. As a result, the rise in export values were eaten 
away in higher-living costs and taxes. When the boom col­
lapsed in 1952, Malayan labor was unwilling to accept wage 
cuts, though they had agreed to a wage tied to the price of 
rubber at the beginning of the boom.^ A period of labor dis­
putes followed— and the inevitable pleas for America to pay 
more for rubber."^
pp. 18-19; U.S., Congress, 82nd Cong., 1st. sess., March 22, 
1951, Congressional Record, Vol. 97, pp. 2891-92; and "People 
Of The Week: Gen. Sir Gerald Templer," U.S. News And World
Report, January 25, 1952, p. 65.
8New York Times, December 30, 1950, p. 3; and "The 
Atlantic Report On The World Today: Malaya," Atlantic,
Vol. 187 (January 1951), p. 14.
9New York Times, July 1, 19 52, p. 8.
•*-°The High Commissioner to Malaya, General Sir Gerald 
Templer (successor to Sir Henry Gurney who was murdered by 
the MRLA in October 1951) criticized the United States' syn­
thetic production in an address given in May 1952. However, 
the strongest verbiage which linked the fight against
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The rubber boom had little tangible benefit in the 
short run and even less in the long term. Between 1945 and 
1950, Malaya had been unable to reverse its trade balance.
In 1949, as.a result of the disruptions and expenditures 
caused by the Emergency, the deficit was $53,246,721.11 In 
1950, the first year of the boom, the balance was reversed 
yielding a surplus of $348,553,680; in 1951, the figure rose 
further to $414,867,090. However, as export values rose, so 
did the value of imports: in 1950, that value increased to
157 per cent of the 1949 value; in 1951, the value was 256 
per cent of the 1949 level. When the rubber boom collapsed, 
the value of exports dropped by nearly half while the value 
of imports remained well above the 1949 level. Compared to 
the boom year of 1951, 1952 exports dropped thirty-seven per 
cent while imports fell only nineteen per cent; the figures 
for 1953 showed exports down by fifty per cent while imports 
were down by only thirty-two per cent. The trade deficit for 
1952 was $16,986,684; for 1953, it increased to $71,213,406. 
There can be no argument that the loss of the surplus balance
communism and economic problems to "protection by arbitrary 
government devices" was deleted from the draft by the Com­
missioner General. See New York Times, June 2, 1952, p. 4.
HThese and following trade figures are calculated 
from those in U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Foreign Commerce, Business Information Service: World Trade
Series, No. 597, Malaya - Summary of Basic Economic Informa­
tion, 1953, Tables 1 and 2, p. 13a.
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achieved in 1951-52 was a direct result of the United States 
Government's decision to use the nation's fifty per cent pur­
chase position and the RFC synthetic industry to effect that 
reversal, a most unmultilateralistic use of a national produc­
tion and buying cartel. However, in fairness, the pressures 
of war and domestic inflation mitigated the decision.
The rubber boom brought some American criticism of
Great Britain in the form of charges that the British were
12exploiting the situation for profit. However, such charges 
lacked conviction inasmuch as the price rise was a result of 
international competition in a demand market; i.e., true 
multilateralism. After all, the United States had been en­
couraged to raise the price in the supply market of 1948-49 
in the interest of aiding Malaya and Britain and had refused. 
There hardly seemed much justice in now asking Malaya to 
lower its price because it was costing the American industry
- ^ A n n o y a n c e  with rising prices was not limited to the 
critics of the Administration's foreign policy. Among them 
was Senator Paul H. Douglas, a usual supporter of foreign 
aid, who attacked the "British . . . monopolies in tin and
rubber." See New York Times, November 25, 1950, p. 22. More 
typical of the criticism was that of Senator Malone who 
charged that in Malaya, the British only "fight for profit." 
U.S., Congress, Senate, Debate On American Foreign Policy,
82nd Cong., 1st. sess., January 3, 1951, Congressional Record, 
Vol. 97, pp. 167-169. In 1950, Great Britain did improve her 
gold and dollar reserve position by $1.4 billion? the im­
provement was attributed to the 1949 devaluation and the 
increase in American stockpiling. The dollar gap was reduced 
from $3.3 billion to $1.1. See Stebbins, USWA: 1950,
pp. 299-300.
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13and consumer more. At any rate, the charge of exploitation 
was minimal in comparison to later charges that the British 
were increasing shipments to Russia and China and aiding both 
the instigators of the Emergency and the enemy in the field 
in Korea.
The charge of British aid to Russia and China actual­
ly originated in the British press in early 1952. The 
story noted with alarm that the tonnage of rubber shipped 
from the United Kingdom to Russia in June 1950 was eighteen 
tons while the figure for January 1952 was 12,260 tons; 
further, that rubber was still being shipped to China despite 
the United Nations' condemnation of China as an aggressor.
The British Board of Trade's response was plausible. ^  The
l^U.S., Congress, House, Extension of remarks of 
the Hon. Joseph R. Bryson, April 3, 1951, 82nd Cong., 1st. 
sess., Congressional Record, Vol. 97, p. A1740. There were 
consumer complaints regarding conservation measures such as 
reducing the number of tires sold with a new automobile from 
five to four— a hardly compelling argument for Malaya to 
lower the price of rubber. There were also complaints about 
the restriction on the manufacture of white side-wall tires.
I4"Sensational Rise '.In Vital War Export To Soviet - 
Stop This Rubber For Russia - June 1950, 18 Tons; January 
1952, 12,2.60," Sunday Dispatch (London) , March 16, 1952 in 
U.S., Congress, Senate, 82nd Cong., 2nd. sess., March 1952, 
Congressional Record, Vol. 9 8, p. 279 5. That the article 
was seized upon in March 195 2 as a vehicle for baiting the 
administration seems clear' since Malone had raised the issue 
as early as January 1951. See Senate, Debate on American 
Foreign Policy, 82nd Cong., 1st. sess., January 11, 1951, 
Congressional Record, Vol. 97., pp. 167-169 .
15See Reuter's news release containing comments of 
Peter Thorneycraft, President of The British Board of Trade, 
in U.S., Congress, Senate, May 2, 1952, 82nd Cong., 2nd. 
sess., Congress iona1 Re cord, Vol.' 97, pp. 9595-96.
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explanation regarding shipments to Russia noted that the 
amounts of rubber had not increased; rather, the amounts 
shipped from the United Kingdom had increased by an almost 
equal amount. The rubber was exchanged for needed Russian 
timber and feed grains. With respect to the shipment of rub­
ber to China, the Board of Trade had noted China's entry into 
the Malayan market in 1950. By 1951, it was clear that China 
was purchasing for military stockpiling purposes. Admittedly 
at the urging of the United States, Britain had ordered a 
halt to all Malayan shipments of rubber to China in April
1951. The device used was destination controls on shipping 
licenses. The embargo was imposed only for the remaining 
eight months of 1951; shipments were to be resumed in 1952 but 
only at that level determined necessary for nonmilitary pur­
poses. Ceylon was requested to do the same. Beyond 1951, 
it would have been extremely difficult for Britain to have 
continued a complete embargo of rubber to China. In addition 
to the British interests in South and Southeast Asia, China 
posed a potential threat to the continued existence of Hong 
Kong as a Crown Colony. The Board of Trade's explanation for 
the shipments to China and Russia would suggest only that 
Britain was attempting to live in an imperfect and dangerous 
world.^
l^While Britain could halt exports from Malaya to 
China by revoking general export licenses, it could only 
request that Ceylon do the same. Britain was obligated to
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The charge of British perfidy received far more atten­
tion than did the explanation. In June 1952, the example of 
British shipments of rubber was cited as the prime example 
in support of a move in Congress, led by Senator James C. Kern, 
to amend the pending Mutual Security Act (MSA) of 1952.^7 
In effect, the Kern Amendment required that any country who 
traded with either Russia or China in strategic or strategic- 
related goods would be ineligible for aid under the Mutual 
Defense Assistance (MDA) Program. The Amendment allowed 
little room for interpretation to accommodate the realities 
of the trade requirements of the MDA recipients; e.g., it 
required cessation of trade and certification of cessation 
by the MDA recipient. Because of its specificity, the Kern 
Amendment could have threatened passage of the MSA and tied 
the hands of the Executive in its administration of the MDA 
program. Despite a reasoned attempt by Senator H. Alexander 
Smith to strike the Amendment following its approval by the
halt shipments for military purposes as a member of the 
United Nations (U.N.). Ceylon, an independent country with­
in the Commonwealth, was not a member of the U.N. by 
Russian veto. See New York Times, August 15, 1952, p. 23ff. 
Ceylon continued to ship to China, and America stopped 
buying rubber in Ceylon until after the Korean settlement.
See ibid., June 2, 19 52, p. 32.
17Senator Herbert R. O'Connor speaking for the Kern 
Amendment, Congressional Record., Vol. 98, p. 2795.
l^U.s., Congress, Senate, Debate On The Mutual Secu­
rity Act Conference Report, June 9, 1952, 82nd Cong., 2nd. 
sess., Congressional Record, Vol. 98, pp. 6838-6849.
Senate and House Conference Committee, the Kern Amendment was 
19retained. However, the Congressional commitment to it 
appears to have been more to passage of the MSA and a desire 
to avoid being on the wrong side of an emotional issue, than 
to Kem's demand that the British and all others cease trade 
with all communist countries. Implementation was simply 
ignored? on advice of the National Security Council, it was 
suspended pending clarification. Implementation was a prac­
tical impossibility; e.g., oil exploration equipment sold to 
the Netherlands was traded to Poland with State Department 
approval. In short, there were valid reasons for discretion­
ary interpretation of trade with communist nations as in the 
example of Malayan rubber for Russian timber and grain.^
In June 1952, the Rubber Act of 1948 came up for 
final renewal. In January 1952, the Administration had recom 
mended an end to allocation and specification controls in
l^Smith attempted to get Kern to withdraw the amend­
ment; i.e., to withdraw that portion of the Conference*Report 
He proposed, instead, amendment of the Mutual Defense^Assist­
ance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act). The point was 
that.the provisions of Title III of the Battle Act which 
provided for a cutoff of MDA when a recipient shipped " . . . 
to any nation . . . threatening . . . the United States in­
cluding [USSR] and all . . . under its domination," was suf­
ficient to Kem's purpose. See ibid., p. 6844. At any rate, 
having failed to dissuade Kem, Smith voted for adoption of 
the Conference Report.
20’ipresidential Letter to The Chairman, Senate Commit 
tee On Foreign Affairs, April 22, 1952" in ibid., p. 6844.
view of the world supply situation. However, extension of 
the Act, until 1954, was recommended to allow time for the 
formulation of plans to sell the RFC's synthetic capacity to 
private industry. The biggest change in the American situa- 
tion was that the Nation was now independent of foreign sup­
ply, capacity having now approached a million tons? and, at
21long last, synthetic was a quality competitor to natural.
The House passed a Bill in substantial compliance with the 
Administration's suggestion; however, the Senate disagreed 
and passed a Bill that limited extension to one year, and
22allowed sale and lease of some plants to private industry.
Senator Lyndon Johnson, who was still suspicious of the threat
of a synthetic monopoly, favored the two year extension and
led the Senate conferees. A compromise was worked out wherein
the Act was extended until March (rather than June) 1954, and
required submission of an administration plan for disposal of
23the plants by March 1953. The issue was no longer the 
21U.S., Congress, House, Presidential Message; Re­
commendations Concerning The Synthetic Rubber Industry In 
The U.S., January 14, 1952, H. Doc. 326, 82nd Cong., 2nd. 
sess., House Miscellaneous Documents, Vol. 118.
22See U.S., Congress, House, Extension of The Rubber 
Act of 1948, report to accompany H.R. 6787, H. Rept. 1513, 
March 13, 1952, 82nd Cong., 1st. sess., 1952, House Miscel­
laneous Documents, Vol. I; and Senate, Extension Of The 
Rubber Act of 1948, S. Rept. 1581, May 15, 1952, Senate Mis­
cellaneous Reports, Vol. 2.
23Johnson, who had spiked Big Rubber's attempt to get 
the plants in 1948, was now a member of the Senate Committee 
On Armed Services. As a member of the Conference Committee
survival of a private synthetic industry; all that remained 
was to insure that American Big Rubber was not permitted to 
monopolize the industry to the disadvantage of the rest of 
the industry. The question of natural rubber supply and 
demand was hardly mentioned as the prediction was that the 
natural demand would remain at a level sufficient to absorb 
the capacity of the Far East.
Though the problem of the inelastic production capa­
city of natural rubber and the accompanying price fluctuations 
were to remain after 1953, the impacts were dampened by a 
generally increasing world demand and advances in the effi­
ciency of natural rubber production through restrictions on 
new plantings and the substitution of high-yield trees for 
older hevea.^ In short, the price of Malayan rubber after
for resolution of the differences between the Senate and 
House versions of the extension act, he was apparently able 
to again delay sale of the plants. One can but wonder if the 
reason was in any way connected to the stability of RFC owner­
ship, and the fact that a large portion of the RFC capacity 
was located in Texas. See U.S., Congress, House, Extension 
Of The Rubber Act: Conference Report, H. Rept. 2168, 82nd
Cong., 2nd. sess., House Miscellaneous Reports, Vol. 3.
2^As a resuit of the destruction of hevea during the 
strip-tapping period of 1950-1952, and Federation programs 
for high-yield replanting of existing trees, production de­
clined and supply went into a shortage in 1954 followed by a 
short-lived rubber boom in 19 55-1958. Prices rose to about 
$.40. See Willard A. Hanna, Sequel To Colonialism; The 
1957-1960 Foundations For Malaysia (New York: American Uni­
versities Field Staff, Inc., 1965), p. 127. The trade surplus, 
lost in 1952, was regained in 1955-1956. See United Nations, 
Statistical Office, Yearbook Of International Trade: 1958
(New York: Office of Social and Economic Development, 1959),
pp. 364-65.
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1953 was no longer immutably and exclusively a function of 
the American bid or the competition of a United States', 
government-owned synthetic industry.
The actions of the United States to control the world 
price of rubber, though explainable in part as a result of 
the Korean War mobilization, was nonetheless a departure in 
principle from the earlier rubber policy. During the period 
March 1947 - December 1950, the Government had refrained from 
direct interference in the world's natural market; admittedly, 
that this was true was in part a result of the bureaucratic 
and Congressional neglect of the stockpile program. In addi­
tion, policy declared that the mandatory consumption of syn­
thetic rubber should be kept at the minimum level for the 
specific purposes of avoiding interference in the free opera­
tion of the natural rubber market. The minor lag in the 
reduction of the mandatory level of synthetic consumption 
noted in 19 4 8 notwithstanding the effect of synthetic was 
minimized; like the lag in stockpile building, the lag in 
synthetic reduction was inadvertent. The policy then, was 
in keeping with the principles of multilateralism— however, 
it was adherence to the best facet of multilateralism. It is 
painless to allow free market operation when one is the pur­
chaser and the price is both low and relatively stable. It 
is quite a different story when the free market is in a 
demand condition and the price rises 400 per cent as did the
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price of rubber between June and December 1950, It took 
little rationalization to view Malayan rubber as "British" 
rubber and to bring the full weight of the GSA's purchase 
monopoly and the RFC's production monopoly to bear. To 
protect the American consumer and taxpayer from exploitation 
by the British was one thing; to reject multilateralism in 
the rubber trade and to break the Malayan rubber boom was 
another. The United States chose the former and ignored the 
latter.
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CHAPTER VIII
ANTICOLONIALISM, ANTICOMMUNISM AND 
THE PRICE OF RUBBER
The relationship of the United States to Malaya dur­
ing the early post-war period is best characterized by its 
indirectness and a sense of detachment. It was indirect in­
asmuch as the decisions of the United States, which had 
affect in Malaya, were not prompted by an American interest 
in, or specific concern for Malaya per se. For example, the 
rubber policy of 194 7 was influenced primarily by the concern 
for a National defense capability independent of foreign sup­
pliers, and the principles of the ITO Proposals. An even 
more indirect relationship is suggested in the British han­
dling of the resistance to the Malayan Union proposal; i.e., 
the degree of accommodation demonstrated by the British may 
have been influenced by a desire to avoid a "bad press" while 
the British Loan was before the American Congress. Later, 
during the American Government purchase monopoly of 1951 - 
1952, the American decision was driven by the requirements 
of the Korean War, and a retreat from the principles of multi­
lateralism to the extent envisioned in the ITO Charter. To 
some degree, the decision was also influenced by American 
annoyance at British recognition of Red China. . The American
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relationship to Malaya was detached in the sense that events 
in Malaya did not call forth specific American decisions or 
actions in the context of the more visible foreign policy 
concerns such as colonialism, communism or economic assist­
ance .
Malaya did fall within the scope of America's view 
of colonialism; however, as the events related in Chapter I 
indicate, Roosevelt's anticolonial sentiment was modified to 
a policy best described as a gradualist approach to the end 
of traditional colonialism. Once the return of the British, 
Dutch, and French to Southeast Asia was accepted, consonance 
with American policy required only that the colonialists 
recognize the justice of self-determination, and demonstrate 
a sincere effort to move their charges toward self-government. 
This is not to suggest that the policy was without commitment; 
the second Dutch police action against the supporters of an 
Indonesian Republic raised serious doubts about Dutch sin­
cerity. The United States demonstrated its commitment to 
policy by joining in condemnation of the Dutch action before 
the United Nations' Security Council, and in the suspension 
of ECA aid to Indonesia. However, in Malaya, the British 
avoided any such action that would run counter to American 
policy. The Union proposal, though a false step, was a step 
in the proper direction. More importantly, the developing 
Malayan nationalist and politico was content with both the 
pace and direction of the British plan for the future. There
Ib9
was no creditable charge of British repression. The progress 
and manner of British rule was acceptable to the majority of 
parties.
The communist uprising of 194 8 in Malaya might have 
been the circumstance which could have served to bring the 
United States into closer contact with Malaya, if not direct­
ly, as a supplier of aid. However, the 1949 request for aid 
in the form of capital investment was discouraged. The 
British argument concerning the connection between the fight 
against communism, progress toward Malayan self-government, 
and American investment in British colonial business inter­
ests was specious at best. In 1950, the British request for 
military assistance to be used in Malaya was also discouraged; 
however, American unwillingness was primarily a result of 
Anglo-American relations, rather than an evaluation of the 
Malayan situation. The granting of aid in the face of the 
British recognition of Red China could have presented a 
potentially troublesome political issue to the Truman Admini­
stration. On the other hand, the refusal of aid did not 
present an immediate threat to Great Britain or Malaya; 
while the rebellion was costly, the British economy was im­
proving, and the British showed no signs of losing control 
of the situation. Military assistance was not, as Acheson 
had earlier described the conditions for American aid, "the 
missing component in a situation which would otherwise be 
solved."
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The American-Malayan contact remained, then, one of 
commerce and trade. The issues were those common to the 
buyer-seller relationship, which paid little attention to the 
issues of politics and ideology. Between 1947 and 1950, the 
trade relationship was primarily influenced by an American 
commitment to multilateralism. However, that commitment 
worked more to the advantage of America in the rubber trade 
as a result of the American domination of a buyer's market. 
After 194 9, the commitment to free trade was modified. The 
pragmatism of America drew the line on multilateralism at 
that point where the market advantage went to the other 
fellow; i.e., the point at which the free market price was 
to the decided disadvantage of the United States.
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